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Right Frame, Right Time: A Study of Anti-American Military Base Protests in East Asia

by

Charmaine N. Willis

A Dissertation

Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York

In Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Nelson A. Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy

Department of Political Science

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Abstract

Why do anti-US-military protests occur in some host communities but not others? Using six cases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, this project argues that a key explanatory factor in anti-US-military movement variability is the extent to which activists' frames, or interpretations of an issue, resonate with the host community or nation. The concept of frame resonance reflects the interplay between framing by social movement leaders and the political opportunity structure (including framing by the US and host nation governments), which influences frames' effectiveness at mobilizing potential protesters. Drawing on interviews, participant observation, protest data and data, and various primary and secondary sources, I explore variations in anti-US-military protests across the host communities of Yokosuka and Okinawa, Japan; Daegu and Jeju, South Korea; and national level movements in the Philippines before and after the signing of the VFA agreement.

I find that three key factors influence frame resonance in anti-US-military protests and contribute to protest variation across host communities and across time. First, I conceptualize base politics as a framing contest among a variety of different actors but most crucially anti-US-military activists, the host community government, the host nation government, and the US military. While anti-US-military activists always frame the US presence as a problem to be solved and the US military highlights the ways in which its presence is important to host nation security, host nation and host community governments vary in their positions about the US military presence. I find that when either government adopts a position aligned with activists' positions, it lends credibility to activists' frames and increases the chances that they can mobilize people *en masse* against the US military. Second, host communities that have a history of marginalization at the hands of the US and/or their host nation government have a greater chance

of witnessing mass anti-US-military mobilization. However, it is not the mere occurrence of these past events that mobilize people; it is the way that activists and their allies link the US military presence to the past and remind people of past grievances. Finally, high levels of anti-US-military protests are more likely in communities where the visibility of US troops is high and negative. When troop visibility is low, people may have difficulty believing that the US military is in their community, and when troop visibility is high and positive, they will have a hard time believing that the troop presence is problematic, undermining activists' claims.

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my mom, E.J., who left this world before my doctoral journey started. She taught me the importance of getting a good education, especially for women.

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List of Abbreviations

AFB Air Force Base
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
Bayan Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
CFA Command Fleet Activities (usually denotes a US naval base)
CNFJ Commander, Naval Forces, Japan
CPP Communist Party of the Philippines
CSL Cooperative Security Location
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
EDCA Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
FOL Forward Operation Location
GKU Green Korea United
J-Peace Japanese Peace Committee
KMU Kilusang Mayo Uno
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
MCAS Marine Corps Air Station
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPA New People's Army
NIMBY Not-In-My-Backyard
OWAAMV Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence
PFAS Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances
PSPD People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
ROK Republic of Korea
SDF Self-Defense Forces (of Japan)
SMO Social Movement Organizations
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TRCK Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Korea
USAG US Army Garrison
USCAR US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands
USFK U.S Forces Korea
USAMGIK United States Army Military Government in Korea
VFA Visiting Forces Agreement

Chapter 1: The US Military Abroad and Anti-US-Military Protests

On September 4, 1995, three US Marines kidnapped and raped a 12-year-old girl on the Japanese island of Okinawa¹, which hosts approximately 31 US military bases² (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2018). In some sense, this crime was not unusual in that US servicemen were implicated in 4,716 crimes in Japan from 1972 to 1995, most of them in Okinawa. Additionally, the US Navy and Marine Corps bases in Japan have the dubious distinction of having the highest number of courts-martial for sexual crimes for all US military bases since 1988 (C. Johnson 1999, 114). What is distinctive about this incident is Okinawans' reaction to it: this incident is often cited as the harbinger of the modern Okinawan protest³ movement against the US bases (C. Johnson 1999; Baker 2004; Inoue 2007; McCormack and Norimatsu 2018). This incident not only sparked the emergence of several civil society groups focused on issues related to the US military but also one of the largest protests ever on the island: on October 21, 1995, 85,000 people demonstrated against the US military in Okinawa (Baker 2004, 137). Since 1995, social movements⁴ against the US military presence in Okinawa have proliferated, encompassing both large-scale demonstrations of thousands of people and decade-long sit-ins in response to base-related concerns (Kawato 2015; McCormack and Norimatsu 2018).

However, studies and media coverage of the Okinawan anti-US-military movements obscure the fact that there are several US military installations on the Japanese mainland that do

¹ "Okinawa" here refers to the island of Okinawa, the largest island in Okinawa Prefecture. The majority of the US bases in the prefecture are on Okinawa Island, but there are some installations in other islands within the prefecture (Ie, Tori, Kume, Idesuna, Oki Daito, Kobi Sho) (Global Resource Center).

² I adopt Vine's (Vine 2015) definition of a base as "a place, facility, or installation used regularly for military purposes of any kind" (4).

³ For the purposes of this project, the term "protest" includes collective public expressions of opinion about a certain topic such as demonstrations, rallies, marches, vigils, sit-ins, and occupying spaces.

⁴ I adopt Tilly and Tarrow's (2007) definition of a social movement: "a sustained campaign of claim making using repeated performances that advertise the claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities" (8).

not elicit the level of opposition found in Okinawa and that protests do not accompany every US-related crime, even in Okinawa. While the US bases occupy a large amount of Okinawan land relative to the island's size⁵, many of the bases on the Japanese mainland⁶ are large and strategically significant.⁷ For example, Yokota Air Force Base (AFB) and Command Fleet Activities (CFA) Yokosuka outside of Tokyo host the US Forces Japan (USFJ) and Commander, Naval Forces, Japan (CNFJ) headquarters, respectively, while CFA Sasebo in Nagasaki Prefecture has played a key role as a supply station for the US military in past conflicts such as the Korean War and Gulf War ("U.S. Forces Japan" n.d.; "History: CFA Sasebo" n.d.). Furthermore, base-related incidents similar to those in Okinawa occur in the Japanese mainland communities that host the US bases as well.⁸ For example, following the 2006 murder of Yoshie Sato by a US servicemember in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, there were few protests—a stark contrast to the 85,000-person protest in Okinawa referenced previously (Otake 2016).

Why, then, do anti-US-military movements⁹ emerge in some contexts but not others? This project explores variations in social movement mobilization through case studies of the US military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. These three countries in eastern Asia share many similarities their long histories with the US military, acute external security threats, and their strategic importance as "links" in the US' regional hub-and-spokes security architecture (Cruz De Castro 2014, 145). Unlike European counterparts such as Germany and

⁵ Seventy-five percent of Japanese land used by the US military is in Okinawa, despite the fact that Okinawa consists of 0.6% of Japan's total landmass (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2018, 2).

⁶ I use the term "Japanese mainland" to denote the islands of Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu.

⁷ These include Misawa Air Base, Yokota Air Base, Sasebo Naval Base, Atsugi Naval Base, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Iwakuni Marine Base (Global Research Center, George Washington University n.d.).

⁸ Also known as host communities.

⁹ I use "anti-US-military movements" to apply to both protests against US bases and protests against the US military presence (which may not entail a US "base"). However, "anti-US-base movements" refers specifically to social movements against US bases.

Italy, the three are not part of a multilateral security institution (i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), and largely depend on the US for their defense. At the same time, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines differ regarding the nature of the US military presence and their patterns of anti-US-military opposition. Today, unlike Japan and South Korea, the Philippines no longer hosts any US-owned bases. However, it has agreed, with sporadic public opposition, to station US troops at various Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) military installations around the country. Finally, anti-US-military protest has occurred much more often in Okinawa than elsewhere in Japan, while anti-US-military protests have taken place in a variety of South Korean host communities, though not all.

I argue that a key explanatory factor in anti-US-military movement variability is the extent to which activists' frames, or interpretations of an issue, resonate with the host community or nation. The concept of frame resonance reflects the interplay between framing by social movement leaders and the political opportunity structure or context, which influences frames' effectiveness at mobilizing potential protesters. Through an examination of six cases across the host nations of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, I find three important factors that impact activists' ability to mobilize the public against the US military. First, when activists and their political allies act upon opportunities to draw negative public attention to the US military presence, such as base-related crimes or base-related construction, they are more likely to be successful in mobilizing the public against the US military. The visibility of the US military presence, what I term "troop visibility," suggests that there are elements of the political opportunity structure that are themselves subject to framing. Second, a place's identity is an important factor in anti-US-military protest mobilization, as it can limit or expand activists' framing choices. Social movement scholars generally understand that activists must identify

opportune times to try to mobilize would-be protesters (in the case of anti-US-military protests, for example, following a crime or accident attributed to the US military presence). In this sense, timing is important. However, some frames are more likely to resonate or mobilize people than others. I argue that in addition to considering the timing of activists' mobilization efforts (a window of opportunity within the political opportunity structure), we also need to consider the role of cultural structures and narratives in crafting resonant frames. Frames that account for cultural identity are more likely to resonate and mobilize the target audience.

Finally, anti-US-military movements tend to be more successful at mobilizing the public when activists' frames synch with host nation political elites' frames (either local or national politicians), both problematizing the US presence. I term the alignment of two or more actors' frames a "framing coalition," which often but not always involves coordinated framing efforts between the actors to persuade or mobilize the public.¹⁰ This contrasts with a framing contest, in which two or more actors with opposition position attempt to counter each other's frames. While social movement scholars have used the term "frame alignment" at times to mean that different actors proffer similar frames, this usage is inconsistent. For example, Snow et al. (1986), one of the foundational work in the framing literature, define frame alignment as "the linkage of individual and SMO [social movement organizations] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary" (464). Similarly in a more recent study, Ketelaars (2016) states that there is "little difference" between frame resonance and alignment, meaning that social movement organizations' frames that align with individuals' frames (and thus, persuade them to mobilize) also resonate (344). Thus, the term framing coalition specifically means the alignment

¹⁰ I thank Dr. Meredith Weiss for this suggestion.

of different actors' frames, not the alignment of collective and individual frames. I will describe these arguments in greater detail in the next chapter.

For the remainder of this chapter, I provide an overview of the US military abroad and base politics, discussing both the positive and negative aspects of hosting a US military presence. I also describe host nation public opinion about the US military and anti-US-military protests from a global perspective. I then discuss the case selection as well as methodology and data collection. Finally, I will give an overview of the chapters to come.

Situating the US Military Abroad

It is unclear how many US bases there are in foreign countries, mostly because these numbers are not fully disclosed by the US government for security reasons (Vine 2015). However, Lutz (2009) estimates as of 2007, there were 909 US military facilities in foreign countries while Vine (2015) estimates 800 bases. The establishment of US military bases within a host nation is but one type of military agreement the US might conclude with another country; not all agreements entail the establishment of US bases. For example, the Philippines, a country that once hosted several strategically important US bases, signed a series of agreements with the US to “temporarily” host US military personnel within its own military bases (Simbulan 2009; Yeo 2012). Furthermore, the nature of the US overseas military agreements vary widely in terms of their scope (for example, who has jurisdiction over US military personnel and/or contractors when they commit crimes), institutionalization, and duration (International Security Advisory Board 2015, 1–3). Table 1.1 provides examples of some types of US military agreements, demonstrating the variation between them. The implication for this variation is that the global reach of the US military goes beyond the number of countries in which there are US bases.

Type of Agreement	Key Feature	Example
Multilateral SOFA	US has right to jurisdiction over military personnel for “offenses arising out of ... performance of official duty”; host nation has right to jurisdiction in cases of incidents not related to official duty (27)	NATO
Bilateral SOFA	Jurisdiction varies by agreement	Australia, Israel, Japan, Philippines, South Korea
Visiting Forces Agreements ¹¹	Covers temporary stationing of US troops	Philippines
Visiting Forces Acts with other Host Country Domestic Legislation	Includes “domestic legislation that confers certain immunities in connection with the presence of U.S. (or, other foreign) military personnel” (31)	UK, Jamaica, Belize
No Protections	Conduct relies on “the host country interest in good relations with the United States and on informal “understandings” and established patterns of cooperative interaction with host nation military and law enforcement authorities.” (32)	Thailand ¹²

Table 1.1: Examples of US-Host Nation Military Agreements (Source: International Security Advisory Board 2015)

¹¹ A report by the International Security Advisory Board (part of the US Department of State), notes that: “normally, the United States is unwilling to rely on Visiting Forces Acts, seeking a bilateral agreement, because such Acts are fundamentally different from SOFAs in that they are *domestic* host country legislation waiving sovereign rights – not international agreements, and *therefore presumptively subject to host country amendment and interpretation*. [emphasis mine] (It is also not uncommon for host governments to insist on legislative approval of SOFA agreements and/or passage of domestic legislation permitting their implementation.)” (2015, 31).

¹² A report by the International Security Advisory Board states that: “despite the lack of an explicit status agreement, there have, according to the command, been no significant status-related problems” (2015, 32).

45 bases to which Russia, France, or the UK have access. What is evident from a comparison of Figures 1.1-1.4 is that the US network of bases is much larger than its counterparts; it is truly global, with host nations on each continent. Even when we only focus on the US's medium and large deployments, the US has about as many host nation partners as Russia, France, and the UK combined. From an analytical perspective, this implies that if a country hosts a foreign base, it is more likely to be an American one. Thus, anti-US-military protests in a host nation may be a typical case of opposition to a foreign military.




Figure 1.2: Countries that host Russian military installations (Adapted from Batashvili 2018)




Figure 1.3: Countries that host French military installations¹⁵ (Adapted from Rogers and Simon 2009, 11–13)




Figure 1.4: Countries that host British military installations¹⁶ (Adapted from Rogers and Simon 2009, 13–14)

¹⁵ Map does not include the French territories of Martinique, Mayotte, and Reunion Island on which there are French bases.

¹⁶ Map does not include the Falkland Islands, on which there are British bases.

The Benefits of Hosting a US Military Presence and Public Opinion

There are several reasons why countries opt to host the US military, the two most commonly-cited being security and economic benefits (Cooley 2008; Holmes 2014; Fitz-Henry 2015; Vine 2015). The US military presence plays both a deterrent and defensive function, preventing other countries from attacking the host nation and coming to the host nation's defense in case of attack (Martinez Machain and Morgan 2012, 103). Many host nation political elites, particularly at the national level, believe that a US military presence protects the host nation from external threats (Smith 2006, 4). Additionally, many members of the public believe that the US presence is essential to host nation security. There has been little comprehensive research that examines host nation public perception of the US military presence's function in host nation security. However, country-level poll data suggest that substantial portions of many host nation populations believe that presence is important for security. For example, a 2019 survey found that 87% of South Koreans believed that the US troop presence in the country contributed to Korean national security (Friedhoff 2019). Similarly, a recent survey indicated that 52% of Germans believe that the US military bases there are important for German national security (Gramlich 2020).

Supporters of hosting a US military presence argue that it can offer a bevy of economic benefits to both the host nation and the host communities. For example, at an aggregate level hosting a US presence is likely to be associated with higher levels of foreign trade and investment (FDI) in the host nation in general because of the stabilizing function of the US presence (U. Heo and Ye 2019, 240–41). Additionally, communities hosting a US military presence may realize more economic benefits than other communities. Economic benefits come through direct contact with US military personnel (through jobs on-base or through US military

personnel patronizing local businesses), construction projects, and development aid (Flynn et al. 2019a; Flynn et al. 2019b). Most studies to date demonstrate that economic benefits positively impact communal and individual perceptions of the US military presence because recipients can easily identify the benefactor: the US military (Allen et al. 2020, 328). Additionally, some host nation governments compensate host communities in exchange for hosting the US military; such is the case between the Japanese national government and many Okinawan communities (Hikotani et al. 2022, 332).

Thus, in numerous host nations, the public supports the US military presence and there is relative harmony in the relationship between the communities which host the bases and US military personnel. Figure 1.5 below presents public opinion survey results from Allen et al.'s (2020; 2022) 14-country survey of US host nations. The authors asked for respondents' opinions of the US military in their country. Public opinion was overwhelmingly positive towards the US military in Kuwait, the Philippines (one of the countries in the current study), and Poland. On the other end of the spectrum, only Turkey had an overwhelming negative opinion of the US military. These responses show that in many countries, the public tends to have positive or neutral opinions of the US military.




Figure 1.5 Public Opinion Towards US Troop Presence in Country (Source: Allen et al. 2020)¹⁷

The Costs of Hosting a US Military Presence and Anti-US-Military Protests

However, as Figure 1.5 also shows, some host nation citizens also have negative opinions of the US military in their country. There are a multitude of reasons why people oppose a US military presence, whether there is an actual base or merely US troops using a host nation base. Some opponents highlight more pragmatic, tangible potential problems related to the US presence while others have more abstract ideological concerns, at times turning the US military's

¹⁷This figure uses responses to the question "In general, what is your opinion of the presence of American military forces in [respondent's country]?" in Allen et al.'s (2020; 2022) survey. Respondents answered using a Likert scale of favorability with 1 being "Don't know/decline to answer," 2 being "very favorable," 3 being "somewhat favorable," 4 being "neutral," 5 being "somewhat unfavorable," and 6 being "very unfavorable." To create Figure 1.5, I omitted the "Don't know/decline to answer" (of which there were only a small amount for each country) and aggregated the favorable and unfavorable responses to create a category of general favorable or unfavorable opinion.

supporters' arguments on their head. Pragmatic concerns include potential environmental problems related to the US military presence, including noise pollution, pollutants like PFAs (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances) leaking into the ground or drinking water from the base, or, in the case of base construction, the destruction of wildlife habitats (Kajihiro 2009, 302; Kirk 2013, 14; C. J. Kim 2018, 341–47). Other opponents argue that a host community's economic dependence on the US military is unsustainable and stifles economic growth; the host community would be better off using returned US base land for development projects (Yoshida 2014; Hikotani, Horiuchi, and Tago 2022, 331). Additionally, opponents may cite base related-crimes or accidents, such as the 1995 Okinawan rape referenced previously, as a reason to not host a US military presence. Some opponents contend that a US military presence may *negatively* impact a host nation's security by serving as a proverbial lightning rod for attack by third parties (Atkins 2004, 45; Kirk 2013, 14; Immerwahr 2019, 354). Others argue that the US military presence is an infringement on national sovereignty, at times citing an “unequal” SOFA agreement that allows the US military to have jurisdictional rights over US servicemembers who commit crimes in the host nation (Yeo 2014, 45).

Thus, unsurprisingly, anti-US-military movements and protests have emerged in some host communities, often over one or more of the aforementioned grievances. Figure 1.6 below provides an overview of anti-US-military protests across a variety of US host nations from 1990 to 2016. Out of the host nations in Figure 1.6, two stand out: Japan and South Korea, with the two highest numbers of anti-US-military protests during this period. Both host nations, perhaps not coincidentally, host the most and third-most US troops and base abroad, respectively (Allen et al. 2021). Additionally, the Philippines has the third-highest number of anti-US-military

protests (slightly more than Italy), despite hosting no US bases past 1990 and, as Figure 1.5 showed, a high level of public support for the US military in the country.




Figure 1.6: Anti-US-Military Protests, 1990-2016¹⁸

Nevertheless, They Persisted: Anti-US-Military Movements in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines

Anti-US-military movements occupy an interesting place in the “universe” of social movements; they are their own distinctive form of movement but with parallels to other types of

¹⁸ This figure uses Willis (2019) protest data. Note that this data is derived from major domestic English-language newspapers and is inclusive of protest events about a host nation’s current or proposed US military presence. The data does not include protests specifically against US wars or offensives, including the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or US intervention in the Syrian Civil War.

movements. On one hand, “anti-base opposition should be understood as a distinct form of contentious politics” (Holmes 2014, 193). Anti-US-military activism has its own master frame and tactical repertoire, largely due to the connectivity between activists and civil society organizations (Yeo 2009, 575). It is no surprise, for example, that activists have engaged in sit-ins to block base construction across several host communities in Japan and South Korea. Nor is it surprising to see similar anti-US-military frames across host nations and communities, such as problematizing the US bases as “instruments of war and imperialism” (Yeo 2009, 575). What is perhaps most striking about anti-US-military movements is that they are rarely successful in meeting their movement goals, which range from denying the US basing access in an entire country to stopping the US military from conducting helicopter flights at night. Movement success usually requires activists to convince *both* host nation and US political elites to change the status of the US forces in the host nation (to some degree), which is difficult to achieve (Yeo 2011a; Kawato 2015). The likelihood that anti-US-military movements will fail to meet their goals suggests that many participants may not believe that the movement will be successful in pressuring political elites to create policy changes, yet they protest anyway. This is, in a sense, puzzling from a social movement perspective in that often a movement needs to at least appear that it may be successful in order to mobilize people to join (Chong 1991, 94–95). Indeed, only in Ecuador and the Philippines have activists been successful in their goals for total base closure (Yeo 2011a; Fitz-Henry 2015; Kawato 2015). Yet, in the Philippines, as I discuss in Chapter 6, the US and Philippines governments signed an agreement to grant the US the ability to deploy its troops to the Philippines, less than 10 years after the US bases closed. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 7, even when the president or the prime minister agrees that some sort of change to the status of US troops in the host nation is necessary, change rarely happens. And yet, anti-US-

military activists persist in their efforts to mobilize the public against the US military and make some kind of difference to the US military presence in their country or community, at times for decades at a time as in the case of Okinawa.

At the same time, anti-US-military movements are like other social movements. As Kim (2021) notes, localized anti-US-military movements are similar to anti-siting or not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) movements in that they are geographically-bound to a particular community (109-110). Additionally, local movements may adopt a NIMBY approach, focused, for example, not on ridding the host nation of the US military entirely, but rather just their community. This is the case across many anti-US-military movements, including two in this study, the All-Okinawa Movement in Japan and the movement against the Jeju Naval Base in South Korea. Additionally, anti-US-military movements are akin to movements against foreign policies, especially policies that involve agreements between countries, such as anti-free-trade agreement (FTAs) movements. While policymakers, especially in a democracy, may take public opinion into consideration when formulating domestic policy, it is unclear to what extent they consider public opinion on foreign policy issues (Holsti 1992, 442). In this sense, anti-FTA movements may be like anti-US-military movements in that it may be more difficult for them to meet their goals than other movements because host nation politicians may be less receptive to their demands.

The host nations of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines and their relationships with the US military yield important puzzles and findings for both comparative politics and international relations, for scholars and policy makers alike. First, a comparison of Figures 1.5 and 1.6 reveals an interesting contrast; while there are high levels of support for the US military in South Korea and the Philippines, there are also high levels of anti-US-military protests. This suggests that while there are many who support the US presence, there are also some who are

willing to take to the streets and protest against it. Furthermore, it also suggests that there may be subnational variation within host nations; although national opinion is high, protests may emerge in some communities. Indeed, as I show in Chapters 3-5, there is often protest variation across host communities, with high levels of protest in some communities and low levels in others. Second, unlike many of their European counterparts (at least until the Russian invasion of Ukraine), all three countries face high external security threats either from competing maritime claims with a rising China or North Korea's weapons program. In the case of the Philippines, the US also assists in counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations. In this sense, one might expect *fewer* anti-US-military protests in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, not the opposite. Third, one source of grievance about host US troops, as discussed earlier is crime, and troop-related crime is different in European host nations than Asian ones. While a US presence is associated with a greater number of thefts in European countries, it is associated with higher levels of drug-related crime, assault, and homicide in Asian host nations, including the three under study (Allen and Flynn 2013, 265).¹⁹ Finally, these host nations are important from a US military perspective, especially Japan and South Korea which host high numbers of US troops and bases. Thus, it is imperative for US policymakers to understand when and why residents in these countries protest the US military.

Methods and Data Collection

To uncover why anti-US-military movements emerge in some contexts and not others, I employ in-depth paired comparisons within each host nation. This particular method of inquiry is

¹⁹ It is important to note that the definition of assault the authors use is a UN definition that excludes sexual assault; there is a separate category for rape, though it is not clear whether sexual assaults that are not rape are included in this category (Allen and Flynn 2013, 271).

recognized as a “productive” one for theory-building, especially paired with quantitative analysis as I do in this study (S. Tarrow 2010, 246). Additionally, paired comparison “offers a balanced combination of descriptive depth” found in single-case studies and the theoretical insights gained from using multiple cases (S. Tarrow 2010, 247). Relying on the logic of paired comparison, the study employs both qualitative case studies, and quantitative regression models (the latter only for the Japanese cases due to data availability). I focus on six cases, two within each host nation, that have different levels of anti-US-military protest mobilization, one case with high levels and one with low levels. In comparison, these cases present puzzles within each country that provide insights for both the social movement and base politics²⁰ literature. At the same time, focusing on six cases within three countries allows me to control for variation that could impact mobilization across countries (such as threat perception, regime type, protest-related legislation, and even the provisions of the SOFAs themselves).

In Japan, I focus on the host communities of Okinawa and Yokosuka. As mentioned earlier, there have been more anti-US-military protests in Okinawa than Yokosuka or any other Japanese host community. Upon further examination, this is perhaps more puzzling when one takes into consideration Yokosuka’s location near Tokyo, thus making it much easier for would-be protesters to travel there. Okinawa, on the other hand, is known as a place of frequent anti-US-military protests, an influential and widely covered case in the base politics literature. What is it about the bases in Okinawa that make them the targets of frequent protests? In South Korea, I examine the communities of Daegu and Jeju Island, with low and high levels of protest, respectively. While Daegu is seemingly a typical host community where US troops have blended into the local community, it has a history of anti-government protests. In other cases, activists

²⁰ Gresh (2015) defines “base politics” as “the interplay between basing nations and host nations on affairs relating to the operation of local military facilities in host nations” (5).

may draw upon such history in their frames to inspire protest in the present, but this has not happened in Daegu. Where has this “fighting spirit” gone? In Jeju, activists mobilized locals, Koreans from other communities, and even people from other countries to protest the construction of the Jeju Naval Base. As mentioned, activists in the Philippines waged one of the only successful campaigns to “oust” the US military from the country, with the US leaving in the early 1990s. During this campaign, activists and their host political allies problematized the US basing presence as the continuity of the US’s colonization of the Philippines, rallying the masses. However, the US returned less than 10 years later vis-à-vis a smaller, more temporary agreement with much less public opposition and protest; why did Filipinos find this US presence more tolerable? The paired comparison in the Philippines examines national-level mobilization against the US military over time, primarily focused on Manila as the center of policymaking in the Philippines. Together, these cases represent different manifestations of the US military presence; four cases (Okinawa, Yokosuka, Daegu, and the Philippines in the early 1990s) focus on contention around US bases while two (Jeju and the Philippines in the 2000s/2010s) focus on contention around US troops accessing host nation domestic bases.

I employed a variety of data in my case studies from activists, US officials, host national political elites, journalists, and scholars. Turning first to the qualitative data, I gathered social media posts on Facebook and Twitter, blogs, websites, short unpublished pieces (in the case of activists), pamphlets, transcripts from interviews with US officials through the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project (for the Philippines cases), and secondary sources. I also went to local and national history museums (to learn about official historical narratives), engaged in (participant) observation of protests and the US bases, and conducted interviews both in person and virtually. I interviewed over 70 people, including

scholars, activists, journalists, and government officials from the US and local and national host nation governments. The interviews were conducted in English in the Philippines and for some of the interviews in Japan and South Korea. Others were conducted in Japanese and Korean, with the assistance of a translator as needed. I anonymized all of the interviews except one where it was not possible to keep the interviewee's identity a secret given their past position, former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. In this case, Mr. Hatoyama gave me permission to use his name.

I employ two types of quantitative data in this study: data from two Japanese surveys and protest data. Colleagues and I administered two online surveys (in Japanese) about attitudes towards the US military to residents of Japan.²¹ We administered the national survey from January to February 2022 to Japanese respondents online using Lucid Marketplace. This survey elicited over 3,000 responses from a reasonably representative sample of the Japanese population.²² We administered a second survey in collaboration with Nikkei Research Inc. with nearly identical questions from March to April 2022 to only Okinawans, eliciting a little over 1,000 responses.²³ For both surveys, each respondent was randomly assigned to one of three groups: the control group, a historical treatment group, or a group for another experiment unrelated to the historical frame experiment. Each group in the national sample had a little over 1,000 participants assigned to the group while each group in the Okinawa sample had about 350 participants. The historical statement treatment group was then randomly assigned into one of three groups, with each group given a different historical statement related to events that

²¹Takako Hikotani (Gakushuin University), Yusaku Horiuchi (Dartmouth College), and Atsushi Tago (Waseda University) spearheaded this survey.

²² The national survey also included Okinawans; approximately 100 respondents were from Okinawa.

²³ While national survey respondents were asked about their prefecture of residence, respondents in the Okinawan survey were asked about their town of residence and their postal code.

Okinawan activists invoke in their anti-US-military frames (detailed in Chapter 3). Among other measures, the survey notably included a framing experiment, questions about respondents' opinions of the US military in Japan, questions about respondents' involvement with anti-US-military activism, questions about respondents' contact with US military personnel, and a battery of basic demographic questions.²⁴ More information about the survey administration and instrument is in Appendix 1.

Lastly, I measure the dependent variable, anti-US-military protests, through an original dataset of prefecture/province-year or country-year (in the Philippines) protest events. There are no available protest datasets that adequately capture the information needed for this project. The Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes dataset (NAVCO), for example, contains comprehensive data on protest (Chenoweth et al. 2019). However, there are several limitations of this dataset regarding the anti-US-military protests that the current study examines, making it difficult to use for this type of research. First, it does not include Japan, so none of the anti-US-military protests in Japan are in the data. Second, it does not include any Philippines protests targeting the US military presence in the country. Third, although it does contain some anti-US-military protests in South Korea, it omits Korean protests between 1996 and 2012, years that included many anti-US-military protests in South Korea, discussed later in Chapter 5. More broadly, the data is national-level data, making it difficult to capture subnational protest variation. Thus, large protest event datasets like NAVCO miss some of the data necessary for the scope of this project.

²⁴ For clarity, I recoded all questions that asked respondents to report their opinions so that “disagree” has a value of 1 (as opposed to 5 in the original survey data) and “agree” has a value of 5 on a 5-point Likert scale. Additionally, while both surveys were administered in Japanese, I report the English language equivalents here.

Additionally, although Allen et al.'s (2022) and Kim's (2023) more recent work uses anti-US-military protest data, these alone are also inadequate for the current study. First, to this author's knowledge, neither dataset is publicly available. Second, the Allen et al. (2022) dataset would be sufficient for the Philippines part of this study as it examines national-level anti-US-military protests, but does not disaggregate them to subnational units, making it insufficient for the Japanese and South Korean portions of this study. And while Kim's (2023) dataset would be sufficient for the Japanese and South Korean cases in the study, it does not contain data on the Philippines. Thus, the best option for capturing protest data appropriate for the current study was to create an original protest dataset.

I collected the data through open-source coding of news articles using LexisUni, which draws from major global media outlets, often but not exclusively in English. Examples of these media outlets are the Associated Press, Agence Presse France, and Xinhua News. This technique is the same technique that the creators of NAVCO and other protest datasets use. Additionally, I collected articles from each country's national news outlets such as Kyodo, Japan Times, Asahi Shimbun, Chosun Ilbo, Korea Times, Korea Herald, Joongang Daily, Hankyoreh, Daegu Ilbo, Rappler, Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and Manila Times, as well as publications that cover US military news such as Stars and Stripes. For LexisUni, I composed a broad search string that included, for example, part of the country's name (e.g., Japan,* which covers both "Japan" and "Japanese"), potential forms of protest (such as "demonstrat*" for demonstrations), and different forms of the military presence (such as "military" and "base"). For the national news outlets, I used search terms such as "protest" and "base" or "military." I then gathered several pieces of information for each article about a protest event, including the location in which the protest took place, the date, and the number of protesters, when available.

Chapter Overview

In the next chapter, I provide an overview of social movement and base politics studies that focus on political opportunity structures, or contextual factors, and frames, or messages. Drawing on these studies, I offer an argument for anti-US-military protest variation. I first emphasize the alignment, what I term a framing coalition, between different actors' frames and the way that it inhibits or assists activists' mobilization efforts. Second, I introduce the term "troop visibility" and discuss the conditions under which troop visibility facilitates anti-US-military protest. Next, I highlight the importance of identity and its role in frame resonance. I then provide an overview of the cases as they fit within the theoretical framework.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine the Japanese host communities of Okinawa and Yokosuka, focusing on activists' frames, local identity, troop visibility, and activists' partnership (or lack thereof) with local political elites. I also use Japanese surveys to examine the roles of activist historical framing and civilian-military contact, with an emphasis on base festivals and base-related employment. I then move on to discussing South Korean anti-US-military activism, with a focus on the cases of Daegu and Jeju (whose status as a "US base" activists and the Korean government contested). In those cases, I explore the same factors (activists' frames, local identity, visibility, and local partnerships).

In the final empirical chapter, I explore national-level protest variation over time in the Philippines. I analyze the key variables in the study as they factor into anti-US-military protests when the US had bases in the Philippines and when it returned under the VFA. I also discuss Jennifer Laude's murder at the hands of a US soldier to show that, even in relatively difficult contexts, it is possible for activists to mobilize would-be protesters if they take advantage of windows of opportunity. Finally, in Chapter 7 I summarize the key arguments as they pertain to

the cases, discuss some limitations of the study, and identify avenues for future research. I conclude with a discussion about the outlook of anti-US-military activism in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

Chapter 2: Right Frame, Right Time: The Interplay of Framing and Political Opportunity Structures in Anti-US-Military Activism

Under what conditions do protests emerge? Many social movement scholars have endeavored to answer this question, invoking concepts such as “framing” and “political opportunity structures.” However, these explanations on their own are often insufficient to explain social movement emergence. Narratives or frames that persuade people in one context do not work in others (McVeigh et al. 2004). Political opportunities sometimes emerge and disappear without much fanfare (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 283). As activism in issue areas like US base politics shows, social movement emergence is often the result of a constellation of factors, including frames and political opportunities. Scholars of US base politics have only recently begun trying to understand the variation in anti-US-military protests from a social movement perspective, with Kim’s (2023) *Base Towns* as the flagship study.

The current study examines protest mobilization through the lens of anti-US-military movements. In doing so, it contributes to both the social movement and base politics literature. First, building on Kim and Boas’s (2020) and Kim’s (2023) concept of “disruption of the status quo” of US base politics, I coin the term troop visibility to mean how aware the host nation public is of the US military presence, with both positive and negative dimensions. I find that when activists and their political allies act upon opportunities to draw negative public attention to

the US military presence (high negative visibility), such as base-related crimes or base-related construction, they are more likely to be successful in mobilizing the public against the US military. However, situations of low visibility and high positive visibility present challenges for activists to either persuade the public that there is a US military presence or that the presence is a problem. In the current study, activists have drawn public attention to the US military and problematized it in all three cases of high anti-US-military mobilization (Okinawa, Jeju, and the Philippines in the late 1980s/early 1990s). In two other cases, Yokosuka and the Philippines in the VFA-era, activists were briefly able to bring negative attention to the US presence when opportunities arose, despite the relatively low or positive visibility most of the time in these cases. The US military presence in Daegu also has relatively low visibility or positive visibility as a result of the US military's and local political elites' efforts. From a social movement perspective, troop visibility is an aspect of the broader political opportunity structure or context (defined in more detail below). What this study demonstrates is that even aspects of the political opportunity structure are subject to framing and interpretation, which can impact protest mobilization.

Second, I find that a place's identity is an important factor in anti-US-military protest mobilization. Places that have a history of marginalization vis-à-vis their national government and the US may tend to be less willing to host a basing presence in the name of national security. Furthermore, places with a history of colonization may also more likely to oppose a US military presence, especially former US colonies. These histories are important because they provide activists and their allies with fruitful "cultural stock" to use to craft frames that will resonate with local audiences. As I show in Chapters 3-6, activists in Okinawa, Jeju, and the Philippines in the late 1980s/early 1990s have drawn upon such histories to problematize the US and, in the case of

Jeju, even their own military's basing presence. By contrast, a history of positive relationships with the central government or the US can constrain activists' framing choices, leading them to focus on more quotidian or "pragmatic" issues such as noise pollution, as activists in Daegu do. This study shows how activists' and their allies' frames need to consider the political opportunity structure to create frames that are more likely to mobilize or resonate with the public. At the same time, it also suggests that we should adopt a more inclusive definition of political opportunity structures, focusing not only on political institutions' impacts on mobilization but also history and culture (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 279).

Finally, I find that anti-US-military movements tend to be more successful at mobilizing the public when activists' frames synch with host nation political elites' frames (either local or national politicians), both problematizing the US presence. I term this alignment of two or more actors' frames a framing coalition. As I discuss in Chapters 4 and 6, framing coalitions between activists and politicians emerged in Okinawa, Japan as well as in the Philippines in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time, framing coalitions are not limited to the alignment of activists' and their allies' frames. The US military and pro-US political elites may also form framing coalitions contexts, highlighting the ways in which the US is a "good neighbor" to the host nation and host community. These contexts, such as in Yokosuka, Japan (Chapter 4), Daegu, South Korea (Chapter 5), and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) era in the Philippines, are more challenging for activists to mobilize the public. The concepts of framing contests and counterframing help us understand base politics as an area where actors' frames interact. At the same time, scholars have typically used them to refer to understand the interactions between social movements, but as I show, other actors such as political elites and military officials engage in these strategies as well.

In the sections that follow, I outline the social movement literature that focuses on political opportunity structures and framing. I also describe how the base politics literature has incorporated these concepts, implicitly and explicitly, into understanding anti-US-military protests and offer critiques about the short-comings in the literature. I then elucidate the theories about troop visibility, historical marginalization, and framing contests and synchronicity. I conclude with an overview of how each of these cases fit within this framework.

Base Politics and the Social Movement Literature

Several previous base politics studies explicitly or implicitly provide insights into why and when anti-US-military movements arise. In the sections below, I discuss how the concepts of political opportunity structures, framing, and frame resonance from the social movement literature may be applied to base politics studies to understand movement emergence. I argue that understanding how political opportunities, framing, and frame resonance play into anti-US-military activism helps uncover in what ways these movements are comparable to others in different issue areas. Furthermore, it helps us to understand from a social movement perspective what factors are missing from the extant base politics literature to explain movement emergence and mobilization. In the sub-sections below, I discuss how these concepts are understood in the social movement and base politics literature and how these studies do not sufficiently answer the question under study. I argue that while these studies together provide a solid foundation for understanding variation in anti-US-military mobilization, many of them focus either on national-level variation or large protest movements and thus cannot adequately explain variation across host communities or across host nations over time.

Political Opportunities

The concept of political opportunity structures offers some insight into why and when social movements against the US military emerge by focusing on context. Meyer (2004) defines political opportunity structures as

exogenous factors that enhance or inhibit a social movement's prospects for (a) mobilizing, (b) advancing particular claims rather than others, (c) cultivating some alliances rather than others, (d) employing particular political strategies and tactics rather than others, and (e) affecting mainstream institutional politics and policy (126)

These structures are typically characterized as open or closed (though they can shift) and exist in various issue areas and at different political-administrative levels (e.g., international, national, or sub-national). Political opportunity structures are more open in liberal democracies where their civil liberties (such as the freedoms of expression and assembly) are protected and policymakers are accountable to the public (Dalton et al. 2010, 53). In such structures, social movement mobilization and success are more likely (McAdam 1982, 41; Dalton et al. 2010, 53; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, 308). At the same time, “other scholars argue that closed political systems are more likely to push actors outside conventional channels, thereby increasing levels of protest activity” (Dalton et al. 2010, 54). In these structures (often in authoritarian or hybrid regimes), the public may face barriers to the political process (such as a lack of free and fair elections).

As Gamson and Meyer (1996) argue, there are some aspects of political opportunity structures (such as institutions) that are relatively stable and may change slowly or not at all (277). Others are more “volatile” and provide sudden or expected windows of opportunity for contention (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 277). For example, in the case of anti-US-military activism in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, an election would be an expected window of opportunity for activists to make their claims while accidents and crimes that US troops sometimes commit are unexpected opportunities. These favorable windows do not inherently

mean that social movements *will* emerge or be successful at such times, however. Changes in the opportunity structure that favor a social movement may not be obvious to potential protesters or political elites; social movement leaders must identify and *interpret* these opportunities as moments to act collectively (or not) (Zald 1996, 265). Furthermore, some studies suggest that activists can sometimes *create* these opportunities themselves. For example, Gamson and Meyer (1996) argue that, “movements often benefit from opportunities created by predecessors or other contemporary movements. Beyond this, opportunities are subject to interpretation and are often matters of controversy” (276). In this sense, political opportunities are themselves subjective and open to framing.

Political Opportunities in Base Politics

The base politics literature has typically considered the role of political opportunities and context in understanding why and when host nation opposition is successful in changing host nation base policy. More recent studies such as Kim (2023) have sought to understand the role of political opportunities in anti-US-military protest mobilization. While these are distinct analytical foci in terms of social movements (“success” as meeting a movement’s goals vs. “success” as mobilizing the public *en masse*), they are related in the sense that greater protest mobilization may lead to policy change. Several studies examine under what conditions host nation political elites grant or deny the US access to maintain a troop presence and frame base politics as a two-level game in which host nation elites must negotiate with their constituents and the basing nation. Calder’s (2007) and Cooley’s (2008) seminal works highlight the influence of regime type and change on basing access. Under authoritarian regimes, the public is less likely to protest in general, let alone against a US military presence, and thus the US is likely to maintain its

basing access (Calder 2007, 76). By contrast, “democratic transitions within base hosts often lead them to politicize and contest security contracts, whereas democratic consolidation leads base hosts to accept or depoliticize them” (Cooley 2008, 18). In this view, there are fewer opportunities for anti-US-military movements to create policy change in either authoritarian regimes *or* consolidated democracies.²⁵ Conversely, democratizing regimes provide greater opportunities for movements to make their claims. As I show in Chapter 6, this was the case in the Philippines in the late 1980s/early 1990s. In this case, activists were not only able to mobilize would-be protesters but were also ultimately successful in their goal of closing the US bases in the Philippines.

Other studies have focused on security threat perception to understand under what conditions base policy may change or resistance to the US troop presence may emerge. Threat perception is, arguably, a national-level factor that can influence social movement mobilization, such that it may make it more or less difficult for anti-US-military activists to mobilize people in general, as the US presence is ostensibly for host nation security. Yeo (2011) argues that host nation political elites’ perception of threat influences their willingness to change base policy. He argues that anti-US-military movements have been successful in creating policy change when host nation elites have divided opinions about the necessity of a US military presence in combatting an external security threat, what he terms a weak “security consensus” (Yeo 2011a, 7) 7). This, for example, was the case in the Philippines in case mentioned above (Yeo 2011a, 35–62). In many cases, however, there is a strong security consensus and host nation elites agree that the US military presence is necessary to protect the host nation against external threats. Yeo

²⁵ Note, however, that these studies do not address the impact of democratic backsliding and/or hybrid regimes on basing access.

argues that this is why, for example, there has been little policy change regarding the US bases in Okinawa, despite frequent local protests, as I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4 (Yeo 2011a, 63–85).

While Holmes (Holmes 2014) also considers the role of threat perception in base politics, she focuses on the *public's* threat perception and how it influences the emergence of resistance against the US military presence, including social movements, in Germany and Turkey. She argues that the interaction of threat perception and grievances attributable to the US military presence (what she terms “collateral harm”) encourage or discourage the emergence of resistance (Holmes 2014, 22). Drawing on Tilly’s (1985) argument that state-making and war-making are inexorably linked, Holmes argues that the host nation public will perceive a US military presence to be “legitimate” when it both offers protection against an outside threat and causes minimal harm for “those it claims to protect” and thus resistance is less likely to emerge (Holmes 2014, 21). If, however, the US military presence does not appear to protect the host nation from an external security threat *and* it causes collateral harm, the public will consider it to be a “protection racket” and resistance to the US military is more likely to occur (Holmes 2014, 22). Holmes argues that there are two other categories of US protection: “precautionary protection” (where the host nation public perceives a low level of external security threat and collateral harm) and “pernicious protection” (where the public perceives both external security threat and collateral harm as high) (Holmes 2014, 24).

While the studies discussed in this section offer some insights into understanding variance in anti-US-military movement mobilization, they cannot fully answer the question under study. First, Yeo treats national-level elites more as a structure and less as actors with their own agency. As I argue later in the chapter, it is important to understand that these elites engage in strategies like framing to shape public opinion; they are not merely passive receivers of host

nation public sentiment and anti-US-military activists' frames. This consonance or dissonance between activists, host nation elites, and even the US military itself influences how the public receives activists' frames and how effective the frames are in mobilizing the public.

Secondly, the focus on national-level politics cannot fully explain local-level variation. In reference to Calder's and Cooley's studies, for example, it may be that anti-US-military movements are more likely to emerge in autocracies and consolidated democracies because the host nation's public is likely to pressure elites to change basing policy. However, the host nation regime type does not explain why large movements emerge in some hosting communities (such as in Okinawa) and smaller movements emerge in others (such as in Yokosuka) or not at all. Similarly, while Holmes details episodes of unrest at specific bases in Germany and Turkey, she ultimately focuses on anti-US-military mobilization at the national level by describing shifts in the public perception of US protection. For example, the US "protection regime" *in Turkey* shifted from legitimate protection to pernicious protection in the 1960s (Holmes 2014, 32). However, it is possible that different communities within a host nation perceive the US presence as different categories within Holmes's protection typology. In Japan, for example, Okinawans may perceive the US presence as a "protection racket" as US troops have committed several highly publicized crimes there while Yokosuka residents may perceive it as legitimate due to the relatively low level of crimes there.

The Framing Perspective

The framing perspective in the social movement literature suggests that different activist narratives or frames cause the variation in why some social movements against a US military presence mobilize more support than others. While individuals possess their own frames, there

are also collective frames which are shared interpretations of an issue (Snow et al. 1986, 466). Through framing, social movement leaders attempt to “align” individuals’ frames with the collective frame to induce collective action.²⁶ To induce collective action, frames must fulfill three main tasks: they must diagnose a problem and specify who or what is to blame for the grievance; they must prescribe solutions to address the grievance; and they must motivate individuals to act (a “call to arms”) (Snow and Benford 1988, 199).

A frame alignment process that has implications for anti-US-military activism is that of frame extension. Frame extension occurs when an organization or a movement “extend[s] the boundaries of its primary framework to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents” (Snow et al. 1986, 470). To broaden their frames, movements often shift from local frames to regional, national, or even transnational ones to appeal to greater swaths of the public. Additionally, activists may shift their frames to garner support from national and transnational movements and organizations, a process known as “upward scale shift” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 94). However, the shift from local to national or transnational can diminish frame resonance within the original targets of mobilization (the local population) by moving from Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) claims that are abstract from locals’ quotidian experiences.

The concept of frame resonance, which is important to the theoretical foundation of this study, also plays a role in base politics. Snow and Benford (1988) define the concept as “under what conditions [...] framing efforts strike a responsive chord or resonate within the targets of mobilization” (198). Three major frame attributes, or what Snow and Benford (1988) term “phenomenological constraints,” impact the degree to which frames resonate with their targets:

²⁶ For a further discussion of frame alignment processes, see Snow et al. (1986).

empirical credibility, the extent to which the frame is subject to verification; experiential commensurability, the extent to which the frame is commensurate with individuals' experiences; and narrative fidelity, or the extent to which the frame comports with cultural narratives (207-211). Frame resonance, however, is ambiguously defined in the social movement literature; it is unclear with what frames resonate.²⁷ In this study, I conceptualize frames as resonating within political opportunity structures, broadly defined.

Finally, counterframing and framing contests are germane to base politics, though the current literature has not addressed them directly. In the realm of base politics and many other issue areas, social movement elites, political officials, media outlets, and others may contest opponents' frames with their own counterframes, "rhetorical strategies that challenge original claims or frames" (Benford and Hunt 2003, 160–61). Counterframing strategies include: denying the existence of the problem the original frame identifies (problem denial), attributing the problem to actors other than the one(s) the original frame identifies (counter attribution), challenging the original frame's proposed solution to the problem (counter prognosis), and attacking or vilifying the collective character of the opponent (Benford and Hunt 2003, 162–74; McCaffrey and Keys 2000, 44). Examples abound in base politics of host nation governments and the US military engaging in such strategies. For example, while activists in the Philippines claimed that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was a precursor for the US to reestablish permanent bases in the Philippines, the Philippines government countered that the US presence was only temporary (problem denial) (Banlaoi 2002, 308). In Okinawa, people generally agree that Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma should be relocated outside of densely

²⁷ For example, with what frames resonate is alternatively termed a "mentality" (S. G. Tarrow 1992); "discursive [political] opportunity structures" (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Ferree 2003); "structural congruence" (McVeigh et al. 2004); and "political or cultural opportunity structures" Benford and Snow (2000).

populated Ginowan City for safety reasons, activists and some (mostly local) politicians claim that the base should move outside of the prefecture while the US and Japanese governments contend that it must remain within Okinawa (counter prognosis). The Korean government has at times claimed that mass anti-US-military movements are not reflective of local residents' opinions but rather so-called "outside agitators" or professional activists from other communities (vilifying the character of the opponent) (Y. S. Lee and Ju 2016).

Framing in Base Politics

Base politics studies have increasingly drawn upon insights from the framing literature to understand what influence activists' frames have on host nation elites and host nation public opinion about the US base presence. As discussed throughout the current study, the framing literature is indeed an illuminating one to apply to the study of base politics as activists proffer a variety of frames to problematize the US military presence in their country or community. While the recent base politics studies that employ framing theories provide key insights, there are still unanswered questions. Kawato (2015), for example, implicitly invokes framing and frame resonance in her analysis of variation in anti-US-base movements' success in meeting their goals. For Kawato (2015), variability in activists' ability to persuade host nation policymakers has led to variation in movements' success in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, at times resulting in full base closure (as was the case in the Philippines in the early 1990s, examined in Chapter 6), limited policy change, symbolic concessions, or no policy change (the most frequent outcome). Movements are successful when their frames align with policy makers' own beliefs and interests and when policymakers believe activist leaders and organizations are credible (Kawato 2015, 5).

Focusing on the *content* of activists' frames, Kim and Boas (2020), in their surveys of four host communities in South Korea and Japan, find that public opinion is more likely to be swayed by frames that draw attention to how the US military presence affects locals' everyday lives (what they term "pragmatic" framing). By contrast, frames that draw attention to accidents and crimes related to the US troop presence and frames that emphasize nationalistic (sovereignty) or ideological appeals (such as pacificism) are unlikely to rally public opposition against the bases (Kim and Boas 2020, 697). Kim's (2023) more recent work, a qualitative study of several Japanese and Korean host communities, also finds that pragmatic framing is more effective than nationalistic or ideological framing. Thus, frames that have empirical credibility and experiential credibility are more likely to mobilize than those that most rely on narrative fidelity.

Several studies in the base politics literature also highlight the role of frame extension and how this framing strategy can help or hinder mobilization. Anti-US-military activists may extend their local frames to national-level ones or transnational ones. Yeo (2011b) shows that frame extension can be beneficial for local movements as it can garner more national-level attention from both the public and the media, as was the case for the Maehyang Village and Jeju movements in South Korea. The Jeju movement, one of the cases under study, is especially interesting because activists extended their local frames about the dangers of the construction of a new naval base to both the national and transnational levels, as details in Chapter 5. Activists contended that "as a prime target for military retaliation, the base will ultimately destabilize not only Jeju but the Asia-Pacific region" (Yeo 2011b, 13). Additionally, local movements may benefit by linking with national or transnational movements and groups because they have

greater resources, possibly new strategies and tactics, and more name recognition (Moon 2010, 115; Davis 2011, 223; Vine 2019, 167).

As the base literature demonstrates, however, frame extension also can alienate locals and undermine activists' efforts to mobilize the public. When movement frames move from local issues to national or transnational ones, they may alienate and even demobilize local communities: "often, these frames capture a higher level of abstraction that goes beyond simple "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) grievances" (Yeo 2006, 39). This is in part because they often move beyond "pragmatic" to broader ideological or nationalist frames. For example, Fitz-Henry's (2015) account of anti-US-military organizing in Manta, Ecuador depicts how frame extension can alienate locals and undermine activists' efforts to mobilize the public. In this case, activists employed a transnational frame that paralleled the experiences of injustice deriving from the US military presence in Ecuador to those of Okinawa, South Korea, and Germany (Fitz-Henry 2015, 105). However, this frame was too distant from locals' experiences with the US military and effectively further alienated the host community, which was already skeptical of the anti-US-military activists. Kim's (2021) analysis offers activists another cautionary tale about frame extension: even when local movements shift their frames to national and/or transnational ones, they may not be successful in gaining more supporters. In her cases in Japan and South Korea, local movements' success in extending their frames and mobilizing broader support depended on political openings that brought these movements and their grievances to the national stage (C. J. Kim 2021b, 121). Frame extension is therefore a double-edged sword: activists may draw new supporters and allies by appealing to national and transnational audiences but may lose the support of the local population.

Finally, as mentioned, counterframing and framing contests are mostly ignored in the base politics literature to date. One exception is Kim's (2017) study about framing contests between different media outlets in South Korea and their impact on the success of anti-US-military movements. She argues that when liberal and conservative media outlets' coverage of an anti-US-military movement is positive/neutral, the movement is more likely to gain concessions from the government (C. J. Kim 2017a, 321). However, when the media diverges in its coverage, activists are less likely to achieve their goals (C. J. Kim 2017a, 317). Kim's (2023) most recent work does not focus on counter-framing or framing contests per se, but on the opposite of those processes: when activists gain support from local political elites. She finds that when activists win elite support, anti-US-military movements are more likely to mobilize would-be protesters (C. J. Kim 2023, 12). While I find something similar in the current study (albeit with a more explicit focus on framing processes), I also consider the role of the US military, which often engages in a framing contest against activists and/or activists' political allies, as discussed below.

Taken together, these studies provide important insights into the role of frames in base politics and host nation protests, but further research is needed in this area. First, frames that are ineffective at persuading political elites and creating policy change may yet be effective at mobilizing would-be protesters. As both Yeo's (2011a) and Kawato's (2015) studies demonstrate, it is generally difficult for anti-US-military movements to persuade host nation or US elites to create policy change. However, there are several instances when movements have organized sustained and/or large protests that resulted in little, if any, change to the status of US troops in the host nation. This study includes two such instances, movements in Okinawa and Jeju, where construction to build a new basing facility continued (and continues) despite massive protests. Thus, studies that analyze which frames are more likely to influence basing policy (and

policymakers) cannot fully explain which frames are more likely to mobilize a host nation public.

Second, it is unclear to what extent it is possible or useful to separate frame categories because in base politics, anti-US-military movements' frames are typically multifaceted. While activists' frames undoubtedly touch upon "pragmatic" issues such as noise pollution and other ways that the US military presence may affect locals' everyday lives, they may situate these issues within a broader historical context and invoke issues of sovereignty, anti-militarism, and other sentiments. Thus, the "recipients" of activists' frames likely also understand them as a package of messages. For example, activists in the All-Okinawa Movement emphasize the expansion of the US's Camp Schwab in Henoko, Okinawa as harming endemic wildlife under the frame of *Nuchi du Takara* ("life is precious"). One of the key findings in the current study is that anti-US-military activists often use nationalistic and ideological frames in contexts where there are high levels of protest mobilization.

Third, understanding the content of frames partially reveals why some are more effective at mobilizing the public than others, but the context in which the public receives these frames is important. The base politics literature that addresses frame extension partly gets at this point; frames that narrowly focus on local problems will likely not be as persuasive to a national audience and vice versa. However, even frames that are aimed at the "appropriate" audience level may not effectively mobilize people to protest. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, anti-US-military activists in the Philippines deployed similar frames across time, highlighting the colonial relationship between the US and the Philippines. At one critical juncture, this framing was effective in mobilizing the public against the US bases; in later periods, the framing lost its potency. In this sense, studies that focus on the political opportunity structure with which

activists are faced can provide important insights into understanding mobilization variation; indeed, it is crucial to analyze both activists' frames and the context in which they are deployed.

Finally, these studies largely ignore the role that other actors' frames play in activists' ability to mobilize the public against a US military presence vis-à-vis framing contests and counter-framing. With the exceptions mentioned previously, the base politics literature has largely overlooked the ways that host nation elites, at the local or national level, and the US itself frames the US military presence. I argue that this is an unfortunate oversight as the alignment (or lack thereof) between activists' frames and the frames that host nation politicians and the US military proffer can play a major role in anti-US-military mobilization. Naturally, the US military frames its presence as beneficial and necessary for the host nation and/or community, at times directly countering activists' claims. However, host nation politicians may or may not frame US troops in a favorable light. For example, in the cases of anti-US-base contention around base lease renewal in the Philippines and the All-Okinawa Movement, I argue that the support of several policymakers helped these movements mobilize a significant number of protesters. Politicians can lend (or deny) activists' claims credibility, depending to some extent on the public's view of the politicians, thus making them more persuasive to the public. At the same time, the lack of support from political elites hurt activists' efforts in the Philippines after the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in 1998, which I contend is an important factor in explaining why protests against the US presence have been fewer and smaller in the past few decades. In short, host nation politicians and the US military play an active role in framing and are important to consider when trying to understand why and when activists' frames are effective.

Framing Political Opportunities in Anti-US-Military Activism

I argue that to understand variation in anti-US-military mobilization, it is imperative to examine both the frames that activists proffer and the opportunity structure or context in which activists deploy them. In this study, I employ and expand on the concepts of frame resonance and political opportunity structures to understand why some areas witness more anti-US-military protests than others. Together, these concepts analyze frames' content and context to understand under what conditions they are effective at mobilizing the public. I contend that, indeed, it is difficult to separate frames from the contexts in which they are deployed because activists strive to use frames that will be well-received and thus often consider context. As Snow and Corrigan-Brown (2005) note,

By being mindful of the context, frames can be adapted and altered to respond to changing political environments, public sentiments, and other outside pressures. Failure to modify one's framings accordingly can render a movement's framing efforts nonresonant and contribute to a movement's marginality or decline, as it comes to be seen as out-of-step or irrelevant. (235)

In other words, political and cultural contexts shape frames especially if activists want to mobilize public support and/or persuade policymakers, as most movements do. At the same time, frames can also shape context by, at a minimum, shaping the public's perception of the context. As discussed in the sections below, I argue that three crucial factors help us to understand why some anti-US-military framing is effective at mobilizing public protests in some instances and not others. First, I argue that the visibility of the US military presence, what I term "troop visibility," is an important factor in anti-US-military activists' success. I theorize that "troop visibility" draws upon two aspects of frame resonance that Snow and Benford (1988) describe: experiential commensurability and empirical credibility. The visibility of a US military presence is subject to framing: it is not wholly objective. Activists and other actors (namely, host nation politicians and the US itself) can make the presence more or less visible by drawing attention to

it or downplaying it. I contend that troop visibility is a *necessary* condition for anti-US-military activists' frames to be successful at mobilizing the public as the identification of a target to blame for a grievance (the prognostication task) is crucial. As Gresh (2015) and Bitar (2016) note in their base politics studies, a less noticeable US presence is generally correlated with less public dissent.

Second, I argue that frames that highlight a target population's known history of marginalization vis-à-vis the host nation or US government have narrative fidelity and are thus more likely to mobilize the public. I note that it is not the occurrence of historical marginalization but rather activists' framing and activation of collective memories of them that facilitate anti-US-military mobilization. I contend that frames that specifically invoke past "wrongs" at the hands of the host nation and/or the US government and link them to issues related to the contemporary US military presence are persuasive for a variety of reasons. First, these frames invoke shared understandings of grievances and how people "should" feel about them. Second, through invoking a shared history, these frames invoke a sense of collective identity that is distinct from the "other," either others in the host nation or the US itself. Finally, the frames themselves represent narratives that may compete with the "official" histories proffered by the central government, which may downplay or ignore the historical injustices that the frames highlight.

Finally, in line with Kim (2023), I argue that host nation political elites proffer frames that either contest or align with activists' frames. Host nation political elites' narratives are in a relatively privileged position vis-à-vis activists due to the various advantages "the state" has over other actors, discussed in more detail below. I argue that when at least some substantial segment of host nation political elites proffer narratives similar to activists' frames, activists' frames are

more likely to persuade the public to mobilize. However, in addition to host nation elites, I also consider the US military/government itself as an actor, not merely as an object of framing, which has been largely ignored in the base politics literature. In cases where there are lower levels of protest mobilization, I find that host nation elites' and the US military's frames align. I define the alignment of two or more actors' frames as a framing coalition.

Experiential Credibility and Troop Visibility

One of the key factors in anti-US-military movements' frame resonance is what I term "troop visibility." Troop visibility refers to the extent to which a host community or host nation public is aware of the location of a US troop presence. Troop visibility plays into the aspects of frame resonance that Snow and Benford (1988) term "empirical credibility" and "experiential commensurability" (208-209). The former term refers to the congruence between activists' frames and things that occur in the real world while the latter refers to the alignment between frames and targets' lived experiences (Benford and Snow 2000, 620-621). However, I concur with Noakes and Johnston (2005) that for most issue areas, there "is little difference in practice" between these two terms (12). While these authors do not provide a label for the aggregation of "empirical credibility" and "experiential commensurability," I do so using the term "experiential credibility" to mean the alignment between activists' frames and the public's everyday experiences and what they see in the world as being true. In the case of troop visibility, an activist's frame has experiential credibility when the public believes there is a US troop presence. This factors into one of frames' core tasks: the identification of a problem that needs solving (Snow and Benford 1988, 199). When the public is not aware of a troop presence (low troop visibility), I argue that they will not agree that there is a problem that needs solving and thus

activists will have difficulty mobilizing the public. As I discuss below and through the cases of Yokosuka (Chapters 3 and 4), Daegu (Chapter 5), and the Philippines in the VFA-era, the low visibility of the US presence is a matter of the US's and sometimes local host nation elites' framing.

Conversely, there are also times or windows in the political opportunity structure where the US military presence becomes more visible in the public's consciousness. While these windows are often driven by actual changes in the political opportunity structure (such as changes in the status of the US presence, crimes or accidents attributed to US military, or more "minor" issues like base-related noise pollution), it is activists' framing efforts and those of their political allies that draw public attention to the US military presence and problematize it, a condition I term high negative troop visibility. At the same time, however, the public may believe that there is a troop presence, but that it is a net benefit for the community. As discussed in Chapter 1, people may believe that the US presence is beneficial for security and economic reasons. Positive perceptions of the US military are often also the result of framing – on the parts of the US and its host nation elite allies. Troop visibility, thus, can be high or low and negative or positive. More importantly, troop visibility is subjective and a result of actors' framing and in this sense, shows how elements of the political opportunity structure can be the objects of actors' interpretations. Elements like troop visibility do not simply exist; actors manipulate them to aid their framing efforts.


I conceive of troop visibility as a spectrum, as shown in Figure 2.1, with conditions of high troop visibility on either end and low troop visibility in the middle of the spectrum. While activists' mobilization efforts are more likely to be successful in cases of high negative troop visibility, low and high positive troop visibility present challenges for activists.

Figure 2.1 Spectrum of Troop Visibility

High Negative Visibility

Low Visibility

High Positive Visibility



Low Troop Visibility

Low troop visibility typically accompanies either US bases that have existed for several years or when US troops are granted access to host nation bases, also called Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) or Forward Operating Locations (FOLs).²⁸ An established US base has low troop visibility because:

Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. A military base, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, can become politically invisible if its ways of doing business and seeing the world insinuate themselves into a community's schools, consumer tastes, housing patterns, children's games, adults' friendships, jobs and gossip. On any given day, therefore, only a handful of these scores of bases scattered around the world are the objects of dispute. (Enloe, 1989, 66)

US bases that have been open in a host community for years become part of the communal fabric and part of residents' everyday lives; over time, they become generally less noticeable, particularly if there are no negative impacts of which the community is aware. The fact that a military installation hosting hundreds or thousands of foreign troops exists in their community becomes quotidian.

Additionally, a US troop presence stationed at a CSL or FOL, regardless of duration, will have low visibility. The US military appears to be shifting its basing strategy from formal agreements involving permanent bases where the US has exclusive access to "quasi-bases" and a smaller host nation presence (Bitar 2016, 4). There are several reasons why the US is shifting to a lighter military "footprint," but one reason is that when the US's military presence is less visible, it is less subject to opposition within the host nation (Gresh 2015; Bitar 2016). These small, more informal, and more temporary arrangements diminish the US's military presence in several ways. First, the convening of less formal agreements often proceeds with little publicity,

²⁸ "Quasi-bases" or "light footprints" include Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) and Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), which typically involve a small number of US troops and staff stationed at host nation bases (Davis 2011, 217; Fitz-Henry 2015, 59).

thus potential opponents of a US military presence and even host nation civilians living in its proximity may not be aware of it (Bitar, 2016, 2). Second, depending on the host nation's laws related to convening foreign treaties, these less formal troop arrangements may not require the host nation's legislative oversight (Bitar 2016, 9). In one of the cases under study, the executive branch of the Philippines signed a temporary basing agreement with the US, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), without approval from the Philippine Senate (*CNN Philippines* 2016). However, the Supreme Court of the Philippines ultimately determined that EDCA did not require Senate approval because it was not an official treaty with the US as it did not involve a permanent US presence. Furthermore, the temporary nature of such agreements may circumvent host nation constitutional provisions that forbid the basing of foreign troops on host nation soil, as is the case with the US's security arrangement with the Philippines (*CNN Philippines* 2016).

Host nation elites who support hosting a US military presence also have incentives to agree to a less visible basing presence. As Bitar (2016) argues in the case of Latin American host nations, incumbent political elites may opt for a more informal agreement when challengers are strong enough to “capitalize on the nationalistic sentiment of the local populations and their rejection of US military interventionism and use such political gains in electoral politics” (8). In his study of Middle Eastern host nations, Gresh (2015) similarly finds that formal basing arrangements may be a liability to the ruling government, where opponents can publicly undermine the legitimacy of the regime by depicting it as “a puppet of the West” (8). Conversely, a less visible presence undermines opponents' claims about the host nation-US relationship while still allowing “US military advisors [to continue] to support the local armed forces with new technology or weapon systems” (Gresh 2015, 3). Finally, less formal basing arrangements may

be preferable to host nations in regions with a history of great power competition, like Singapore, so that they can reap the potential benefits of a security alliance while not fully committing to an alliance with one great power over others (Koga 2020, 133–34).

Negative Troop Visibility

There are conditions where the public perceives the US military presence negatively, one where the US military presence is highly visible and one where it is less visible. Conditions of high negative troop visibility typically occur when there are base-related construction, crimes and accidents attributed to the US presence, or other changes to the US military presence like the docking of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 in the context of Yokosuka, Japan). During these times, activists have tended to be the most successful at mobilizing the public against the US military presence. As the concept of political opportunity structures suggests, is not merely the occurrence of these events that provide windows of opportunities but rather, activists' efforts at drawing public attention to these events, spotlighting the US's troop presence. As Koopmans and Olzak (2004) suggest, “openings that do not become publicly visible may be considered ‘non-opportunities’, which for all practical purposes might as well not exist at all” (648). Activists (and, at times, their political allies), also use these opportunities to problematize the US presence. After the rape and murder of Rina Shimabukuro in Okinawa, for example, activists stated that “we seek the withdrawal of all bases and forces to ensure that people in Okinawa can live in peace,” without the possibility of another US soldier raping and murdering more Okinawan residents (*The Japan Times* 2016).

As mentioned, base-related construction can also facilitate high negative troop visibility. Kim and Boas (2020) and Kim (2023) conceptualize such projects as “status quo disruptions” of the US military presence. Status quo disruptions can lead to major changes in the host

community, such as “displacement of local population, sometimes directly threatening their livelihood” (C. J. Kim and Boas 2020, 6). Thus,

Activists are quick to seize upon changes in the status of U.S. bases such as those introduced by U.S. force posture realignments [such as construction or expansion]. Activists see such changes as a crack in the system and an opportunity to promote the anti-base agenda. (C. J. Kim and Boas 2020, 5)

A base undergoing construction is highly visible in the local community as activists bring local (and sometimes national) awareness to it. The disruption of the status quo caused by base-related construction offered windows of opportunity for activists in two of the cases in this study, the All-Okinawa Movement and the movement against the Jeju Naval Base. The latter case demonstrates how base construction can start as a disruption of the status quo (a volatile aspect of base visibility, making it more visible) and later fade into the background after construction is completed. Construction on the Jeju Naval Base began in 2007 and was completed in 2016. As detailed more deeply in Chapter 5, there were several large protests in the 2010s, including not only Jeju residents but also participants from the Korean mainland and abroad. However, since 2016 the protests against the Jeju Naval Base have been markedly smaller. I argue that part of the issue is that this base has become part of the local community and landscape over the seven years since its completion. As Kim (2023) notes, status quo disruptions have an “oft-overlooked temporal element that [...] makes it a fleeting source of opportunities” as the disruption can become a new normal (12).

Additionally, the public perceives the US military presence negatively in light of more quotidian “annoyances” like noise pollution, increased traffic around US bases, or regulations impeding local economic development. While activists have also focused on such issues, using “pragmatic” framing, these issues tend not to mobilize the public to protest in the same way that crimes and accidents and status quo disruptions do. This may partially be because, as one activist put it, the public becomes “number” to the US military presence and the everyday problems

stemming from it over time, especially in communities with long-standing bases (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022). In this sense, these issues render the US presence more publicly visible but not to the same level as status quo disruptions and crime and accidents.

Positive Troop Visibility

At the other end of the spectrum is positive troop visibility, which can also be high or moderate. Mirroring the previous discussion of high negative visibility, the US troop presence can become highly visible to the public when the US or the host nation governments (at either a national or local level) draw public attention to the US being a “good neighbor,” either to the host nation or host community. The US and its host nation allies achieve this positive image through both framing and activities in which US troops interact with the host nation public (Allen et al. 2020). I argue that it is discrete, time-limited activities that have the greatest potential to draw high positive visibility, versus more routinized programs. Events that facilitate high positive troop visibility include festivals held on US bases, disaster relief efforts, and non-routinized humanitarian relief operations. Such efforts not only provide direct benefits to the host nation public but can also serve as a form of US soft power, boosting positive public perceptions of the US (Flynn et al. 2019). Discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, base open houses, sometimes termed “friendship days” or “friendship festivals,” are events that US bases host in collaboration with the local government that allow host nation citizens on-base access.²⁹ These events take on a festival atmosphere and typically last for one or two days and are intended to

²⁹ While Japanese and US citizens need only to show a valid form of identification to enter a US base during a friendship event, “non-Japanese nationals and non-U.S. nationals visitors are required to bring a current passport and ‘Residency Card’ and are asked to register prior to or day of the event” (Yokota Air Base n.d.). The US requires a similar procedure for on-base events in South Korea as well.

facilitate positive civilian-military relations (Interview, US military official in Yokota, July 16, 2019; Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). An example of the US military's host nation relief efforts is Operation Tomodachi in Japan ("friend" in Japanese), where the US military provided the use of several warships and aircraft, soldiers, and emergency supplies to aid in recovery efforts in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 191). The US and host nation governments (local in the case of base festivals, national in the case of disaster relief) use these events to both draw public attention to the US presence and frame it as a positive influence.

The US military engages in more routinized community-building activities as well, although I contend that these tend to be more low profile since they occur often and thus provide a limited opportunity to make the US presence visible to the community. These include things like English language classes (as I discuss in depth in the case of Daegu in Chapter 5) and other regular volunteering activities like serving meals to underprivileged members of the host community (P. K. Kim 2019). While these activities likely facilitate positive opinions of the US military, the routine nature of the activities make them unlikely to render the US presence highly visible to the public; people often take for granted things they see or experience on a regular basis.

Historical Marginalization and Narrative Fidelity

Another key factor in anti-US-military movements' frame resonance regards narrative fidelity, the extent to which activists' frames align with the target population's cultural and historical narratives (Snow and Benford 1988, 211). I argue that frames that specifically highlight histories of marginalization vis-à-vis the host nation's central government and/or the US are more likely to foster higher levels of anti-US-military protest mobilization. For example,

anti-US-military activist frames in Okinawa may relate Okinawa's disproportionate number of US bases to the historic Battle of Okinawa (discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4), framing it as just another example of the Japanese government sacrificing Okinawa to the US military. Similarly, activists in Jeju, South Korea invoked the 4.3 incident, where, in an effort to combat communist insurgents, Korean military and police officers killed thousands of Jeju Islanders (many innocent), to problematize the construction of the Jeju naval base, examined in Chapter 5. Thus, the historical relationship between a host community and its national government plays a role in the way a host community receives anti-US-military frames and helps explain some subnational variation in protest mobilization. This theory expands, to an extent, on Calder's (2007) colonization hypothesis; a history of colonization with the base nation makes host nation anti-base sentiment more likely (76). I concur with this argument, but I elaborate on *why* and *how* a history of colonization facilitates anti-base sentiment: it is not merely a fact of history but rather that activists invoke this history, thereby helping to keep this history alive in the public consciousness. Furthermore, I contend that it is important to recognize that colonial experiences are not equally distributed across a host nation: different communities may have different colonial experiences. As discussed in the concluding chapter, for example, this is a key reason why Filipino activists' national-level frames that invoke the US-Philippines colonial relationship have not been as effective in the southern region of Mindanao, which had a different colonial experience than the rest of the Philippines.

Frames that invoke this sort of history are effective for a variety of reasons. First, it is activists' invocation of historical grievances, not simply the occurrence of past events, that make these frames persuasive. As I discuss in Chapters 3-6, protest mobilization against the US military does not occur in every host community or host nation that has a history of

marginalization. Rather, through framing, activists bring these histories to the public's consciousness to remind them of the past and connect it to the present. Furthermore, as the literature on nationalism and mnemonic politics reminds us, history is both subject to interpretation and contested among a variety of actors. It is no coincidence what the dominant or "official" histories of a place are; they are the winning narratives of a discursive contest. Official "narratives, in other words, should always be seen in the context of relations of power and logics of dominance" (Bell 2003, 73). Taking "the state" again as the driver of hegemonic discourse, the national government actively proffers certain historical myths and narratives for nation-building to create a cohesive national identity through various avenues, including mass education (Bell 2003, 75).

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the US and host nation central governments generally have an incentive to facilitate positive relations between the US military presence and the host nation public. At a fundamental level, this means promoting historical narratives that portray the US in a positive light or overlook historical injustices. At the same time, the state's narrative "is constantly contested by subaltern myths, which are capable of generating their own traditions and stories, stories as likely to be concerned with past oppression and suffering at the hands of the dominant groups as by tales of national glory" (Bell 2003, 73). I argue that through framing, activists can perpetuate a certain view of both the past and the present that often, though not always, competes with official narratives, "reminding" their targets of mobilization of historical injustices at the hands of the host nation government and/or the US. In the case of host communities, frames also "remind" locals of how they are distinct from other host nation citizens. In short, it is important to understand that "history" is neither objective nor static and there are many actors who shape it for strategic purposes. In the case of anti-US-military

activism, I argue that activists shape and perpetuate particular understandings of history (both local and national ones) through frames that connect the past with the present.

Second, these frames invoke historical grievances, comparing them to something happening in the present. I understand “grievances” here in the sense of Gurr’s (1970) notion of relative deprivation; people feel aggrieved when others have things they do not and believe that they should. I concur with Snow and Soule (2009) and Simmons (2014) that grievance is an important factor, but it is not a sufficient one to *cause* collective action. Certain types of grievances, what Snow and Soule (2009) term “mobilizing grievances,” particularly spur individuals to collective action because they invoke shared feelings “such as dissatisfaction, fear, indignation, resentment, and moral shock” (23). As Simmons (2014) argues, such grievances are about interpretation and are thus “meaning-laden” (4). Individuals “know” what a grievance is through social interaction and construction (Snow and Soule 2009, 51).

The “shared” nature of these grievances not only implies that there are socially constructed interpretations of what a grievance looks like but also how to *feel* about them (Jasper 1998, 399). When activists invoke historical marginalization in their frames, they expose would-be protesters to what Jasper (1998) terms “moral shock.” Jasper (1998) defines “moral shocks” as “occur[ing] when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, whether or not she has acquaintances in the movement” (409). While moral shocks can invoke a variety of emotions, activists “work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to provide a target against which these can be vented” to encourage would-be protesters to engage in protest rather than to do nothing (Jasper 1998, 410). What is especially notable about the historical events that activists’ use to problematize the present is that some of them like the Battle of Okinawa or 4.3 are

traumatic events involving mass loss of life, that some people experienced. However, those who did not personally experience these traumas are also exposed to them as members of the community (Resende and Budryte 2013, 3). Thus, I argue that historical framing can play a critical role in collective action, as I demonstrate in Chapters 3-6 with the cases of Okinawa, Jeju, and the Philippines (in the late 1980s and early 1990s).

Lastly, through their invocation of a specific history, these frames invoke and perpetuate a sense of collective identity, “an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place” (Melucci 1988, 342). No matter what the “definition” of the collective identity is, it is relational and involves distinguishing who is part of the collective identity and who is the “other” (Melucci 1988, 332). This process of “othering,” I argue, helps groups determine who to blame for their grievances and who can ameliorate them. Furthermore, as nationalism scholars note, identification with a group can create a powerful sense of solidarity. As Anderson (1983) famously noted, nations are “imagined communities” in that “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the imagination of their communion” (6). People feel powerful solidarity with other members of the nation, often not because of a personal relationship with them but by virtue of shared membership in this group.

I contend that this is true for many other groups and even sub-national groupings like provinces and municipalities as well. This identification with a group can be a powerful motivator for collective action: “the more someone identifies with a group, the higher the chances are that he or she will take part in collective action on behalf of that group” (Klandermans 2014, 8). Furthermore, activists can remind potential protesters of their belonging

(or not) to this collective identity and how this identity is different from other shared identities. I argue that in the case of Okinawa, this sense of collective identity fostered both solidarity among host communities and host nation citizens and distinguished them from others. In the cases of Okinawa and Jeju (as discussed in Chapters 3-5), anti-US-military activists reinforced how their identities are distinct from “Japanese-ness” or “Korean-ness.” In the case of the Philippines in the period mentioned, activists’ frames highlighted how the Philippines was different from the US and appealed for more independence from the US (after years of colonization).

Framing Contests and Coalitions

Finally, this study brings the concepts of framing contests and counterframing to bear on base politics. While this concept in the social movement literature has typically referred to framing contests between activists, I contend that in base politics and other issue areas, other actors contest activists’ frames as well. In this study, I also focus on political elites’ and the US military’s frames. While Kim (2023) has more recently brought the role of political elites into our understandings of anti-US-military movements, I focus specifically on their role as framers and introduce the US military itself as an actor who also engages in framing. Framing contests between anti-US-military activists and the US military itself are, unsurprisingly, common; activists problematize the US military presence while the US military highlights the benefits while downplaying the negatives. Framing contests between activists and local and national politicians do occur, though not always; in some cases, activists’ frames align with those of host nation elites, what I term a framing coalition. I find that when activists’ and host nation elites’ frames align, activists are more likely to be successful in mobilizing the public against the US military. However, when host nation elites’ and the US military’s frames align and contest

activists' frames, activists are less likely to be able to mobilize the public. Thus, I concur with Kim (2023) that elite allies can significantly help activists' mobilization efforts.

Political elites are important to consider in base politics not only because national governments are the actors who negotiate basing access but also because the state is more powerful than activists and other players. As Noakes and Johnston (2005) argue,

the state also engages in the struggle for cultural supremacy- albeit at a considerable advantage- by promoting frames that, if accepted, increase its legitimacy and expand its domain (Becker 1963). A state's legitimacy provides it with a unique advantage in the struggle for cultural supremacy. (18)

While a state's "legitimacy" has many facets, I adopt Tilly's (1985) conception of the relationship between the state and its citizens. States provide citizens protection against external and internal threats, "guarantees of rights, representative institutions, [and] courts of appeal" (181-183). In return, citizens recognize the state as an authority with a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and provide it with taxes. Thus, because of its legitimacy, the state's default position is that it will have more credibility than other actors, who are often at a power disadvantage. Additionally, because of this position, state officials have greater access to the media than other actors and thus, more "frequent opportunities to articulate their interpretations of events and issues. Given the ubiquity of official frames in media discourse, the frames advanced by state officials generally have considerable resonance with members of the public" (Noakes and Johnston 2005, 18). Thus, state frames are important to consider in relation to activists' frames as they may carry more credibility.

At a fundamental level, the host nation national government generally wants to maintain the US military presence, as evidenced by its security agreement with the US government.³⁰ In

³⁰ It is important to note, however, that this can change depending on who holds power; as I discuss in Chapters 4 and 7, different candidates and parties hold different stances about the US military presence. However, it is generally difficult to change basing agreements and even national leaders with anti-US-military stances have ultimately been unable to substantially change the US presence.

that regard, the national government has an incentive to frame the US presence as being a “good neighbor” to host nation residents. However, I argue that it is important to understand the state not as a monolithic entity but rather as a collection of groups and individuals that may have different interpretations and proffer different frames. The disaggregation of “the state” has two key implications. First, drawing upon Yeo’s (2011a) notion of “strong” and “weak” security consensus, I argue that there is a relatively unified elite frame when there is a strong consensus (national politicians agree that the US military presence is necessary for national security) and multiple elite frames when there is a weak consensus and national elite opinion over the US presence is divided. The result is that at a national level, anti-US-military activists’ frames will be less likely to mobilize the public when it contests a unified elite frame at the national level. At the same time, when national elite framing is fragmented, anti-US-military activists’ frames are more likely to align with at least some national elite discourse and are more likely to mobilize. Chapter 6 on national-level anti-US-military activism in the Philippines demonstrates how having some level of elite support for activists’ frames helped protest mobilization and vice-versa.

However, local political elites arguably have a greater impact on public opinion at the local level and the emergence of movements against a specific US deployment than national elites for a variety of reasons, especially in host communities that are far removed from the host nation capital. While the national government may promulgate a frame that the US military presence is necessary for national security, provincial and/or municipal governments may have divided frames or even frames that oppose the local US presence. Thus, I also argue that it is important to disaggregate the state into different subnational levels to understand mobilization variation within a host nation. Local elites are typically more attuned to local problems related to

a US military presence in their community, in part because many provincial and municipal governments have departments devoted to US military issues. Additionally, they likely are more concerned with local US military-civilian relations because they may have personal ties to the community they represent and/or the US military. Furthermore, in some host communities like Okinawa, local base politics is one of the top political issues that any prospective politician needs to take a stance on to have any hopes of being elected to office. Finally, local elites are likely to have more credibility in host communities that have a historically antagonistic relationship with the national government than national elites. In short, because local elites have more credibility with the local public, their interpretations or frames of the local US military presence is likely to resonate more with their respective host community. I demonstrate, for instance, that during the All-Okinawa Movement under study (which began in the early 2010s), the Okinawan prefectural government unequivocally opposed the plan to expand the US's Camp Schwab in Henoko. The US and Japanese national governments agreed upon this plan in the late 1990s and have adamantly continued with the plan despite local opposition, causing much friction between the Japanese and Okinawan governments. Thus, I argue that one reason that the All-Okinawa Movement has been successful in rallying public support is the Okinawan governments' frames about the Henoko construction have aligned with activists' interpretations of the issue.

Conclusion

As discussed in this chapter, troop visibility, a history of marginalization or colonialization, and whether activists have political elite allies who proffer similar anti-US-military frames are important factors that influence the likelihood that activists can mobilize the public against the US military en masse. Table 2.1 summarizes how each case in the study fits

along these dimensions. While I discuss the cases in depth in the subsequent chapters, I will provide a brief overview of them here. First, the case of Okinawa has been the subject of volumes of literature about base politics. In Chapters 3 and 4, I provide an in-depth analysis of the All-Okinawa Movement that emerged in the 2010s in response to the extension of Camp Schwab. This case, in a sense, is highly favorable to anti-US-military activism: there is high negative troop visibility, a history of marginalization vis-à-vis the US and the Japanese governments, and political elite allies. Given that this case “checks all the boxes,” it unsurprisingly features a high level of protest mobilization.

Anti-US-military activists in Yokosuka, outside of Tokyo, have been less successful in rallying the public against the US’s naval base there (also discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). This is because of Yokosuka’s identity as a military town, its relative lack of marginalization within Japan, the generally low or high positive troop visibility, and generally a lack of elite support. However, activists in Yokosuka were somewhat successful in mobilizing the public in the mid-2000s when US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers docked in Yokosuka, rendering the US presence highly visible but negative. In these instances, activists also had limited elite support (at least initially) and there were anti-US-military protests in the community. However, as nuclear-powered aircraft carriers have become more normalized in the community due to their increasing frequency in Yokosuka, and Yokosuka political elites have become agnostic about the ships, activists have been less able to rally the public on this issue over time.

Turning to South Korean anti-US-military activism in Chapter 5, the case of the movement in Gangjeong Village against the Jeju Naval Base resembles the Okinawan case in many ways. The base was highly visible, and activists problematized it in a variety of ways, including through drawing on Jeju’s history of marginalization. However, unlike in Okinawa,

activists received only mixed support from political elites at the local level (the village and provincial levels) and engaged in a variety of framing contests with the Korean national government. As activists were still able to rally the public to protest the base, it appears that while elite allies are helpful for a movement, they are not necessary for activists to mobilize the public *en masse*. Daegu also shares many similarities with its analytical counterpart, Yokosuka. This case is perhaps the most unfavorable to anti-US-military activism out of any in the study, as Daegu's current identity as a sort of conservative "king maker" in Korean politics, the low or high positive visibility of the US presence, and the lack of political allies makes it difficult for activists to rally the public against Daegu's US bases. Unsurprisingly, protests against the US bases in Daegu have been relatively low.

Case	Troop Visibility	Marginalization/ Colonization?	Elite Allies?	Level of Protest
Okinawa, Japan	High negative	Yes	Yes	High
Yokosuka, Japan	Low/High positive (usually)	No	Mixed	Low (generally)
Jeju, South Korea	High negative (until 2016)	Yes	Mixed	High (before 2016)
Daegu, South Korea	Low/High positive (usually)	No	No	Low
Philippines (late 1980s/early 1990s)	High negative	Yes	Yes	High
Philippines (post- 1999)	Low/High positive (usually)	Yes	Mixed	Low (generally)

Table 2.1 Summary of Cases in the Study

Finally, Chapter 6 features the case of the Philippines. This chapter is unique to the study in several aspects; it features national-level anti-US-military activism over time and showcases an instance where the US presence in a host nation is limited to the use of CSLs and FOLs. The first case in the Philippines focuses on the Anti-Treaty Movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Besides focusing on a national-level movement, this case is similar to Okinawa in many

ways: high troop visibility, history of colonization, and the presence of elite allies facilitating high levels of anti-US-military protest. The second case in the Philippines is more akin to Yokosuka and Daegu in that the troop visibility was generally low or high positive. However, as I discuss in Chapter 6, the nature of the US presence in the Philippines is different because there are no identifiable US bases, unlike in Yokosuka and Daegu, facilitating low troop visibility. At the same time, the US and Philippines governments have drawn attention to the US presence when it is “doing good” in the community. As in Yokosuka, anti-US-military activists in the VFA-era have had some political allies, but not nearly as many as in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Additionally, activists have at times been successful in the VFA-era when they take advantage of opportunities such as drawing attention to base-related crimes, such as the murder of Jennifer Laude in 2014, like activists do in Yokosuka when nuclear-powered carriers arrive. However, perhaps the greatest insight that the Philippines cases provide is that a frame that works at one point in time (sovereignty frames emphasizing the Philippines’ history as a former US colony) may fail to mobilize would-be protesters later after shifts in the political opportunity structure.

Chapter 3: Identity, Historical Framing, and Anti-US-Military Activism in Japan

On a sunny Sunday in May, activists in Yokosuka gathered at Verny Park on the waterfront to march through the city, denouncing the nearby US and Japanese naval bases. A monthly ritual, the group of about 25 people started their march the way they always did: making speeches through a microphone and speaker on wheels about their concerns. On this day, these ranged from specific concerns about nuclear-powered US aircraft carriers docking in the US's naval base (specifically "CVN 72," also known as the USS Abraham Lincoln) to broader concerns about the war in Ukraine and war in general. Interestingly, the protesters included a gentleman from Okinawa (whose wife was from a nearby town), who spoke about the expansion of Camp Schwab in Henoko. Although Okinawa is almost 1,000 miles away from Tokyo, the Henoko issue featured prominently in activists' discussions about the US military in Japan as they wielded signs with slogans like "Stop Landfill Work in Henoko Bay! Stop New US Base in Henoko!" (in English) and "No bases anywhere! Not in Okinawa, nor Kanagawa, nor Yokosuka" (*Kichiwa iranai! Okinawamo, Kanagawamo, Yokosukamo*). The march wound its way through Yokosuka, stopping outside the Japanese and US bases to make speeches directed at the soldiers inside, and ending at another city park. Although the participants were devoted to their cause, they were relatively few in number.

Weeks later, on a dreary weekend in June, a few hundred protesters gathered at the gates of Camp Schwab (a US marine base) in Henoko, Okinawa. Some were from Okinawa, some were from mainland Japan, and a few others came from abroad. On both sides of the street, people waved flags and held banners that said things like "No US Base!" (in English) or mentioned the construction taking place beyond the gates of Camp Schwab would damage the

local wildlife. Several people gave speeches about opposing this construction and gearing up for the upcoming election atop a van with a loudspeaker including politician Yoichi Iha, a former mayor of Ginowan City and current member of the Japanese Diet, and long-time Okinawan activist Suzuyo Takazato. Out of the speeches and banners, two messages were clear: the construction in Henoko is problematic and neither the Japanese nor US governments were listening to Okinawans' opinions.

Since the end of World War II, the US has maintained a military presence in Japan with military installations spread throughout the archipelago as a key feature of the countries' bilateral security agreement. Most studies of the US military in Japan focus on the US military in Okinawa and for good reason: anti-US-military sentiment is more visible in Okinawa than in other communities that host US military personnel. Various waves of protest against the US military presence in Okinawa have occurred since the US's occupation of the islands began post-World War II. Anti-US-military sentiment tends to rise in the wake of well-publicized crimes committed by US military personnel or base contractors, often resulting in large protests. For example, the 2016 rape and murder of Rina Shimabukuro by a US base contractor (and former marine) drew crowds of protesters of as many as 65,000 (McCurry 2016).

The Japanese mainland also hosts several large US bases, many within the vicinity of Tokyo, including the headquarters of US Forces Japan (USFJ) in Yokota Air Base and the headquarters of the US's 7th Fleet, its largest naval installation in the Pacific (Yokosuka). The communities which host these bases experience many of the same issues that Okinawans do, such as crimes committed by US military personnel or base contractors, base-related accidents, and noise pollution. However, the US military presence in the mainland host communities has historically met less local resistance than in Okinawa, even following base-related crimes or

accidents. For example, following the 2006 murder of Yoshie Sato by a US servicemember in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, there were few street demonstrations (Otake 2016). Why have there been larger and more frequent anti-US-military protests in Okinawa than in any mainland prefecture?

In this chapter, I argue that local identity and the visibility of the US military presence are key drivers of protest variation. In the case of Okinawa, activists implicitly or explicitly draw upon Okinawa's historical marginalization at the hands of the Japanese and US governments (what one Okinawan leader called "the Okinawan identity") to problematize the US military presence (Jin 2016, 567). In this sense, Okinawa's cultural stock is favorable to anti-US-military framing. As we will see in Chapter 5, a similar dynamic emerged in Jeju, South Korea, in the movement against the Jeju Naval Base. Additionally, activists in recent years have drawn upon transnational concepts like "human rights," "discrimination," and "indigenous rights" to appeal to a wider audience. The US military presence is generally visible and negative, with the recent All-Okinawa Movement problematizing base construction in Henoko and Okinawa's high density of US bases. In contrast, activists in communities like Yokosuka are more limited in their framing choices because the city has long identified itself as a military city, a challenge that activists in Daegu, South Korea have also confronted. Activists in Yokosuka have been more successful in mobilizing would-be protesters, however, when they have drawn upon national identity and anti-nuclear norms in particular to problematize US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers' port calls. Before beginning to analyze the impact of historical frames and local identity, I first provide an overview of the US military and anti-US-military activism in Japan.

An Overview of US Bases and Anti-US-Military Activism in Japan

The US military presence in Japan began after Japan's defeat in WWII, with more than 300,000 US troops stationed there during the 1950s (Smith 2006, 12). The so-called "San Francisco System" laid the foundation for the US-Japan security relationship, including a peace treaty between Japan and World War II's Allied Powers and a bilateral security treaty between the US and Japan (Hara 1999, 519). One of the most important aspects of the peace treaty in terms of the security relationship was Article 3, which granted the US "the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants" of several islands belonging to Japan, including the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa Prefecture) (Hara 1999, 536). Accordingly, the US governed Okinawa under the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) until Okinawa reverted to Japanese rule in 1972, after which the US could maintain military bases on the island (Inoue 2007, 42).

Since the inception of the 1951 peace treaty and the 1960 ANPO treaty,³¹ the security alliance has benefitted both Japanese and US interests. The number of US troops in Japan decreased significantly following the end of the Cold War but remains one of the US's largest military contingents abroad, with more than 50,000 US servicepeople stationed in Japan as of 2017 (Allen et al. 2020, 327). In terms of the land that the bases use across Japan,³² Okinawa prefecture hosts 70.26% of the US military bases (in surface area), followed by Aomori (9.0%), Kanagawa (5.6%), Tokyo (5.0%), Yamaguchi (3.3%) and Nagasaki (1.8%) prefectures (Hikotani et al. 2022, 336, Footnote 19). In terms of the number of bases, Okinawa hosts the most bases which the US owns or jointly uses with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) (14), followed

³¹ Officially named the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan" (also known as *Anpo Jōyaku* in Japan). The ANPO treaty notably granted the US "the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan" in the name of Japanese and regional security (Mason 2012, 12).

³² These figures include bases that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces jointly uses with the US military.

by Kanagawa (7), Tokyo (4), Hiroshima (3), and the rest of the prefectures hosting one or two bases each (Allen et al. 2021). Japan hosts troops from each US military branch except for the Coast Guard (Lostumbo et al. 2013). Most of the US military bases in Okinawa are Marine bases (such as Marine Corps Air Station [MCAS] Futenma, Camp Schwab, and other camps that are part of the Marine Corps Base Camp Smedley Butler complex), except Kadena (Air Force Base [AFB]) and Torii Station (Army). The other prefectures host a variety of US military bases across service branches including (but not limited to) Misawa (Aomori) and Yokota (Tokyo) Air Bases, Camp Zama (Kanagawa) Army base, MCAS Iwakuni (Yamaguchi), and naval facilities Atsugi (Kanagawa), Yokosuka (Kanagawa), and Sasebo (Nagasaki) (Lostumbo et al. 2013). Additionally, smaller installations and facilities that the US shares with the SDF exist in Chiba, Fukuoka, Hokkaido, Oita, Saitama, and Shizuoka prefectures.

The base politics literature suggests that, overall, the relationship between the US military presence abroad and the communities that host it is typically harmonious (Allen et al. 2020). However, opposition to the US military does occur in host communities in the form of protests, including in Japan. Discussed in greater detail in the subsequent sections, anti-US-military activism has been the most visible in Okinawa, with several waves of activism since the 1950s. In Okinawa, mass protests occurred as a result of land expropriation by the US in the mid-1950s (the All-Island Struggle), in support of reversion to Japanese rule in the 1960s and early 1970s (the Reversion Movement), after a 1995 rape of an Okinawan girl by US marines, and the All-Okinawa Movement, which started around 2012-2013 in response to the deployment of Osprey helicopters to the US bases in Okinawa. However, anti-base protest has not been confined to Okinawa. Mass anti-US-military protests also occurred in the Greater Tokyo Area³³ in the 1950s

³³ The Tokyo Metropolitan Government defines the “Greater Tokyo Area” as consisting of the Tokyo Metropolis, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama prefectures.

and early 1960s as a result of land expropriation and base expansion in Tachikawa (known as the Sunagawa Struggle) and the 1960s and 1970s around the renewal of the US-Japan security alliance (the anti-ANPO protests). Local communities have also at times protested the US military presence, albeit with lower turnout numbers and fewer protests. For example, locals have protested facilities used jointly by the US and the SDF in Hokkaido (Seaton and Kageyama 2010, 3). Further, a localized movement has opposed noise pollution from and the expansion of the Iwakuni Marine base in Yamaguchi prefecture (Sakai 2011; Jin 2014). As discussed in this chapter, activists in the host community in Yokosuka, Kanagawa prefecture, have also consistently protested the US naval base, especially when nuclear-powered aircraft carriers dock there. Figures 3.1a, 3.1b and 3.2 below depict the number of anti-US-base protests for each prefecture that hosts a US military base from 2000 to 2019.




Figure 3.1a: Distribution of Anti-US-Military Protests and US Bases in Japan, 2000-2019³⁴

³⁴ Prefectures in white do not host a US base.



Figure 3.1b: Frequency of Anti-US-Military Protests in Okinawa Prefecture, 2000-2019




Figure 3.2: Anti-US-Military Protests by Japanese Host Prefecture, 2000-2019

Figure 3.1a presents the distribution of anti-US-military protests in a choropleth map with the US base locations depicted as red dots while Figure 3.2 contains the protest data in a bar chart across each Japanese prefecture that hosts a US base, disaggregated by size of protest. As the figures suggest, protests against the US military presence have been significantly higher in Okinawa prefecture than any other base hosting prefecture for the last 20 years. Furthermore, as Figure 3.3 shows, many of the protests in Tokyo are about the US bases in Okinawa. As Figure 3.2 shows, many of the anti-US-military protests are large with over 1,000 participants. In some sense, this may be unsurprising given the number of bases in Okinawa, as depicted in Figure 3.1a. However, Allen et al. (2020) found that globally, greater contact between US military personnel and host nation citizens facilitated more positive perceptions of the US military presence. Therefore, by this logic, a host community like Okinawa with a high concentration of bases may be *less* likely to hold negative views of and protest the US military presence. In this sense, the causes of anti-US-military protest variation across Japanese prefectures are not obvious.




Figure 3.3: Anti-US-Military Protests in Tokyo Against US Bases in Okinawa, 2000-2019

Note that the left bar represents protests about Tokyo-area bases or the US military presence in Japan more broadly, while the right bar represents protests about bases in Okinawa.




Figure 3.4: Anti-US-Military Protests in Japan, 2000-2019 (Mainland and Okinawa)

Figure 3.4 provides a view of anti-US-base protests in Japan over time, with protests disaggregated between Okinawa and the Japanese mainland. Figure 3.4 supports the picture presented in Figure 3.2 that anti-US-base protests in Okinawa make up the greatest proportion of anti-US-base protests in Japan. Furthermore, anti-base protests in Okinawa increased over the last ten years of the data, beginning around 2009 with the election of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) politician Yukio Hatoyama as prime minister (Kawato 2015). Unlike his predecessors, Hatoyama promised in his election platform to reduce the number of US bases in Okinawa and stop the expansion of Camp Schwab there (Kawato 2015; McCormack and Norimatsu 2018). Two interviewees identified this as a critical juncture in Okinawan activism against the US military presence because it “seemed like something good may happen” and felt like “we can say no” to the US and Japanese governments (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, July 14, 2019; Interview, Okinawan journalist, July 22, 2019). As Figure 3.4 shows, protests increased not only in Okinawa, but also on the mainland following Hatoyama’s election, in part because protests against the Henoko construction also occurred in Tokyo (Alabaster 2010). Hatoyama ultimately was unsuccessful in persuading not only the US government but bureaucrats within his own administration to abandon the expansion plan, resigning at the end of 2010 after not being able to live up to his electoral promises (Kim 2017, 184). There was a decline in anti-US-military protests in 2011, likely related to Hatoyama’s resignation the previous year and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster at the beginning of 2011 (which may have shifted activists’ focus to nuclear issues, at least temporarily). Anti-US-military activism continued to increase in 2012 with the controversial deployment of the Osprey helicopters to the prefecture. As discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, the Osprey controversy sparked the emergence of the All-Okinawa Movement, which corresponds with the higher protest numbers after 2012. This movement, as

detailed later in the chapter, focused primarily on opposing the expansion of Camp Schwab in Henoko. What, then, causes this variation in anti-US-military activism across Japanese prefectures?

Historical Framing, Public Opinion, and Protest

One answer to this question is that the frames, specific interpretations of an event, that activists use in Okinawa resonate more with their target audience than those elsewhere in Japan. As argued in Chapter 2, a key factor in frame resonance in anti-US-military activism in terms of mobilizing the public is the extent to which activists' frames emphasize a history of marginalization vis-à-vis the US military and/or the national government in the case of local activism. It is not enough for a host nation or a host community to have historically contentious relations with the US and/or their own governments; activists must actively remind people of local identity and historical grievances through framing. This framing encourages people to make sense of current events through a historical lens, attaching specific meanings and emotions from the past to the present. Okinawan activists have often employed this strategy, connecting the prefecture's historic marginalization to the US military presence.

Kim (2023) argues that pragmatic framing is more effective in mobilizing the public to protest against the US military presence because it is more tangible to their daily lives. However, if pragmatic frames are more likely to mobilize people against the US military, it is puzzling why activists in host communities like Okinawa problematize the US presence in terms of the past through ideological or sovereignty frames, which often include elements of anti-war sentiment or sovereignty claims. For example, in an interview, a prominent Okinawan activist, Hiroji Yamashiro, stated that “bases can only bring the menace and victimization of war. This is the

lesson Okinawa learned seventy-two years ago. From the movement to stop construction of the base at Henoko [...] Okinawa can build on the principle of peace” (McCormack 2017).

Yamashiro was referring to the Battle of Okinawa between the US and Japanese forces during World War II in which a third of Okinawans died (A. Johnson 2019, 86). As discussed below, the legacy of the conflict is that Okinawans do not trust the Japanese government to protect them (Kirk 2013, 12). Historical framing is not simply an Okinawan phenomenon, however. As I show in Chapters 5 and 6, activists in South Korea and the Philippines have also employed historical frames with success to problematize the US military presence, invoking elements of anti-militarism and sovereignty claims.

Historical framing has been an effective strategy in historically marginalized communities for two major reasons. First, historical framing taps into a local collective identity by invoking symbols and myths that are particularly meaningful to the collective. It distinguishes the target population as having a particular collective identity and the US military and/or the rest of the host nation as the “other.” Through invoking a collective identity, historical framing also heightens a sense of solidarity between members of the community, even if they have never met (Anderson 1983, 6). In this sense, it is unsurprising that historical framing would help to mobilize members of a marginalized community. Second, historical framing about the plights of these historically marginalized communities also mobilizes people *outside* of the community. While many anti-US-military movements are localized, as Kim (2023) notes, others, such as those in Okinawa and Jeju, have mobilized people from both their respective “mainlands” and other countries. In some cases, this is a function of activist networks. Some activists involved in an anti-US-military campaign elsewhere or anti-military activism in general have become involved in these movements. However, others have become involved in the movements in

Okinawa and Jeju without having previously participated in anti-US-military activism or activism in general. As Jasper and Poulsen (1995) note, “strangers” and “friends” are recruited through different mechanisms, “through existing organizations and networks, and through moral shocks. No doubt all movements use both” (499).

Colleagues and I conducted a framing experiment to test the impact of historical framing on Japanese attitudes towards the US bases in Okinawa and the US-Japan security alliance more generally.³⁵ This experiment allows us to isolate the effect of historical frames from other frame types (such as pragmatic framing) and from the political opportunity structure. As discussed in Chapter 1, we administered nearly identical surveys to two sample groups: the Japanese public in general³⁶ and the Okinawan public specifically.³⁷ For both surveys, each respondent was randomly assigned to one of three groups: the control group, a historical treatment group, or a group for another experiment unrelated to the historical frame experiment. In each sample, the historical statement group was further separated into three groups, each corresponding to a statement that references a way that the Japanese or US government has marginalized Okinawa in the past. While there are many episodes of Okinawan grievance that appear in activists’ historical frames, I focus on three specific ones: the Battle of Okinawa during WWII, the USCAR administration of Okinawa in the immediate post-WWII period, and Okinawa’s reversion to Japanese rule in 1972. Takeshi Onaga, the former governor of Okinawa prefecture and one of the key figures of the All-Okinawa Movement, identified these historical events as “constituting the Okinawan identity” (Jin 2016, 567).

³⁵ Takako Hikotani (Gakushuin University), Yusaku Horiuchi (Dartmouth College), and Atsushi Tago (Waseda University) collaboratively designed this survey.

³⁶ The national survey includes 100 respondents from Okinawa.

³⁷ The national survey asked respondents to record their prefecture of residence while the Okinawa survey asked for respondents’ towns of residence.

Table 3.1 below summarizes the episodes and frames used in the experiment. These episodes occurred in the relatively recent past (WWII and onward) and thus there are likely many people alive in Okinawa today who have either lived through these events or have heard stories about them through older relatives. This is in contrast, for example, to the Meiji government's annexation of Okinawa (formerly a separate political entity known as the Ryukyu Kingdom) in 1879 and the subsequent introduction of Japan's assimilation policies in Okinawa (Inoue 2007, 56). Those policies promoted assimilation through education and military service and banned Okinawans from practicing Ryukyuan customs or language (Inoue 2007, 56; A. Johnson 2019, 23). This is another contentious episode that anti-US-military activists' frames sometimes invoke, but it may not have the same personal connections and meanings as more recent events and resonates less in other Japanese communities.

Additionally, the three events highlight different targets. Per Snow et al. (1986), the identification of a culprit (prognostication) is a core framing task; would-be protesters need to have a target to blame for a problem. Varying the target allows us to identify if different targets are associated with more negative perceptions and protest (or vice-versa). While the US military instigated the Battle of Okinawa, "the Okinawan memory is more of the neglect, abuse, deprivation, and even killing suffered at the hands of Japan's own forces than of the civilian casualties caused by the US attacks" (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 23). When activists invoke this event in their anti-US-military frames, they are reminding Okinawans of the past "neglect, abuse, deprivation, and even killing" perpetuated by their own national government and questioning the extent to which the Japanese government should be trusted on US base-related issues specifically or in general. A 2020 survey suggests that Okinawans support the national government less than mainland Japanese citizens, specifically the cabinet of the late Shinzo Abe,

with 18.7% of Okinawan respondents and 39.4% of national respondents having a favorable view (*Ryukyu Shimpo* 2020).

Conversely, the US military is the culprit in the second episode of grievance, when USCAR governed Okinawa. In this case, activists often highlight both the land expropriation, which the US military used to construct its military bases, and crimes attributed to US military personnel. The reversion episode is about both the US military and the Japanese government as target. It reminds Okinawans about the problems they experienced under the USCAR administration and the fact that, even after reversion to Japanese rule, the US bases remained and, in their opinion, US servicemembers could commit crimes in Okinawa with few consequences; the Japanese government did not protect them. This last episode is perhaps the most salient given that it occurred more recently, and more Okinawans may have their own memories of this period.

Event	Frame	Variable Name
Battle of Okinawa (1945)	“The people of Okinawa were treated unfairly by the Japanese government during the Battle of Okinawa during World War II.”	<i>WW2</i>
USCAR Administration of Okinawa (1945-1972)	“The people of Okinawa were treated unfairly by the US military when Okinawa was under the control of the United States after World War II.”	<i>USCAR</i>
Reversion to Japanese Rule (1972)	“The people of Okinawa were treated unfairly by the Japanese government at the time of the return of Okinawa.”	<i>Reversion</i>

Table 3.1: Framing Experiment in Japan

1945: The Battle of Okinawa

During the final year of WWII, the US invaded Okinawa. In addition to thousands of US and Japanese troops, a third of Okinawa's population died during the two-month clash (A. Johnson 2019, 24). Unsurprisingly, this is a particularly bitter episode in Okinawan memory regarding both the Japanese and US militaries. Okinawans believe that the Japanese government "sacrificed" the prefecture to the US, using it as a buffer between the surging US forces and the Japanese mainland (Cooley and Marten 2006, 569; Inoue 2007, 59; McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 23). This perception is primarily based on several accounts that indicate that the Japanese officers in Okinawa directed civilians to commit suicide rather than be captured by US troops (Inoue 2007, 61; McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 21–25; A. Johnson 2019, 88). While the US troops treated captured Okinawan civilians better than Japanese officials led Okinawans to believe, the US military did kill Okinawans and held them captive in internment camps where they faced disease, starvation, and/or rape (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 29). This episode was particularly bitter for Okinawans after decades of the Japanese government suppressing Okinawans' native culture to develop them into Japanese citizens (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 23; A. Johnson 2019, 79). The Battle of Okinawa and its immediate aftermath suggested to Okinawans that they were/are treated as second-class Japanese citizens.

In more recent years, the Japanese government itself has revisited the Battle of Okinawa and rekindled Okinawan grievances through textbook revisions. In 2007, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) ordered Japanese history textbooks to omit the mention of mass suicides in Okinawa, triggering massive protests in Okinawa (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 33).

Post 1945-1972: US Administration of Okinawa

During and immediately after the Battle of Okinawa, the only land battle on Japan's home territory during WWII, the US military placed Okinawans who surrendered or were captured into internment camps (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018; Johnson 2019). While Okinawans remained in the camps, "eighteen thousand hectares, about 8 percent of the land of the prefecture, was requisitioned, forty thousand landowners lost their land, and twelve thousand households their homes" for US base construction (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 78). After the USCAR government was established in Okinawa, land expropriation continued, and Okinawan resistance became more visible and confrontational. In 1953 for example, over a thousand Okinawan residents attempted to stop the US military from razing their land, resulting in a physical altercation with the US military (A. Johnson 2019, 116–17). The US military's expropriation of Okinawan land inflamed local grievances not solely because of the heavy-handed way that the US acquired the land but also because of the value of the land to Okinawans. Okinawa's economy was traditionally agrarian, with approximately 70% of Okinawans working in agriculture before the war (Kagotani and Yanai 2014, 106). However, the US military expropriated prime farming land for base construction: approximately 20% of all arable farmland in the prefecture was used by the US military by the mid-1950s (Miller 2014, 972). The expropriation of Okinawa land was also problematic because of cultural connections to land and the fact that some of the land the US acquired hosted traditional Okinawan burial grounds (A. Johnson 2019, 117). Perhaps most grievously, the US military did not compensate Okinawans at the fair market rate for their land, if they compensated landowners at all (Miller 2014; Kawato 2015; Johnson 2019).

This was also a strained moment in the Okinawan-US military relationship because of the prevalence of crimes attributed to the US military under the USCAR administration. By one estimate, “in the first six months of 1949, American soldiers robbed and/or assaulted forty-nine, raped eighteen, and murdered twenty-nine innocent [Okinawans]” (A. Johnson 2019, 50). Some crimes in the early occupation years were particularly heinous, including the “rape and murder of a six-year-old girl” (Souillac 2009, 5). In many instances, US military personnel implicated in these crimes were acquitted due to ambiguity over jurisdictional rights, adding insult to injury (Inoue 2007; Mason 2012; Johnson 2019). Taken together, these factors facilitated the emergence of the first Okinawan anti-US-military movement, the All-Island Struggle.

1972: Reversion to Japanese Rule

Despite the bitterness between Okinawa and the Japanese government due their contentious past, Okinawans overwhelmingly sought to revert to Japanese rule from USCAR governance. One poll reported that as many as 90% of Okinawans wanted to return to Japan (Inoue 2007, 52). There were several major reasons for Okinawans’ desire to return. First, proponents felt that Okinawans would be better protected in cases of base-related crimes and accidents if they had full Japanese citizenship; under USCAR, Okinawa was “a “stateless” land, wherein people were entitled neither to U.S. nor Japanese citizenship” (Inoue 2007, 42). Base-related crimes and accidents continued into the 1960s and pro-reversion Okinawans believed that perpetrators were more likely to be held accountable by the Japanese government (Kawato 2015). Second, Okinawans were concerned that the US bases housed nuclear weapons, especially given the emerging Cold War, and generally opposed the involvement of the bases in the US’s conflict in Vietnam. Proponents of reversion, therefore, believed that by returning to Japanese rule, the Japanese constitution (especially Article 9, which renounces Japan’s right to

offensive war) would apply directly to Okinawa (Kawato 2015; McCormack and Norimatsu 2018; Johnson 2019). The US and Japan ultimately agreed that Okinawa should return to Japanese rule, that nuclear weapons should remain out of the prefecture, but that the US would retain basing access in Okinawa (Inoue 2007; Kawato 2015). Additionally, Okinawans believed that reversion would stop the land expropriation that occurred under USCAR rule. Although Okinawans believed that they would have more rights as Japanese citizens (again) and more recourse against base-related incidents, their hopes did not come to pass. It is for this reason that Okinawans do not celebrate the anniversary of Okinawa's reversion to Japanese rule, despite the Japanese government's efforts to cast the reversion as a positive event.

As discussed previously, activists invoke these historical episodes to problematize the US military presence in Okinawa, mobilizing both Okinawans and people from elsewhere (to a lesser extent). To what extent do these events influence people's opinion of the US-Japan alliance (the reason that US military bases are in Okinawa)? And what is the relationship between people's opinions of the claims in these frames and their participation in anti-US-military activism? Table 3.2 below provides a description of the key variables used to answer these questions. For the first question, I used *USCAR*, *WW2*, and *Reversion* as the key independent variables of interest and *Sec. Treaty* as the dependent variable in the ordered logistic regression models. For the question about activism, I used *Hist. Frame* as the key independent variable and *Activism* as the dependent variable in the hurdle regression models. I also incorporated a series of control variables that pertain to respondents' characteristics across the regressions: *Party*, *Gender*, *Education*, *Age*, and *Income*.

Variable Name	Survey Question³⁸	Operationalization
<i>USCAR</i>	[Randomly assigned to USCAR frame treatment group]	1 for inclusion into treatment group, 0 for exclusion
<i>WW2</i>	[Randomly assigned to Battle of Okinawa frame treatment group]	1 for inclusion into treatment group, 0 for exclusion
<i>Reversion</i>	[Randomly assigned to Reversion frame treatment group]	1 for inclusion into treatment group, 0 for exclusion
<i>Sec. Treaty</i>	“Japan currently has a security treaty with the United States. Do you think that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is useful for peace and security in Japan or not?”	Not at all important (1) to very important (4) ³⁹
<i>Hist. Frame</i>	“The following is one opinion on the historical experience of Okinawa. [After respondents see the historical frame] How much do you agree with or disagree with this opinion?”	Disagree (1) to agree (5)
<i>Activism</i>	“Have you ever participated in or will participate in any of the following activities? Select all that apply.”	No reported anti-US-military activism (0) to participated in all forms of activism (10)

Table 3.2: Key Variables

³⁸ We conducted the survey in Japanese; the English translations are included here for accessibility.

³⁹ The survey included an option for “don’t know,” which has been excluded here for clarity.

	National Survey	Okinawa Survey
USCAR	0.2424** (0.1185)	-0.0305 (0.1946)
WW2	0.1561 (0.1207)	-0.0677 (0.2109)
Reversion	0.1554 (0.1191)	-0.2848 (0.1957)
Party	0.4342*** (0.0404)	0.4084*** (0.0689)
Gender	-0.5534*** (0.0770)	-0.4065*** (0.1309)
Education	0.0030 (0.0280)	-0.0169 (0.0476)
Age	0.0111*** (0.0024)	-0.0014 (0.0056)
Income	0.0273 (0.0211)	0.0405 (0.0406)
1 2	-1.9653*** (0.2007)	-1.8061*** (0.3434)
2 3	-0.6512*** (0.1915)	-0.4695 (0.3365)
3 4	1.9466*** (0.1954)	1.7763*** (0.3433)
AIC	5958.9109	2273.3201
BIC	6023.9958	2326.2438
Log Likelihood	-2968.4554	-1125.6601
Deviance	5936.9109	2251.3201
Num. obs.	2743	908

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table 3.3: Frame Exposure and Opinion of US-Japan Security Alliance (Ordered Logit)

Table 3.3 above presents the results of the ordered logistical regression to test the impact of exposure to anti-US-military historical frames on opinions about the US-Japan Security Alliance. The only statistically significant relationship across both models is between the USCAR historical frame treatment in the national survey (the first model) and respondents'

opinions of the US-Japan security alliance and its usefulness to Japanese security. However, the relationship is not in the predicted direction; exposure to the USCAR frame is associated with *higher* levels of support for the US-Japan alliance than the levels of support among respondents in the control group. As Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 shows, this relationship is robust across differently worded survey questions about the US-Japan Security Alliance. However, as Figure A2.2 in Appendix 2 also shows, the magnitude of the relationship is small; while exposure to the USCAR frame does impact one's opinion of the US-Japan Security Alliance, it is a minor impact. Mainland Japanese citizens do not have the same memory of or relationship to USCAR as those in Okinawa. As mentioned, part of Okinawans' aversion to USCAR is the land expropriation for bases that took place. Some interviewees mentioned the land expropriation as a reason for higher levels of anti-US-military protest in Okinawa versus the mainland (Interview, Japanese politician, June 13, 2022). Additionally, the USCAR frame may be a reminder for Japanese citizens in general that the US has been involved in protecting Japan for decades. Some of the open-ended answers to the survey convey this sentiment, highlighting the importance of US protection and Okinawa's role in Japanese security as a host of several US bases. Some answers also suggest that some mainland Japanese citizens do not believe that Okinawans were marginalized during this episode.

Historical Frames and Anti-US-Military Activism

Table 3.4 below presents a series of hurdle regression models across the national survey treatment groups using the protest activity as the dependent variable. Hurdle regressions are two-part models that separate observations of the dependent variable where the value is zero from those where the value is above zero. In this case, the first part of the model contains observations

where the respondent reported they did not participate in the forms of anti-US-military activism listed and the second part of the model contains responses from people who reported engaging in activism. Turning first to the “zero” models, the negative and statistically significant intercept across all models suggests that non-activism is more likely than activism. Indeed, the bar graphs of the *Activism* variable for both surveys in Appendix 2 (Figures A2.3-A2.4) show that most respondents did not participate in any anti-US-military activism. However, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship in the zero models between all the frame treatment groups and *Activism*. This suggests that across all groups, higher levels of agreement with respondents’ respective historical frames are associated with a greater likelihood of anti-US-military activism. Additionally, in the Battle of Okinawa group, higher levels of agreement with the frame are associated with higher levels of anti-US-military activism. This supports the notion that those who participate in anti-US-military activism are moved to action by activists’ historical frames. Indeed, explicit or implicit references to these events are present at many anti-US-military protests in or about Okinawa. For example, at a 2014 protest, in reference to the Battle of Okinawa, another activist stated that “the world needs to know the sufferings of Okinawa — both during World War II and today. We want peace in Asia and no military bases on our island” (Mitchell 2014). At the same time, this analysis only shows that there is a correlation, not necessarily a causal relationship. As Tables A2.2 and A2.3 in Appendix 2 show, most respondents tended to agree with the sentiment in their framing treatment. Taken together, it suggests that these historical frames are marginally influential in that some of those who agree with them participate in anti-US-military activism but do not persuade others. It may be that Japanese citizens are already familiar enough with these historical events and their linkages to the

contemporary US military presence in Japan that they have already formed immutable opinions about them that framing alone cannot sway.

	USCAR Frame	WW2 Okinawa Frame	Reversion Frame
Count: Intercept	0.7403 (0.8711)	0.9684 (0.6230)	0.6496 (1.0864)
Count: Hist. Frame	0.1410 (0.1465)	0.2445** (0.1138)	0.1042 (0.1542)
Count: Party	0.0385 (0.2275)	-0.0834 (0.1218)	0.0990 (0.1906)
Count: Gender	-0.5476 (0.3474)	-0.4966** (0.2213)	-0.3702 (0.3521)
Count: Education	-0.0170 (0.1479)	-0.0302 (0.0805)	0.1857 (0.1278)
Count: Age	-0.0131 (0.0127)	-0.0126* (0.0074)	-0.0119 (0.0113)
Count: Income	0.0149 (0.0882)	0.0265 (0.0548)	-0.1405 (0.0899)
Log(theta)	1.6583 (1.4217)	2.7072* (1.4198)	1.5366 (1.0916)
Zero: Intercept	-4.3369*** (1.0065)	-3.1553*** (1.0428)	-3.9604*** (1.0508)
Zero: Hist. Frame	0.3729** (0.1813)	0.4675** (0.1884)	0.8025*** (0.2002)
Zero: Party Ideology	0.5109*** (0.1931)	0.1322 (0.1810)	0.3941** (0.1908)
Zero: Gender	0.0728 (0.3486)	0.0889 (0.3595)	-0.1914 (0.3489)
Zero: Education	0.1980 (0.1337)	0.0360 (0.1268)	-0.0324 (0.1411)
Zero: Age	-0.0118 (0.0110)	-0.0374*** (0.0117)	-0.0323*** (0.0116)
Zero: Income	0.0482 (0.0909)	0.2260* (0.0892)	0.1506 (0.0986)
AIC	405.2358	438.7109	413.5510
Log Likelihood	-187.6179	-204.3555	-191.7755
Num. obs.	353	355	356

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table 3.4: National Survey Results by Treatment Group- Reported Anti-US-Military Activism (Hurdle)

Turning to the Okinawa survey in Table 3.5, we see that, like in the national survey, the negative and statistically significant coefficients for the intercepts in the USCAR and Battle of Okinawa models suggests that for these respondents, non-action is more likely than any form of activism. There is only one treatment group, the USCAR group, in which higher levels of agreement with the historical statement are associated with a higher likelihood of participating in

some anti-US-military activism. This partially reflects the previous discussion that, although the USCAR frame may mean something different in mainland Japan, Okinawans, particularly those who participate in activism, feel aggrieved by the USCAR government in Okinawa. Additionally, for both the USCAR and Reversion treatment groups, higher levels of agreement with their respective statements are associated with higher levels of anti-US-military activism. As mentioned, the land expropriation that took place under the USCAR government remains a contentious issue in Okinawa, one way that Okinawa is distinct from other base-hosting Japanese prefectures. Reversion to Japanese rule is another issue that commonly emerges in Okinawan activism. At a 2000 protest, for example, Yoshikazu Nakasone, a leader of the Okinawa Peace Action Center referenced Okinawa's reversion to Japanese rules in 1972 by stating that "Despite the fact that Okinawa was returned to Japan 28 years ago, Okinawa still houses 75 percent of the US military based in Japan and this is an aberrant situation for us" (*Agence France Presse*).

	USCAR Frame	WW2 Okinawa Frame	Reversion Frame
Count: Intercept	0.0989 (1.2541)	2.7506 [*] (1.5491)	-7.4879 [*] (4.4681)
Count: Hist. Frame	0.6319 ^{**} (0.2786)	-0.1559 (0.2522)	0.7215 ^{**} (0.3485)
Count: Party	0.5597 (0.3441)	0.2779 (0.2615)	0.0169 (0.3312)
Count: Gender	0.3998 (0.3172)	-1.2387 ^{**} (0.6103)	1.8222 (1.3555)
Count: Education	-0.2877 ^{**} (0.1251)	0.0806 (0.2002)	-0.1514 (0.2485)
Count: Age	-0.0348 ^{**} (0.0173)	-0.0303 (0.0282)	0.0833 (0.0545)
Count: Income	0.1001 (0.0888)	0.0018 (0.1671)	0.4154 [*] (0.2379)
Log(theta)	2.9636 (3.6577)	0.4355 (0.9949)	-0.1695 (1.1664)
Zero: Intercept	-5.8472 ^{***} (1.5428)	-2.9994 [*] (1.6032)	-2.7579 (1.6911)
Zero: Hist. Frame	0.5428 ^{**} (0.2471)	0.2515 (0.2359)	0.3890 (0.2500)
Zero: Party	0.1607 (0.2995)	0.5234 ^{**} (0.2550)	0.0999 (0.2617)
Zero: Gender	0.4841 (0.4929)	-0.0183 (0.5214)	-0.6888 (0.5194)
Zero: Age	0.1270 (0.1856)	-0.1631 (0.1900)	0.1598 (0.1773)
Zero: Education	0.0334 (0.0243)	0.0099 (0.0234)	-0.0024 (0.0220)
Zero: Income	0.0785 (0.1779)	0.1078 (0.1496)	-0.1034 (0.1757)
AIC	226.2725	227.8800	245.5383
Log Likelihood	-98.1363	-98.9400	-107.7691
Num. obs.	116	116	121

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table 3.5: Okinawa Survey Results by Treatment Group- Reported Anti-US-Military Activism (Hurdle)

Discussion of Survey Results

Taken together, there is limited support for the contention that historical framing alone impacts public opinion of and protest against the US military. Exposure to the USCAR frame in the national survey had a statistically significant relationship with views of the alliance, albeit in the opposite direction from what I predicted. Exposure to this frame is associated with more support for the alliance; as discussed, there are a variety of reasons that this may be true. At the same time, exposure to any of the historical frames was not associated with a statistically significant relationship with opinions about the alliance among Okinawan respondents. This

suggests that these statements may not influence people's views of the US-Japan alliance, even in Okinawa, a prefecture in which frequent anti-US-military protests occur. It may be that Okinawans are already familiar with these statements and that these sentiments have already impacted their opinions about the security alliance. It may also be that even though they may agree with these sentiments, some Okinawans believe that the US-Japan security alliance is important to Japanese security, including their own. An interview with a representative from the Okinawan prefectural government perhaps captures this sentiment best. The Okinawan official said that the prefectural government "appreciates" the US-Japan security alliance and as the US bases are part of this agreement, their position is not to remove all of the US bases from Okinawa but rather to reduce the number of bases in the prefecture (Interview, Okinawan prefectural government official, July 25, 2019). As I discuss in greater detail in the sections that follow, the major contemporary anti-US-military movement in Okinawa, the All-Okinawa Movement, was not focused on total base removal but rather the relocation of one base outside of the prefecture.

The survey responses also suggest that most Japanese people do not engage in anti-US-military activism and when they do, it tends to be a relatively low-stakes form of activism, petition signing. Most activists and non-activists agreed with their respective historical statement about Okinawa's historical marginalization. However, in several treatment groups, activists were more likely to agree with these statements, as expected. Based on these findings, there appear to be many residents in both the Japanese mainland and Okinawa who believe that Okinawa has been historically marginalized, but do not engage in anti-US-military activism. This suggests that there is a pool of potential participants that activists have yet to reach.

However, one important limitation to the survey is that the historical statements that most respondents saw are often part of Okinawan activists' anti-US-military frames, but are

incomplete. While these statements describe a problem (the diagnostic framing function) and identify who is to blame (the prognostication function), they do not contain information about how to redress this problem (the motivational function). For example, the Battle of Okinawa was a tragedy in that almost a third of the Okinawan population died during the conflict, and the Japanese government played a role, but what can people in the present do about it, over 70 years later? This suggests that it is not simply a matter of history that Okinawans especially protest the US bases in the prefecture but rather a matter of activist agency in using a historical lens to problematize the US bases in the present. As one Okinawan activist wrote,

it is the bitter lesson of the Battle of Okinawa from which survivors continue to suffer today that armies do not protect people, but cause great bloodshed. Those with experience of the Battle of Okinawa feel a growing sense of crisis that the construction of a new military base at Henoko might raise Asian tensions even higher and lead to a repeat of the catastrophe of war on these islands (Urashima 2013, 3)

This activist is implying that the construction at Camp Schwab in Henoko could bring another brutal conflict to Okinawa and in this sense, stopping the construction would limit the possibility of another Battle of Okinawa in the islands. It may thus be that the crucial part of the frame in this case is the motivational piece, linking past grievances to current issues.

Similarly, it may be that we cannot understand frames' impact separately from the political opportunity structure in which they are deployed. For example, the reversion statement that the Japanese government treated Okinawans' unfairly when Okinawa reverted to Japanese rule may not influence people's impact of the US-Japan alliance. However, activists deploying a frame that the Japanese government has treated Okinawans' unfairly since Okinawa reverted to Japanese rule because Okinawa still maintains a large proportion of US bases in Japan in the wake of a US soldier committing a crime may be more likely to impact Okinawan and mainland Japanese residents. In this sense, the context in which frames are deployed also matters for their mobilization power. As I show in the following sections, these historical frames work in

Okinawa because they are drawing up Okinawa's local identity. In some communities like Yokosuka, however, there are not such historical events that lend themselves to problematizing the US military; indeed, Yokosuka's identity makes it difficult for activists to mobilize the public against the US military and constrains activists' framing choices.

[“There Will Be No Stopping the Okinawan Resistance:” The All-Okinawa Movement⁴⁰](#)

When people think about anti-US-military protests and activism, often the example that comes to mind is the Okinawan anti-US-military movement. Indeed, Okinawa has arguably both the longest history of activism against the US military and the largest protests of any of the cases in this study, with one protest in 1995 mobilizing up to 85,000 participants and a more recent one in 2016 up to 65,000, both in the wake of US military related-crimes (*The Japan Times* 2016; McCurry 2016). During the 2016 protest episode, in response to Rina Shimabukuro's murder, protesters made statements like “we seek the withdrawal of all bases and forces to ensure that people in Okinawa can live in peace” and “I want the Japanese government to realize that the presence of the bases has trampled on women's rights and caused this incident to occur” (*The Japan Times* 2016).

A common answer to the question “why are there more anti-US-military protests in Okinawa than in other host prefectures?” is some variation of what one US official said: “because Okinawa is Okinawa” (Interview, US official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). The official further explained that Okinawa's identity is that of the “Ryukyu Kingdom” (its name before Japan annexed it in the 19th century) and that Okinawa sees itself as separate from the rest of Japan. The problem with this type of answer is that it glosses over the structural factors

⁴⁰ Hiroji Yamashiro, Okinawan activist and part of the Okinawa Peace Movement Center (*Okinawa Heiwa Undo Senta*) as quoted in McCormack (2017, 1).

(historical, political, and social) and the agency of the main players that facilitate these high levels of protests. As the previous quantitative analysis shows, there are many Okinawans who do not participate in anti-US-military activism; these high protest numbers are not a given. As this section demonstrates, the combination of a favorable political opportunity structure that Okinawans strategically exploit through framing facilitate high levels of protest mobilization. Their frames highlight a distinct Okinawan identity that the Japanese and US government have marginalized and continue to marginalize through their persistence in base construction in Henoko and Okinawa's overall high "base burden." For example, one Okinawan protester stated in 2017 that "[the US and Japanese governments] should not make Okinawa shoulder the burden of hosting (U.S.) bases anymore [...] If there were no bases, the 1995 rape of a local girl by American servicemen would not have occurred" (*The Japan Times* 2017).

Anti-US-Military Activism in Okinawa and the All-Okinawa Movement

As mentioned previously, there is a long history of anti-US military activism in Okinawa dating back to when the bases were first constructed after WWII. In this sense, it may be most accurate to understand Okinawan resistance against the US military presence as a long social movement with various waves or episodes of contention. While the focus of this case study is the most recent episode, which coincides with emergence of the All-Okinawa Movement, the history of Okinawan anti-US-military activism shapes the contemporary movement. Tanji (2006), for example, discusses the history of this activism as a "myth" or contentious repertoire from which contemporary activists draw. She states:

In the creation of the 'myth' of an 'Okinawan struggle', interpretation and understanding of one's own past are, again, particularly important: the myth connects the contemporary activists to past struggles. For example, the residents' direct participation in mass collective action that brought the end to the US military dictatorship, repatriation to Japanese administration, and the formal entitlement to the postwar Japanese Constitution and democracy – despite the fact that the US military presence remained – stand out as a proud achievement of locals' own political

activism. (Tanji 2006, 20)

Thus, it is important to understand the All-Okinawa Movement as a part of a longer historical trajectory because the past very much influences the present. Contemporary activists employ some of the same tactical strategies that their predecessors used. One interviewee, a student activist, recounted that they decided to hold a hunger strike to raise awareness about problems with the US bases in Okinawa because Okinawan activists in the 1950s had done the same when protesting the US's expropriation of their farmland to build the bases on (Interview, Okinawan activist, June 19, 2022). Another tactic in the Okinawan tactical repertoire that has been used for decades is the sit-in or to otherwise occupy space. For example, the Association to Protect Life (*Inochi wo mamoru kai*) has manned a tent on the beach in Henoko since 1997 to monitor base construction and educate visitors from Okinawa, mainland Japan, and abroad about the Henoko relocation plan (Spencer 2003, 127; Inoue 2007, 139). Activists, many retired from other occupations, staff the sit-in full-time (Spencer 2003, 128). Activists also built a tent site in 2014 directly in front of one of Camp Schwab's gates to monitor the construction trucks bringing in materials (Okinawa Field Notes, June 2022). The tent is manned daily by different anti-US-military organizations (I attended on the day that Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence (OWAAMV) was in charge of the tent) and three times each day, activists sit in front of the gates to physically block the trucks from entering the site, doing things such as singing songs (including songs about Okinawa's beautiful nature and "We Shall Overcome") and even calisthenics (Okinawa Field Notes, June 2022). Organizations such as Henoko Blue have taken to nearby Oura Bay in kayaks to block construction, at times leading to confrontation with Japanese and US officials (Johnson 2019, 221; Interview, Okinawa Activist, November 29, 2020).

Additionally, some of the same activist networks, groups, and individuals have participated in anti-US-military activism for decades and continue to be involved. For example, OWAAMV, one of the major groups currently involved with anti-US-military activism in Okinawa, was formed in response to the 1995 rape case (Akibayashi and Takazato 2009, 258). Some of the women involved with this organization were involved with anti-US-military activism in Okinawa even before this incident (Interview, Okinawan activist, June 10, 2022). In this sense, contemporary activism benefits from these established networks and organizations and their knowledge of the Okinawan anti-US-military protest repertoire. Finally, as I have argued previously in this chapter, Okinawan activists invoke historical episodes when problematizing the US military presence in the present to remind people of the ways that the US and Japan have marginalized Okinawa in the past in regard to the US bases. As Takeshi Onaga, the former governor of Okinawa prefecture and one of the key figures of the All-Okinawa Movement, identified these historical events as “constituting the Okinawan identity” (Jin 2016, 567).

In the wake of the 1995 kidnapping and rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by US soldiers and massive protests, the US and Japan established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to review the status of the US bases in Okinawa and the burden on the host communities. The SACO released its recommendations in 1996, which included reducing the US presence in Okinawa by moving Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma from Ginowan City to a more remote area (Henoko Beach), among other provisions (Ikeda et al. 1996). Futenma’s location within Ginowan City is particularly precarious as it is in the middle of a residential area with homes located close to the base’s perimeter (Okinawa Field Notes, June 2022). Anti-US-military activists are opposed to the construction of another base at Henoko (in practice, an

enlargement of Camp Schwab; “new base construction” is the phrase that many groups choose to use⁴¹) rather than relocating MCAS Futenma outside of the prefecture; Okinawans have been protesting this issue since the SACO made this recommendation. Furthermore, the Henoko relocation is the issue on which the All-Okinawa Movement has focused (Jin 2016, 567).

The All-Okinawa Movement emerged because of several precipitating events. When asked about the origins of the All-Okinawa Movement, several interviewees cited the 2007-2008 textbook controversy. The controversy was about the revision of Japanese textbooks that effectively whitewashed the Japanese military’s role in the massive Okinawan death toll during the Battle of Okinawa, resulting in protests in Okinawa (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 33). One interviewee mentioned that this incident was important because LDP politicians in Okinawa (the conservative ruling party in Japan) played a key role in these protests and Onaga, the future governor of Okinawa prefecture, changed his opinion about the Henoko relocation as a result (Interview, Okinawan activist, July 27, 2019). Another key event was Yukio Hatoyama’s 2009 prime ministerial election pledge to relocate Futenma to outside of Okinawa. When, after he was elected into office, Hatoyama’s administration was unable to fulfill this promise, Okinawans were “deeply disappointed and angered” (Jin 2016, 563). However, one of the immediate precipitating events was the US deployment of Osprey helicopters around 2012 to the Northern Training Area (NTA, also known as Camp Gonsalves) in northern Okinawa (Nelson 2012, 831). The deployment of the Ospreys was met with massive opposition and protest in Okinawa, with many residents concerned about the safety of the aircraft and the prospects of helicopter crashes (Sumida and Tritten 2012). The All-Okinawa Movement, a coalition of politicians, civil society groups, business leaders, and other Okinawans opposed to the Henoko construction emerged

⁴¹ Interview, Okinawa Activist, July 27, 2019.

around 2014-2015, with then-governor Onaga serving as one of the icons of the movement. As discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, Onaga and other politicians (including many other LDP members) played a key role in the movement, supporting and lending legitimacy to many activists' claims.

A variety of groups and individuals participate in the All-Okinawa Movement.

Demographically, like many anti-US-military or peace movements in Japan, many retirees participate. In the case of Okinawa, they most likely have lived through one of the events that are key to Okinawan identity, such as the USCAR military government or the reversion, or that they have heard stories about such events as the Battle of Okinawa from their families (Jin 2016, 567). At the same time, though, some younger people participate in the movement, as well. Jinshiro Motoyama, for example, a prominent Okinawan activist, is in his 20s. Additionally, while a lot of native Okinawans are involved in the movement, many people from mainland Japan and beyond have participated. Some people have moved from mainland Japan to Okinawa but unlike in the Jeju, South Korea case (discussed in Chapter 5), they did not move explicitly to support anti-US-military activism in Okinawa, but rather became interested in the issue and joined the movement after moving to Okinawa. One interviewee, for example, moved from Kyoto to Okinawa and began participating in anti-US-military activism after the 1995 rape case because they had a daughter the same age as the victim (Interview, Okinawan activist, December 5, 2022). At the same time, some activists living in mainland Japan participate in anti-US-military activism about Okinawa either in their local communities or remotely. One Tokyo-based activist in their 30s mentioned that their organization, for example, sent members to Henoko to see what was happening and then have them speak at public events in Tokyo to tell the public about their experiences (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, May 13, 2022). Another

Okinawan activist mentioned that their group included a few Korean members who had been involved with the movement against the naval base in Jeju, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 (Interview, Okinawan activist, November 29, 2020).

Additionally, many different groups have been involved in anti-US-military activism and the All-Okinawa movement, although they all ultimately link the Henoko construction to their issue area. Women's rights groups, like the OWAAMV, for example, link the construction to potential violence towards women. As a member of the OWAAMV stated, the Henoko construction will lead to more US soldiers being in Okinawa, which will lead to more violence against women (Interview, Okinawan activist, June 10, 2022). Environmental groups such as Henoko Blue, the Okinawan Environmental Network, and Environmental Justice Okinawa argue that the Henoko construction will ruin habits of endangered species such as the dugong⁴² and corals (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, August 13, 2019; Interview, Okinawan activist, November 29, 2020). Additionally, peace groups like the Okinawa Peace Movement Center frame the presence of US bases and the expansion of the US presence in Henoko as problematic due to incidents and accidents involving the US military and the loss of Okinawan lives ("Okinawa Peace Movement Center/Protest Statement: Human Chain Appeal" 2016). However, as one Okinawan activist stated, the base-related problems are perceived as "different dimensions of the same issue," at least partially because many activists are involved in a variety of different organizations and networks (Interview, Okinawan activist, July 31, 2019). Indeed, the All-Okinawa Movement's framing strategy can be condensed into two broad categories: "life is precious" (*nuchi du takara*) and emphasis on discrimination towards Okinawans. Both frames invoke Okinawa's history.

⁴² A type of sea cow (Williams 2013, 970).

Nuchi du Takara (Life is Precious)

At the core of many Okinawan activists' claims about the dangers of the Henoko construction is the Okinawan concept *nuchi du takara* ("life is precious") ("Henoko?" 2017). While the origins of the concept are unclear, "the words took on their true power" during the Battle of Okinawa during WWII and the massive loss of life (Mitchell 2004). In this sense, *nuchi du takara* invokes Okinawa's WWII experience, a reminder that "the military is an organization of structural violence and does not protect human security in times of war or peace" (Takazato 2016). The concept has manifested itself in activists' concerns about the Henoko construction primarily through environmental protection, including of local wildlife such as the dugong. As Kim (2021) states, "Okinawan activists called the fight for dugongs 'the new Battle of Okinawa'" (271). Indeed, the dugong has been central to the environmental aspect of the movement against the Henoko construction, with groups focused explicitly on protecting them and the dugong appearing on various pamphlets, billboards, keychains, and other materials (Kim 2021, 270). The dugong is significant to Okinawans not simply because it is an endangered native species but also because it is a figure in indigenous mythology (Kim 2021, 271). In some sense, the dugong has come to symbolize activists' environmental claims.

However, as one environmental activist stated, the Henoko issue is "bigger than the dugong" (Interview, Okinawan activist, July 31, 2019). In recent years, activists have raised concerns about the construction's impact on the ocean floor in nearby Oura Bay. One of the major issues is that "parts of the seafloor of the construction site have proven to be extremely fragile, having the consistency of mayonnaise. To solidify the seafloor sufficiently to support a functional airport, a "sand compaction pile method" needs to be carried out" (Yoshikawa 2019, 1). The US military has been transporting sand into Camp Schwab from outside Henoko; the

construction trucks which the protesters have been blocking are transporting this material.

Activists have raised two primary issues with the land reclamation project. The first issue is that it would destroy the habitats in Oura Bay, which multiple interviewees mentioned (Interview, Okinawan activist, July 31, 2019; Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, August 13, 2019).

Another issue is where to get the sand from for the construction. The problem with getting it from outside Okinawa is that it may accidentally contain fauna or flora and introduce them to Okinawa's ecosystem, possibly damaging it (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, August 13, 2019). More recently, the Japanese government has proposed to use sand from southern Okinawa to remedy this issue. However, activists have raised the issue that the sand in southern Okinawa (the landing site for US forces during WWII), may contain remains of Okinawans or US and/or Japanese soldiers during WWII (Kusumoto and Burke 2021). In the words of one prominent Okinawan activist, it is "the second time they are killing people," the first being the Battle of Okinawa itself (Interview, Okinawan activist, June 10, 2022).

Nuchi du takara has also appeared in activist discourse about continuity and protecting future generations. Some activists mention Oura Bay as something that generations of Okinawans have had a connection to: "based on such nature, our ancestors in this region built a lifestyle and culture" (Urashima 2013, 5). Activists also frame the "destruction" of the bay for the base expansion as "a crime against generations unborn" (Urashima 2013, 4). In the context of the Henoko construction, one activist commented that US base removal was important for the benefit of future generations (Interview, Okinawan activist, August 5, 2019). Opposing the Henoko construction for future generations also manifests at protests. During a protest where activists blocked one of Camp Schwab's gates to prevent the construction trucks from entering, a member of the riot police told one participant, "you should move to protect your children and

grandchildren from getting COVID.” The activist replied, “I am protecting your children and grandchildren by protesting the base construction” (Okinawa Field Notes, June 2022).

“If People Understand Human Rights, They Understand Okinawans’ Protests:” Injustice Framing in Okinawa

In more recent years, especially since the emergence of the All-Okinawa Movement, activists have invoked Okinawa’s historical marginalization in the context of human rights and indigenous rights claims. This was a strategic decision to extend local frames about Okinawa to a larger audience to garner more attention and support nationally and internationally (a process known as frame extension (Snow et al. 1986, 470)). Many interviewees mentioned the US bases and the Henoko construction as a denial of Okinawans’ “human rights.” For example, a prominent Okinawan activist highlighted Okinawans’ human rights as a key issue, stating that their “goal is to make each individual’s human rights protected by the Japanese government” and that “if people understand human rights, they understand Okinawans’ protests” (Interview, Okinawa Activist, June 19, 2022).

In addition to the term “human rights,” many interviewees invoked the term “discrimination.” Many activists argue that the US and Japanese governments discriminate against them through maintaining a high ratio of US bases on Okinawa (including not relocating MCAS Futenma outside of the prefecture), by not acknowledging various local referenda about the bases, and because base-related accidents and crimes continue, at times with little or no recourse for the perpetrators. One activist succinctly summarized this sentiment: “Okinawa is like a colony of US and Japan,” a sentiment that perhaps underpins people’s views of the historical episodes mentioned previously (Interview, Okinawan activist, November 29, 2020). In

a 1997 referendum, for example, a majority of voters opposed the Henoko construction plan (Inoue 2007). In the more recent 2019 referendum, even more Okinawans voted to oppose the construction (Maedomari 2020, 1). One activist said that “democracy is the main issue” over the Henoko construction, later mentioning “discrimination” and Okinawan identity (Interview, Okinawan activist, July 31, 2019). One interviewee’s answer to the question about Okinawan anti-US-military sentiment touched upon discrimination in the context of the “base burden” and crimes:

I think there are two reasons why anti-base sentiment in Okinawa is stronger than that of mainland Japan. One is the excess burden of US bases (about 70% of US military bases are placed in Okinawa). The other is [a] sense of inequality. Due to the status of forces agreement between US and Japan, US servicemembers who commit crimes are not placed in custody by Japanese authority. People in Okinawa still remember several cases that US servicemembers were finally found not guilty and released even though they were involved in serious incidents. (Email, Okinawa Journalist, July 29, 2019).

Anti-US-military activists contend that the Japanese government prioritizes the US’s interests over those of Okinawans and thus cannot be trusted. One Okinawan activist invoked the concept of *okami* to describe the lack of trust between the Japanese government and Okinawa. They described *okami* as a Japanese feudal-era concept that denoted an overlord’s protection of his underlings. The interviewee stated that some Japanese citizens in the mainland still hold this sentiment towards the government. However, few in Okinawa share that perspective because they do not trust the Japanese government to look out for Okinawan interests (Interview, Okinawa Activist, July 27, 2019).

Okinawan activists often link “human rights violations” and “discrimination” by the US and Japanese government to a sense of a distinct Okinawan identity. For example, in a statement to the UN General Assembly, civil society groups framed both the existing US bases and the expansion of Camp Schwab as “hav[ing] caused serious human rights violations in Okinawa” specifically against the “Ryukyuan/Okinawan people” (Shimin Gaikou Centre 2016, 2). This

statement is significant not only in terms of framing the base presence and construction as a human rights violation, but also in that it uses the term “Ryukyuan,” the term for inhabitants of Okinawa prior to Japan’s annexation of the archipelago in 1879, signaling that there is an Okinawan identity that is distinct from Japanese identity that pre-dates Japanese rule in Okinawa. As discussed more in depth in the next chapter, former Okinawan governor Onaga, current governor Temaki, and many other Okinawan politicians have fostered this sense of a distinct Okinawan identity, including by making parts of their speeches in Ryukuan language (*Uchinaaguchi*) (Vogt 2022, 229). One activist stated that “Ryukyu [Okinawan] people [are] treated like animals,” “like being in a zoo” watched by Japanese people, similar to the experiences of Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese people (Interview, Okinawan activist, June 19, 2022). These sentiments speak to different but related causes and forms of discrimination. Like Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese people, some Okinawans believe that most mainland Japanese people discriminate against them on the basis of cultural and physical differences. Some Okinawans believe that this manifests in many mainland Japanese people feeling indifference towards Okinawa’s disproportionate share of the US bases in Japan.

Unsurprisingly, Okinawans sought out (and were granted) indigenous recognition from the UN. Advocates hoped that Okinawans would be granted more land rights and thus be able to change how the land is used (such as stopping the expansion of Camp Schwab and/or removing some or all of the bases) (Interview, Okinawan activist, August 5, 2019). However, the Japanese government has not yet recognized Okinawa’s indigenous status, which activists may emphasize in their anti-US-base frames (All Okinawa Council for Human Rights 2017). As one activist said, one “can’t even say [Okinawa has indigenous status] in Japanese” because the government has not recognized Okinawans’ indigenous status (Interview, Okinawan activist, June 19, 2022).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, some Okinawan groups are focused on possible independence from Japan. One activist mentioned being inspired to think about Okinawan independence and later becoming involved with a pro-independence group after studying abroad in London and talking with people from Scotland and Wales (Interview, Okinawan activist, August 5, 2019). Taken together, these elements connect the Okinawan struggle against the US bases to transnational discourses about human and specifically indigenous rights.

Henoko Construction, Base Burdens, and Visibility in Okinawa

Generally, the US presence in Okinawa is visible and mostly negative, especially compared to the US bases on the Japanese mainland. I argue that there are three main factors in the visibility of the US military presence in Okinawa: the Henoko construction, the Okinawa “base burden,” and base-related incidents and accidents. First, the Henoko construction is highly visible in the Okinawan consciousness and is generally negative because of activists seizing upon an opening in the political opportunity structure and problematizing the construction. “Disruptions of the status quo,” as Kim (2023) terms openings in the political opportunity structures around US base politics, do not inherently carry a negative connotation for the US military with them; it is activists’ problematization that creates negative public perceptions. As discussed in the previous sections, Okinawan activists, most recently as part of the All-Okinawa movement, have problematized the Henoko construction in a variety of ways, drawing upon both local history and transnational frames. The All-Okinawa movement made the Henoko construction its focus and in doing so, has continually brought public attention to the base.

Additionally, many interviewees mentioned Okinawa’s so-called “base burden” as one of the reasons that there is greater anti-US-military sentiment in Okinawa than on the mainland. A common refrain in Okinawa is that Okinawa composes only 0.6% of Japan’s total landmass but

hosts 70% of the US bases in Japan (in terms of base-hosting land) (Kuniyoshi 2021). Indeed, one is often struck by the number of US bases in Okinawa (14) when travelling through the prefecture and passing by base after base (Okinawa Field Notes, July 2019). Thus, there is a high concentration of bases within Okinawa prefecture and as one interviewee put it, it is “harder to escape” the base presence there (Interview, US scholar, October 25, 2020). However, it is not merely the presence of the bases but rather the quotidian problems associated with them, such as noise pollution (a common complaint among residents living in the vicinity of a military base) that are multiplied by the presence of the high number of bases in a relatively small area. The consequence for Okinawans is that, in the words of one activist, they face and think more about base-related problems than mainland Japanese residents (Interview, Okinawan activist, June 19, 2022). Additionally, several of the large bases in Okinawa, such as MCAS Futenma and Kadena AFB, are in the middle of densely-populated residential areas, one of the primary motivations behind the US and Japan’s efforts to relocate troops from Futenma to Camp Schwab in Henoko (Nishiyama 2020, 4). This stands in stark contrast to a base like Command Fleet Activities (CFA) Yokosuka, located on Tokyo Bay.

At the same time, however, the Okinawan bases become even more visible and are perceived more negatively when major crimes and accidents happen. These incidents are other forms of openings in the political opportunity structure for Okinawan activists to frame as evidence of why the US military presence is problematic. As discussed previously, the 1995 rape case was one such event where activists ensured the incident got governmental and media attention by holding a press conference shortly after it occurred (Akibayashi 2002, 89). The rape and murder of Rina Shimabukuro by a former US Marine in 2016 was another incident in Okinawa that received a great deal of attention, in part due to the efforts of Okinawan anti-US-

military activists: “on May 20 [2016], the day after the suspect was arrested, 16 women’s groups held a press conference and presented their written demand to both the Japanese and U.S. governments to close the U.S. bases” (Takazato 2016, 2). Okinawan organizations later wrote a letter demanding “that all military bases and troops in Okinawa be withdrawn so that we can achieve a truly safe society for the people living here” after Rina Shimabukuro’s murder (Takazato 2016, 4). In short, while the political opportunity structure is generally favorable to activists making anti-US-military claims due to the high concentration of bases in Okinawa, it is activists’ agency and identification of the right times to make their claims that is the primary driver of the generally high negative visibility of the US base presence.

Living with the US Military in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture

Yokosuka, like many other military hosting-communities in Japan and South Korea, has been a military city for well over a century. Following Commodore Perry’s arrival in Tokyo Bay, the Japanese government selected Yokosuka as the optimal location for building a shipyard for trade (“Command History” n.d.). Japanese imperial forces later used it extensively during WWII and following Japan’s surrender, it became a US naval base (“Command History” n.d.). Unlike Okinawa, the US military in Yokosuka has had a relatively harmonious relationship with the local community, in part due to the efforts of the local government and US military as discussed in the next chapter. However, a persistent anti-US-military movement has existed in Yokosuka since at least the Vietnam War. Activists have generally struggled to mobilize the surrounding community against the base in large part because of the town’s local identity and the embeddedness of the base in the communal fabric. Activists have at times been successful at mobilizing opposition, however, during certain breaks in the political opportunity structure; as

Kim (2023, 75–78) notes, activists have been able to mobilize opposition to port calls by nuclear-powered aircraft carriers due to Japan’s strong anti-nuclear norms. Although activists have a relatively unfavorable political opportunity structure for mobilizing locals against the Yokosuka naval base, they can rally the public to their cause if their messaging and timing are right.

Anti-US-Military Activism in Yokosuka

The history of the resistance to the US military in Yokosuka is long, as it is in many other host communities in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Generally, activists raise both quotidian concerns (such as about noise pollution, environmental degradation, and soldiers’ conduct in the community) and more abstract concerns (such as war and nuclear energy). Several interviewees mentioned large-scale protests that occurred around the time of the Vietnam War, showing both the longevity of the anti-base movement and also the nature of their concerns. One activist showed me their organization’s headquarters near one of the major train stations in the city, established around the time of the war. While the upper part of the building, a small area adorned with many old pamphlets, signs, and bulletins, is the only part of the building that the organization currently uses, the organization used the lower part as an anti-war coffee shop during the war (Yokosuka Field Notes, May 2022). Around 1973, residents from a broad swath of society waged large-scale demonstrations against the war (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022). In Yokosuka, as in many other host communities in Asia at the time, residents were concerned about the US using its base as a place from which to launch troops to go to Vietnam and kill innocent civilians. A key figure in Yokosuka anti-US-military activism mentioned that Japanese organizations even tried to help sailors from the USS Midway desert while in Japan and take refuge in Sweden (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, May

26, 2022). It was (and arguably still is) “common practice for people to be anti-war and anti-base” (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022). In addition to anti-war views, residents were also concerned at that time about whether Yokosuka should be the homeport for a US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, especially given Japan’s “nuclear allergy” (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, May 26, 2022). Opposition to allowing nuclear-powered carriers to port in Yokosuka is one of the key anti-base claims that Yokosuka activists make to this day.

Like other base-hosting communities in Japan and South Korea, there are essentially two types of civil society groups involved with anti-US-military activism in Yokosuka. The first type of group is local, either focused explicitly on the US military and/or SDF bases or a related issue that is impacted by the base presence (e.g., environmental groups, women’s rights groups, etc.). In the case of Yokosuka, groups involved with anti-US-military activism have tended to have an anti-nuclear focus or a focus on noise pollution (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, May 26, 2022). In fact, one of the main local groups opposing the base is the Nuclear Free Citizen Declaration Movement Yokosuka, one of the groups involved with the monthly protests (“非核市民宣言運動・ヨコスカ [Nuclear Free Citizen Declaration Movement Yokosuka]” n.d.).

More recently, groups have focused more on PFAs contamination at the base, at times in consultation with Okinawan groups involved in anti-US-military activism who have worked on this issue in their own prefecture (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, October 16, 2022; Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022). The second type of group is national groups, who may have local chapters and many of which have local members. The Japan Peace Committee (colloquially called “J-Peace”), for example, is often involved in anti-US-military activism in host communities like Yokosuka (Interview, Japanese activists in Tokyo,

June 17, 2022; Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, June 30, 2022). There is also a local chapter, the Yokosuka Peace Committee, involved with anti-US-military activism in Yokosuka and peace activism more broadly (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, October 16, 2022).

“Holding down the fort” for Japanese Security in Yokosuka

As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, even at the prefectural level, there have been fewer anti-US-military protests in Okinawa than Kanagawa prefecture, despite the presence of as many as seven official US military installations, including two large bases (Yokosuka and Atsugi naval base) (Allen et al. 2021). There are several reasons for the fewer and generally smaller protests against the US base in Yokosuka than Okinawa. Yokosuka’s identity as a Japanese naval city, dating back decades, makes anti-US-military protest mobilization more challenging, especially in contrast with Okinawa. Unlike for many Okinawan bases, establishing a US military base in Yokosuka did not require obtaining citizen-owned land, but, rather, transferring the ownership of the base from the Japanese military to the US one (Interview, Yokosuka Activist, October 16, 2022). Without even knowing about Yokosuka’s history, however, any visitor can immediately identify it as a proud naval city, from its nationally-famous “*kaigun* navy curry” to its restaurants named “Yokosuka Navy Burger” and the many shops and services catering to English speakers (specifically, the US troops) (Yokosuka Field Notes 2022). In the words of a US official, the US naval base in Yokosuka is “part of the culture” (Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). One activist in Yokosuka stated that many residents’ feelings towards hosting the naval base is about pride; they feel that they are “holding down the fort” to protect Japan (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, October 16, 2022). In this sense, Yokosuka anti-US-military activists’ framing choices are relatively limited; unlike in Okinawa, local history offers few if any avenues to problematize the US military presence. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, the

political opportunity structures for communities that have hosted long-standing bases like Daegu, South Korea, often make it challenging for activists to mobilize would-be protesters. It is important to note, however, that this identity is not passive; as I will discuss in the next chapter, Yokosuka's city government and the US military foster Yokosuka's identity as a proud naval city.

As a long-standing military base, CFA Yokosuka also fades into the background of the community with generally low visibility. As one Yokosuka activist stated, over time, the Yokosuka public has "become more numb to the base" (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022). However, there are times that the base has become more prominent in the public consciousness. As discussed in the next chapter, the Yokosuka city government and the US military have engaged in a variety of activities to heighten the visibility of the presence in a positive light, such as "friendship" festivals. For their part, activists have also drawn attention to the base, albeit to problematize it.

Yokosuka activists, as mentioned, have often tried to raise public awareness about nuclear issues in regard to the US base. In this sense, the activists have drawn not upon local identity (as there is not a lot of appropriate cultural stock for constructing a resonant anti-US-military frame) but on national identity to problematize the US base. Nuclear weapons and nuclear power in Japan have been sensitive social and political topics since the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in WWII. Later, Prime Minister Sato issued the Three Non-Nuclear Principles in the 1960s (not possessing, manufacturing, or allowing nuclear weapons to enter Japan) ("Three Non-Nuclear Principles" n.d.). The last principle has especially impacted US base politics as activists in several host communities, including in Yokosuka and Okinawa, have raised concerns about nuclear weapons being brought to the US bases on Japanese soil. As mentioned, this has been a concern in Yokosuka at least since the Vietnam War. In more recent years, activists raised

concerns about hosting nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at CFA Yokosuka. As Kim (2023) notes, Yokosuka activists had long been suspicious that nuclear-powered carriers would begin to port at the US base as non-nuclear carriers were decommissioned; that concern became a reality in 2005 (75). Activists, anticipating this shift, rallied to raise local awareness about the nuclear carriers (the first being the USS *George Washington*) through activities such as street protests, petition drives, and street polls (Kim 2023, 75–78). Since the USS *George Washington*'s first port call at CFA Yokosuka, the US made Yokosuka the ship's official homeport abroad and other nuclear-powered carriers such as the USS *Ronald Reagan* have docked at the base (Kim 2023, 57). Two Yokosuka activists mentioned that protests against the base usually happen when the nuclear-powered carriers dock at the base (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, May 26, 2022; Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022). However, since the USS *George Washington*'s initial port call, protests against these port calls have gotten smaller over time, suggesting that these events, too, have routinized and begun to fade into the naval city's background (Kim 2023, 78).

Conclusion

This chapter focused on the role of historical framing, local identity, and the visibility of the US presence as factors in anti-US-military protest variation in Japan. The quantitative analysis showed that while people may agree with the sentiments in historical frames (in this case, frames that highlight Okinawa's marginalization), they may be limited in their ability to influence public opinion or be associated with higher levels of activism (at least without activists explicitly linking historical to contemporary problems). It could be that people weigh the costs and benefits of the US military presence when formulating their opinions or deciding to

participate in activism against it (e.g., a thought that Okinawa has been historically marginalized *but* the economic benefits of the bases matters more). The complicated findings have important implications. While scholars, policymakers, and others may think that Okinawans inherently hold anti-US-military attitudes, the quantitative findings suggest that there are many Okinawans who do not participate in activism against the US bases; even if they hold these views, they are not translating to mobilization. At the same time, many Japanese people in general are empathetic to Okinawans' historical marginalization but most do not participate in anti-US-military activism, either against the bases in their own community or those elsewhere, including those in Okinawa. In short, the relationship between historical framing, public opinion, and activism is complicated.

The qualitative case studies reveal an important insight that may explain some of the uncertainty in the quantitative analysis; to craft frames that will mobilize their intended audience, activists need to pay attention to local identity and draw upon local cultural stock. Okinawan frames often invoke historical instances of marginalization vis-à-vis the Japanese government or the US military (key components of the "Okinawan identity", which comports with cultural narratives. In recent years they have also used transnational terms like "human rights," "discrimination," and "indigenous status" to link the Okinawan struggle to ones elsewhere in Japan (such as the Ainu's campaign for indigenous status) and beyond. In host communities like Yokosuka, activists are limited by local identity in crafting anti-US-military frames. They have been more successful, however, in invoking national identity and norms about nuclear weapons and drawing attention to US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers' port calls, openings in the political opportunity structure. However, even these events appear to be providing less of a political opportunity over time as the public gets used to these port calls.

Chapter 4: Friends or Foes? Local Governments and the US Military in Japan

On a rainy Saturday in June 2022, Okinawan anti-US-military activists held a rally in front of the gates of Camp Schwab in Henoko, one of their first large rallies since the COVID-19 pandemic (Okinawa Field Notes, June 2022). Participants traveled to the gate from around Okinawa and elsewhere to protest the enlargement of Camp Schwab as a replacement for Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. A variety of speakers spoke at the rally including Yoichi Iha, a former mayor of Ginowan City (which hosts MCAS Futenma) and a current House of Councilors Representative, as well as prominent Okinawan activist Suzuyo Takazato. During his speech, Iha mentioned that he was “working hard” to get Governor Denny Tamaki, a vocal critic of the Henoko construction, reelected in the September 2022 gubernatorial election. He also expressed his concerns about increasing tensions with China in the nearby Taiwan Strait and did not want Okinawa to again be a “war island,” an allusion to the devastating Battle of Okinawa. While Tamaki himself did not attend the rally, he also sent a message of solidarity that was read to protesters, stating that he has been “the voice for the Okinawan people” even before being elected to office and that he too had attended protests against the Henoko construction. This partnership between activists and Okinawan politicians is one of the All-Okinawa Movement’s defining features, setting it apart from many anti-US-military movements on the Japanese mainland.

Local government officials have mixed stances on the US military in their community: some are more supportive while others are not. While activists in some communities have to compete with both the US military and their local governments for public support of their cause, Okinawan politicians, especially at the prefectural level, have echoed Okinawan activists’ claims

about the Henoko construction for the past decade. Even at the municipal level, some mayors have adopted similar frames, perhaps most significantly former mayor Susumu Inamine of Nago City, the city that governs Henoko. While the US government and anti-US-military activists will generally be locked in a framing contest over the US military's host nation presence, host community local governments' positions on the US military vary, at times supporting activists, as is the case in Okinawa. As discussed in Chapter 2, the harmony between these actors' frames, what I term a framing coalition, both lends credibility and serves as a "signal boost" to activists' claims. In this sense, local governmental support is a factor in anti-US-military activists' success at mobilizing would-be protesters.

In other situations, the partnership between the US military and a host community's government is strong, often resulting in a framing coalition that depicts the US military presence as beneficial to the community and conflicts with activists' claims. Such has generally been the case in Yokosuka City, a host community near Tokyo on the Japanese mainland. As Kim chronicles, while the Yokosuka government was once wary of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers docking at Commander Fleet Activities (CFA) Yokosuka, aligning with activists for a brief moment, it eventually accepted the ships (C. J. Kim 2023, 138–41). It now emphasizes the inevitability of the ships, their importance to the US-Japan alliance, and their safety, countering activists' claims. Anti-US-military activists in Yokosuka as in many other mainland communities in Japan therefore are met with a formidable obstacle to mobilizing the public. Not only must they contend with a local identity that is generally pro-military (discussed in the previous chapter), but they are a minority voice emphasizing the dangers of the nuclear carriers while the US and local government counter their claims. Additionally, although the carriers' port calls once provided an opening in the political opportunity structure where activists' frames were more

likely to resonate with the public, the increasing frequency of the carriers and the government's counterframing diminish the potential of this opportunity.

The US military is also not merely an object of framing but rather an agent engaged in framing through both messaging and community-building/soft power activities such as base festivals or even employment related to the bases (either on- or off-base). These activities are often not simply a US undertaking but rather conducted in part with local host community governments to foster better civilian-military relations. How effective are these tools? Although important studies in the base politics literature on this topic have been published in recent years, the role of troop contact remains unclear. I find that generally, base festivals and base-related employment are more likely to be associated with views that the US-Japan alliance is not important for Japanese security and a greater likelihood that someone will participate in activism against the US military in Japan. At the same time, however, base festival attendance and employment is associated with more positive opinions of US troops in one's community, suggesting that soft power strategies are more likely to work when the US military presence is framed as a more tangible entity (i.e. troops in one's community). While base festivals and employment may be somewhat effective at facilitating positive civilian-military relations, festivals may be associated with higher levels of anti-US-military activism partially because activists also seize on base festivals as windows of opportunity to problematize the US military presence, at times protesting outside of the festivals. These findings further emphasize the important role that local governments play in fostering positive relationships between the US military and the host community (or not) as they need to actively link the US military presence with its benefits (like host nation security or base-related employment).

Unreliable Allies: Base Politics in Yokosuka

Unlike in Okinawa, where many politicians have vocally criticized the US bases (typically the Henoko construction), politicians in the naval city of Yokosuka have tended to support the US presence. Both a former US naval officer and anti-US-military activist in Yokosuka expressed that base politics are not typically controversial in Yokosuka (Interview, YCAPS official, May 20, 2022; Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022). As a result, anti-US-military activists have largely gone without elite allies who, as I have argued previously, are an important factor in mobilizing the public against the US military. What is interesting in the case of Yokosuka, however, is that following a change in the political opportunity structure – the introduction of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to CFA Yokosuka in 2005 – it appeared that anti-US-military activists and local politicians were on the same page, both wary of the potential dangers of nuclear accidents (C. J. Kim 2023, 138). However, although Mayor Kabaya was elected partially due to his platform of opposing the nuclear-powered carriers in Yokosuka, he eventually acquiesced to pressure from the central government in 2006 and stated that “there is no legal basis for my opposition” (C. J. Kim 2023, 140). Since then, Yokosuka city has accepted the nuclear carriers and provides residents with a variety of information about the ships, some given to the city by the US government itself. This acceptance is challenging to anti-US-military activists in Yokosuka who continue to organize demonstrations and other activities when the ships dock in Yokosuka, attempting to draw public attention to the issue.

In general, the Yokosuka City government disseminates information from the US government about base-related community-building activities and issues related to the base (including about the nuclear-powered carriers) (Email, Yokosuka City officials, June 1, 2022).

Base-related community-building activities, discussed in more detail in the next section, include festivals on base and various exchange programs between the US military and local residents (Email, Yokosuka City officials, June 1, 2022). The US military tries to use these activities to build positive relationships between the US military and the local community, a form of soft power. However, the city contributes to building positive civilian-military relations by disseminating information about these activities to residents. Furthermore, as one US official stated, the US's community-building activities are only possible with the local government's cooperation (Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). While the US military may benefit from these activities, the city benefits from tourism associated with the events as people from other parts of Japan also attend the base festivals (Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022).

Yokosuka City also distributes information to residents about base-related issues, at times from the US government itself (Email, Yokosuka City officials, June 1, 2022). On its website, the city mentions base-related problems such as environmental degradation and crimes (including some major ones) and what the city has done to mitigate the impact on local residents, often in consultation with the US military (横須賀市 [Yokosuka City] n.d.). One example is that following the 2006 robbery and murder of Yokosuka woman Yoshie Sato by a US soldier, the city established a council focused on safety measures around the base (横須賀市 [Yokosuka City] n.d.). However, most of the information for Yokosuka residents is about the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In the years since the city accepted nuclear-powered carriers docking at the US base, the Yokosuka City government has disseminated a lot of information about the ships especially on their websites, in some cases information from the US or Japanese central governments. Some of this information is in essence a form of counterframing as it contradicts

some of the anti-US-military activists' claims about the safety of the carriers. The government provides information about the number of times US nuclear submarines or nuclear aircraft carriers have visited CFA Yokosuka (the only place in Kanagawa prefecture where they can dock), a historical overview of nuclear vessels (including submarines) to Yokosuka, and what the governments are doing to ensure locals' safety (横須賀市 [Yokosuka City] n.d.). The latter type of information not only appears to try to assuage locals' concerns about possible radiation from the ships, but also often demonstrates that the government is acting on locals' behalf. A report about radioactive materials found in Yokosuka Port, for example, says that the radiation is within safe parameters, is not related to the US nuclear submarine *Honolulu*, and that the city will continue to work with the US Navy to monitor potential radioactive activity near CFA Yokosuka (横須賀市 [Yokosuka City] 2006a). The government also frames the nuclear carriers as important to Japanese security. The aforementioned Yokosuka City report, for example, said that matters of national defense are for national, not local, governments to decide and that aircraft carriers are important to maintaining the US-Japan alliance (横須賀市 [Yokosuka City] 2006b). Finally, the government provides information about the safety of the carriers on its website, such as how the probability of an accident related to the carriers is small and how they can withstand strong external forces such as earthquakes (横須賀市 [Yokosuka City] 2006b). In short, while Yokosuka City politicians were once hesitant to accept nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, they now frame the carriers as safe to local residents and important to maintaining the US-Japan security alliance.

“Easily Among the Friendliest Host Towns in the World”: Civilian-Military Relations in Yokosuka

The US military in Yokosuka has tried to frame itself as a “good neighbor” to Yokosuka residents, not unlike its efforts in other host communities, including Okinawa (discussed below). Generally, the US Navy has been successful in this regard, in part because Yokosuka residents have long hosted a naval presence and take pride in their identity as a naval city. As Kim (2023) puts it, Yokosuka is “easily among the friendliest host towns in the world” (67). However, this is partially due to the community-building efforts that the US navy does in Yokosuka. One interviewee, a retired US servicemember who was stationed in Yokosuka in the 1990s, suggested that the relationship between the US and the community was once not as strong; it is through more recent US efforts that it has such a strong relationship now (Email, retired US servicemember, August 31, 2022). This suggests that the US military’s agency is important: although communities like Yokosuka are more prone to having a harmonious relationship with the military due to local history and identity, it is not guaranteed. Rather, it is the US’s continual framing and other soft power strategies that help ensure a positive civilian-military relationship. This is especially important in light of my findings about the counterintuitive relationship between base festival attendance and anti-US-military activism as the US’s continued public relations management may help ameliorate negative impacts.

Base open houses or festivals, sometimes termed “friendship days” or “friendship festivals,” are events that US bases host in collaboration with the local government that allow host nation citizens on-base access.⁴³ These events take on a festival atmosphere and typically

⁴³ While Japanese and US citizens need only to show a valid form of identification to enter a US base during a friendship event, “non-Japanese nationals and non-U.S. nationals visitors are required to bring a current passport and ‘Residency Card’ and are asked to register prior to or day of the event” (Yokota Air Base n.d.).

last for one or two days. For example, in October 2022, United States Fleet Activities Yokosuka (located near Tokyo) held its 44th annual “Yokosuka Friendship Day,” its first since 2019 due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). This event included: a ship visit, live music, a car show, food and beverages, carnival games, train rides, a fire department static display, and a fireworks festival at night (Yokosuka MWR Happenings 2022). Similarly, Yokota Air Base (also near Tokyo) held a “Friendship Festival” in May 2022 with aircraft displays, live music, food vendors, and performances (Yokota Air Base n.d.). Approximately 110,000 people visited the base over the course of the two-day festival (Edwards 2022). The Yokota Air Base website states that these events “celebrate the enduring partnership between the U.S. and Japan and serve as an opportunity to strengthen ties between the base and local communities” (Yokota Air Base n.d.).

Another important feature in Yokosuka, not unlike the relationship between the US army and local government in Daegu, South Korea (discussed in Chapter 5), is a strong partnership between the US and the Yokosuka government. One of the consequences of the relationship is that the local government’s framing of the US military typically agrees with how the US frames itself, unlike the case of Okinawa (discussed later in the chapter). In this sense, locals are receiving a message from multiple entities that the US military base is important to Yokosuka, both in terms of providing security and employment. At the same time, the framing coalition between the local government and the US military counters activists’ frames, undermining activists’ credibility.

As elsewhere, the military at CFA Yokosuka have engaged in a variety of community-building activities, including hosting base festivals. Perhaps most symbolic of the US military’s relationship with Yokosuka City is its participation in the city’s Mikoshi Festival, a Yokosuka

tradition for over 40 years (Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka 2014). The festival includes a parade from the city's Chuo Station to the US naval base, with both US servicemembers and local residents carrying various portable shrines (*Mikoshi*) and floats together down the street (Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka 2014). Then, like in other on-base festivals, community members and US military personnel mingle on base while buying food from vendors, listening to live music, and enjoying other forms of entertainment (Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). One interviewee estimated that about 20,000 people attended that last festival (pre-COVID) (Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). Another unique feature of Yokosuka's community-building is one of the events' frequent visitors: Yoko-Pon, or CFA Yokosuka's mascot, a tanuki (Japanese raccoon-dog) dressed as a sailor (Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka 2022). Regional or city mascots are common in Japan (also called *yuru-chara*) but CFA Yokosuka is one of the only US installations in Japan to create its own mascot (Kundert 2021; Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). As "Yoko-Pon" said in a recent interview, they serve as a "positive ambassador of the United States Navy to Japan" (Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka 2022). Taken together, the US military in Yokosuka engages in a variety of community-building activities to facilitate a positive relationship with the local community, at times beyond what the US military has done in other places. There is no mascot for the US Marines in Okinawa, for example, to serve as an "ambassador" to the local public.

Another unique feature around the US base in Yokosuka is the presence of the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Although the organization began as a forum for people connected to the US military to study various topics, its goal gradually shifted to a focus on community-building (Interview, YCAPS official, May 20, 2022). Although most people

involved with YCAPS are linked to the US military, the events are held off-base (and, in the COVID-era, online) so that other people can attend the events (Interview, YCAPS official, May 20, 2022). The YCAPS member mentioned that attendees may include members of the Yokosuka business community, white collar workers, restaurant owners, retired people, and high school students from the Yokosuka community (Interview, YCAPS official, May 20, 2022). Thus, in more recent years, YCAPS has focused on providing a forum for members of the community (both people linked to the US military and Yokosuka civilians) to interact. As the YCAPS official stated, the organization uses “regional studies as a convening tool to bring people together to increase dialogue” within the community (Interview, YCAPS official, May 20, 2022). Although YCAPS has branched out to other host communities (including Okinawa), its primary operations remain in the military-friendly city of Yokosuka, providing another avenue for stronger civilian-military relations.

In terms of framing itself as doing more good than harm, the US military emphasizes the strategic importance of CFA Yokosuka and how it has addressed base-related problems. The US Navy states that CFA Yokosuka “is the largest overseas U.S. Naval installation in the world and is considered to be one of the most strategically important bases in the U.S. military” (“Mission and Vision” n.d.). One of the reasons that the base is strategic is that its “location and support capabilities allow operating forces to be 17 days closer to locations in Asia than their counterparts based in the continental United States” (“Mission and Vision” n.d.). In this sense, the Yokosuka base is important to the US’s operations in Asia, including around Japan.

In addition to bringing positive public attention to its presence in Yokosuka, the US military also has a variety of strategies to mitigate negative attention in the wake of crimes and accidents. The US military in Yokosuka has emphasized the actions it has taken to combat

alcohol-related issues such as drunk driving, arguably one of the most frequent type of base-related crimes. A former US servicemember once stationed in Yokosuka praised the US military's efforts, in partnership with Yokosuka City, to address some of the issues with US soldiers drinking in the community: "debauchery outside the main [base] gate has disappeared, and the infamous "Honch" is now replaced with more touristy attractions" (Interview, retired US servicemember, August 31, 2022). The "Honch" is what US soldiers commonly call the Yokosuka district of Hon-cho, an area populated with a variety of bars that often cater to US soldiers (Yokosuka Field Notes, May 2022). One of the reasons that the Honch has changed in recent decades is that the US military in Japan implemented the "Liberty Policy," a set of guidelines about troops' conduct in Japan, in 2016 (Schneider 2020). As a US officer in Yokosuka explained to me, two of the major provisions of the policy are that servicemembers cannot drink in public after 12 am and must leave the bars, and low-ranking soldiers can only go out in pairs (Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). (The US military relaxed these provisions slightly in late 2022 (Wilson 2022).) Indeed, during a visit to the Honch at night, one will see a multitude of off-duty US soldiers as well as some on duty, monitoring the activities of the soldiers enjoying the night life and reminding them when it is time to leave, per the Liberty Policy (Yokosuka Field Notes, May 2022). Additionally, US soldiers in Yokosuka are provided a handout entitled "Responsible Drinking," which discusses drinking in Japan, acceptable and unacceptable drinking behaviors, and the consequences of drinking (Commander US 7th Fleet 2014). One page shows statistics of sexual assaults linked to the naval base in Yokosuka and highlights the perpetrator had consumed alcohol in 92% of these incidents, concluding that "alcohol abuse increases your chances of committing criminal behavior" (Commander US 7th Fleet 2014). Thus, the US military in Yokosuka has taken visible steps to

showing the public and the local government how it is addressing alcohol-related crimes and incidents to bolster its image as a “good neighbor.”

Framing Coalitions Against the US Military Presence in Okinawa

What is distinctive about the Okinawan case, especially compared to many mainland host communities like Yokosuka, is that there is a history of Okinawan politicians at both the prefectural and municipal levels adopting positions and frames compatible with those of anti-US-military activists. Perhaps most uniquely, former Prime Minister Hatoyama, originally from the Tokyo area, adopted the stance that the Henoko construction should stop and MCAS Futenma should be relocated outside of Okinawa in his political platform (Kawato 2015, 65). As I discuss in the sections below, Okinawan politicians (especially at the prefectural level) over the past decade have echoed many of the same arguments as anti-US-military activists, framing Okinawa’s disproportionate share of Japan’s US bases and the continuity of the Henoko construction as injustice, discrimination, and a violation of Okinawan sovereignty and democracy. Additionally, like the activists, many politicians have framed the Henoko construction as problematic for the potential environmental damage it may cause. One argument that is perhaps different is that the prefectural government as well as municipal-level politicians have emphasized that the US military presence does not contribute much to the Okinawan economy, directly countering the US’ military claims, discussed in the next section.

The framing coalition between Okinawan anti-US-military activists and politicians started to gain traction during Governor Masahide Ota’s tenure in the 1990s. In response to the 1995 rape mentioned previously, a watershed moment for the anti-US-military movement in Okinawa, Governor Ota famously “refused to sign an executive order to force landowners to lease their property for American military use” (Mochizuki and O’Hanlon 1996, 11). Although

the Japanese central government eventually forced Ota to renew the leases, he made his opinion about the US bases in Okinawa known, stating that “to build an Okinawa in which young people can hold hope, it will be necessary to get rid of the bases that block independent development” (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 138–39). In the subsequent decades, politicians with anti-US-military stances have publicly stated opinions that support those of many activists. As mentioned in Chapter 3 and discussed in more detail below, Okinawan politicians have played a central role in the All-Okinawa Movement itself, which began almost 10 years ago. Indeed, especially in the past decade, “in Okinawa, no [governor] can win if they say they support [the Henoko construction]” (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, July 14, 2019). Although “candidates supported by the national government could win elections,” they could only do so if “they focused their campaign on the economy (jobs) and local issues, avoiding mention of the base question” (McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 277). In the most recent Okinawan gubernatorial elections in 2022, incumbent Denny Tamaki (a vocal critic of the Henoko relocation plan) again defeated Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) candidate Atsushi Sakima, a pro-Henoko construction candidate whom Tamaki defeated initially in 2018 (*The Japan Times* 2022). In short, the only politically viable opinions toward the Henoko construction in Okinawa currently are to oppose the construction or to avoid adopting a public stance.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the harbinger of the All-Okinawa Movement was in some sense former Prime Minister Hatoyama’s inclusion of stopping the Henoko construction as part of his party’s platform, first as a candidate and then after he was elected to office (Jin 2016, 566). Prior to running for prime minister, Hatoyama had visited Okinawa many times and heard from most Okinawans that instead of being relocated to Henoko, the Futenma base should be relocated outside of the prefecture (Interview, Yukio Hatoyama, June 27, 2022). This stance, along with

reducing and eventually removing US bases from Okinawa and Japan entirely, became part of the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) platform (Kawato 2015, 65–66). Hatoyama reiterated this stance in our interview, stating that it is “not true and natural to have a foreign military in our land” (Interview, Yukio Hatoyama, June 27, 2022). On this point, Mr. Hatoyama lamented Japan's dependence on the US and stated that the US bases were “more of a threat than protection” to the communities that host them (Interview, Yukio Hatoyama, June 27, 2022). Taken together, Hatoyama's platform legitimized Okinawan anti-US-military activists' contention that Futenma should be relocated outside of Okinawa and that, more broadly, US bases were problematic for Japan, perhaps even lending legitimacy to other anti-US-military movements. By bringing the Henoko construction issue into the national discourse, Hatoyama effectually “broadcasted” this anti-US-military frame more widely and provided a catalyst for a different phase in anti-US-military activism in Okinawa. As mentioned in the previous chapter, several interviewees identified Hatoyama's election as a sign of hope that the Henoko construction might be stopped (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, July 14, 2019; Interview, Okinawan journalist, July 22, 2019).

Governor Takeshi Onaga introduced the concept of “All-Okinawa” during his gubernatorial campaign in 2014 (Jin 2016, 564). This name, which harkens back to the Okinawan “All-Island Struggle” in the 1950s, meant that initially Okinawans of all political persuasions (including citizens, activists, and politicians) were united in agreement on one point: no construction in Henoko (Jin 2016, 566–67). Onaga, originally an LDP candidate, was elected due to support by both conservative and progressive groups (Jin 2016, 566). Indeed, when Onaga decided to leave the LDP over this issue, it split the LDP in Okinawa, with some other conservative politicians following his lead and leaving the party (Interview, Japanese activist in

Tokyo, June 28, 2022). In addition to opposing the Henoko construction and Okinawan unity through “All-Okinawa,” “identity over ideology” was also key to Onaga’s platform (Jin 2016, 567; Interview, Okinawan activist, July 27, 2019). “Identity” referred to a distinct Okinawan identity underpinned by historical marginalization vis-à-vis the Japanese and US governments over the disproportionate number of US bases in Okinawa more broadly and the historical episodes discussed in the previous chapter (the Battle of Okinawa, oppressive conditions under the US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) government, and the reversion to Japanese rule) (Jin 2016, 567). “Ideology” was a reference to political party alignment in that Onaga himself had been a member of the conservative LDP, despite adopting an anti-Henoko construction stance, which he viewed it as “a serious violation of [Okinawan] democracy, human rights, and local autonomy” (Jin 2016, 567). As such, Onaga, like many of the anti-US-military activists in Okinawa, conceptualized the Henoko construction as an injustice that the Japanese and US governments levied against Okinawans. In a 2017 meeting with the US ambassador, Onaga referred to the Henoko construction as “discrimination” and stated that “in the hearts of Okinawans, the U.S. government and military are entirely responsible [for the construction] [...] I want you to understand that the base construction in Henoko is calling into doubt Japanese and American democracy” (*Ryukyu Shimpō* 2017). Thus, Onaga not only framed the construction as an injustice but also as “discrimination,” a violation of Okinawa’s autonomy, and undemocratic, echoing activists’ claims as well.

Following Onaga’s death in 2018, his successor Denny Tamaki also won the gubernatorial election on a platform of opposing the Henoko construction and, according to one source, winning with the largest vote share in Okinawan history (Interview, Okinawan prefectural official, July 25, 2019). Through a variety of media, the Okinawan prefectural

government under Tamaki has intimated that the US and Japanese government have pressed forward with the “Henoko Plan” without the consent of the Okinawan public, primarily because in a 2019 citizen-initiated referendum, 72.2 of Okinawans who voted (about half of the registered voters) elected to stop the construction (Maedomari 2020, 1). In a letter to several US Military officials, including then-Secretary of Defense Esper, Tamaki stated that he “repeatedly conveyed to both the U.S. and the Japanese governments the democratic voice of the people of Okinawa against the construction,” although the construction continues (Tamaki 2020). Additionally, in an informational booklet about the Henoko project, the Okinawan prefectural government emphasizes that the plan to relocate troops from Futenma to Henoko was done without the consent of the Okinawan people (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2018, 8). The booklet also states that Okinawa’s share of the bases is an “excessive burden” and that there is a “gap vis-à-vis the extent to which such facilities are hosted in mainland Japan,” emphasizing that there is an injustice in terms of Okinawa’s share of the bases (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2018, 3). Thus, under Tamaki’s governorship as well, the Okinawan prefectural government continues to problematize the Henoko relocation project and Okinawa’s share of Japan’s US bases, highlighting injustice, discrimination, and lack of respect for Okinawan autonomy and democracy.

As with anti-US-military activists, the Okinawan prefectural government also argues that the Henoko construction is environmentally harmful and that neither the US nor Japanese governments have done enough to address it. In various media, the Okinawan government has noted its concern about environmental degradation related to the expansion of Camp Schwab, including the destruction of the dugongs’ habitat in Oura Bay (Tamaki 2020). Like activists, the Okinawa prefectural government also frames the preservation of Henoko and Oura Bay as

important “for its biological and cultural significance for future generations,” invoking the Okinawan concept of *nuchi du takara* (“life is precious”) discussed in the previous chapter (Tamaki 2020). It also emphasizes that the Japanese and US governments have not sufficiently addressed concerns about the construction, calling on both governments to stop construction and conduct more thorough ecological impact studies (“Summary Report of the Symposium on Henoko-Oura Bay” 2018, 8).

Okinawan politicians at other governmental levels have also adopted compatible frames that problematize the US bases and the Henoko project specifically. For example, Yoichi Iha, the Okinawan politician mentioned in the introductory vignette, stated that “he had the feeling Okinawa was being subjected to ‘something akin to discrimination’” due to its disproportionate amount of US bases vis-à-vis the mainland (Yoichi Iha as stated in McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 150). Another Okinawan politician, a member of the Okinawan prefectural legislature, also emphasized Okinawa’s unequal share of the US bases as opposed to the Japanese mainland, calling mainland Japanese “two-time free riders” in that they are depending on the US for security and on Okinawa for hosting most of the US’s bases (Interview, Okinawan politician, July 25, 2019). Additionally, municipal governments also highlight the disparity in Okinawa’s “base burden” relative to the mainland as form of injustice and discrimination. For example, in its literature on the Henoko relocation, Nago City’s government, which governs Henoko, emphasizes not only Okinawa’s proportion of bases, but states that “about 70% of the facilities are concentrated in the northern part” of the main island in Okinawa prefecture where Nago is located (“Issues of US Military Bases...” 2016, 5). Similarly, a former mayor of Nago also emphasized a perspective of Okinawan injustice, stating that “the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty are based on Okinawa as collateral” (Interview, Okinawan politician,

June 15, 2023). Further in the vein of Okinawa's unequal base burden, the politician said that "the concentration of bases poses a greater risk than maintaining them. This comes from the lessons of the Pacific War" (Interview, Okinawan politician, June 15, 2023). In this quote, the former mayor is linking Okinawa's base burden to the Battle of Okinawa, which, as mentioned, is a historical episode that is key to Okinawan identity. Furthermore, they also highlighted the burden as discrimination against Okinawa:

"Now, I think that the burden should be borne not only in Okinawa but also in the whole country. Furthermore, Okinawa was under the rule of the U.S. military for 27 years and was not subject to the application of the Japanese Constitution and laws. Even though we are all citizens of the same country, we have experienced unbearable pain, such as being trampled. These are proof that the Japanese government's policy of discrimination and division against Okinawa continues to this day. I believe that the development of Okinawa cannot be expected unless this structural discrimination is overcome." (Email, Okinawan politician, June 15, 2023)

Here, the former mayor discussed Okinawa's experience under the USCAR government (another key Okinawan historical episode) and suggested that even though Okinawa is now back under Japanese rule, Okinawans are treated as second class citizens, also invoking the term "discrimination."

The mention of "development" is also important, as discussion of Okinawa's economic development tends to feature in many Okinawan politicians' frames about the US military presence. The Marines, the largest US military branch in Okinawa, highlights that US bases in Okinawa employ 9,000 residents and contribute 241 billion yen to the economy (as of 2016) (Hikotani et al. 2022, 333).⁴⁴⁴ Additionally, as of 2019, there were approximately 26,000 Japanese citizens employed at US bases across 10 host prefectures, the majority working in Kanagawa or Okinawa prefectures (Weinek and Sato 2019, 1). However, one of the arguments that the Okinawan government levies against the US bases in the prefecture is that the bases

⁴⁴⁴ In 2016, Okinawa's population was approximately 1,439,000 people (Japanese Government 2017).

impede Okinawa's economic development. This is also part of the theme of injustice as the frame claims that Okinawa's base burden has unduly inhibited the prefecture's development, implying that the Japanese mainland is economically better off because it does not host the same proportion of bases. In one of the pamphlets that the Okinawan prefectural government disseminates on the US base presence, it emphasizes that the prefecture would be economically better off through the return and the development of land used for bases for other purposes. Using data from a survey it collected about the economic impact, the Okinawan prefectural government shows that communities that currently host a US base presence will directly benefit economically through the return of base-occupied land, including job creation ("What Okinawa Wants You to Understand..." 2018, 13). For example, the return of the land that MCAS Futenma occupies should correspond with a 32-times increase in the money going directly into the economy from new businesses and the same increase in jobs ("What Okinawa Wants You to Understand..." 2018, 13). An Okinawan prefectural official confirmed this stance in an interview, stating that the claim (that the US military makes) that the bases are necessary for Okinawa's economy is untrue and that a decrease in the number of US bases (though not full removal) will facilitate an increase in Okinawa's economy through the development of former base land (Interview, Okinawan prefectural official, July 25, 2019). According to the Okinawan government, base-related income only makes up five percent of Okinawa's economy ("What Okinawa Wants You to Understand..." 2018, 12). Rather, it is tourism, not the US bases, on which Okinawa's economy is dependent ("What Okinawa Wants You to Understand..." 2018, 2). As discussed and tested later in the chapter, several studies have found that, despite the US and Japanese governments' claims that the US bases are important to Okinawa's economy, economic benefits like base-related employment do not impact Okinawans' views on the US

presence (Kagotani and Yanai 2014; Hikotani et al. 2022). At the municipal level, several governments of base-hosting communities such as Nago City echo the sentiment that the bases have inhibited their towns' economic development ("Issues of US Military Bases..." 2016, 5).

Okinawan anti-US-military activists, unlike many of their mainland Japan counterparts, have many political allies, locally, at the prefectural level, and, at times, even nationally. The All-Okinawa Movement itself is, in a sense, a partnership between activists and Okinawan politicians. This partnership has resulted in a framing coalition between how activists problematize the US base presence (and the Henoko construction specifically) and how anti-US-military politicians frame the presence, legitimizing and providing a signal boost to activists' claims. The frames are similar in that they emphasize the Henoko construction as discrimination towards or an injustice against Okinawa, as it maintains instead of reduces Okinawa's "base burden." Both entities also highlight a lack of consent on the part of Okinawans and a violation of Okinawan democracy through the Japanese and US governments' dismissal of the 2019 referendum, which suggested that most Okinawans do not approve of the construction. Additionally, they both emphasize the potential environmental destruction that may accompany the construction. Okinawan politicians also deny that the prefectural economy is dependent on the US bases in general; rather, the prefectural government argues that the economy would be better off with *fewer* US bases, directly challenging the US military's frame.

The Benefits of the US Bases in Okinawa?

Although there is a formidable anti-US-military social movement in Okinawa with many political allies, the US government tries to frame its military presence in Okinawa as beneficial to Okinawa and Japan more broadly. In this sense, the US government is engaged in a framing

contest with anti-US-military activists and some Okinawan officials (most notably, in recent years, the Okinawan prefectural government) over its presence in Okinawa. First, the US frames its bases in Okinawa as necessary for Okinawan, Japanese, and Asian regional security. The US Consulate in Naha, Okinawa's website mentions several key arguments from the US perspective as to why the US troops stationed in Okinawa are integral to security. The narrative on the website depicts the US presence in Okinawa as maintaining regional stability, stating that "security has been likened to oxygen: you only notice it when it's gone" ("U.S. Consulate General Naha..." 2021). It further goes on to explain that Okinawa's central location is crucial to "tangibly back[ing] our security commitments to our allies and friends in Asia," possibly a counterargument to anti-US-military activists' claim that the US bases should be transferred from Okinawa to the Japanese mainland " ("U.S. Consulate General Naha..." 2021). The Consulate also implicitly mentions the importance of Japan's military alliance with the US as it highlights the lack of a collective defense agreement in Asia "capable of carrying out a regional security role," which differs from the security landscape in Europe " ("U.S. Consulate General Naha..." 2021).

While the US emphasizes that its primary role in Okinawa is to protect the prefecture and the rest of Japan and to maintain regional stability, it also depicts its role in Okinawa as being a "good neighbor" in the local community ("U.S. Consulate General Naha..." 2021). It actively promulgates this "good neighbor" narrative through activities to help and improve the community such as cleaning up beaches and public parks ("Community Engagement between the US Marine Corps and Okinawa," n.d.). The US military also promotes language and cultural exchanges between US troops and local Okinawans such as English conversation classes (on- and off-base), base open-houses and festivals, and sports programs ("Community Engagement

between the US Marine Corps and Okinawa,” n.d.). As discussed later in this chapter, the tactic to promote positive perceptions of the US military presence in the local community is not unique to Okinawa but is used in many other host communities as well. However, it does seem to have some impact on local perceptions of its presence. Even a representative from the US bases in Okinawa, expressed their/the government’s appreciation for the US military’s volunteer work and community engagement (Interview, Okinawan prefectural official, July 25, 2019).

In line with the US military’s frame that it is a “good neighbor,” the US emphasizes that its presence is beneficial for both the local economy and the Japanese economy at large. For example, the US Consulate in Naha mentions that “U.S. bases are the second largest employer in Okinawa and contribute over \$3 billion a year to the local economy, almost \$3,000 dollars per year for every man, woman and child in Okinawa” (“U.S. Consulate General Naha...” 2021). As for Okinawa’s (or any prefecture’s) economy shifting from reliance on the US bases to tourism, one US official stated that “there is not enough tourism in Japan to match the US military’s contribution” (Interview, US military official in Yokosuka June 15, 2022). Taken together, these statistics suggest that the US base presence is integral to Okinawans’ economic well-being, which counter local politicians’ frames that the base presence is impeding Okinawa’s economic development.

As for the Henoko construction specifically, the US, in partnership with the Japanese national government, supports the plan to relocate Futenma to Henoko. While the US government has agreed with the positions of many Okinawan politicians that MCAS Futenma needs to be relocated outside of Ginowan City (its current location) (with former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once calling it “the world’s most dangerous base”), it argues that the base has to remain in the prefecture (Lummis 2018, 1). As a former US ambassador stated, “there

are issues surrounding the Futenma location [...] The population has grown significantly around [Futenma]. The only solution to this to date that has been negotiated has been relocating to Henoko” (Hlavac 2017). US officials have cited Japan’s security environment as the rationale for keeping the base in the prefecture. The former ambassador, for example, mentioned recent North Korean missile tests, some of which have been in Japan’s direction (Hlavac 2017). A former Secretary of Defense similarly stated that the relocation within Okinawa “is absolutely critical to the United States’ ongoing rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and our ability to maintain a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture in the region” (Wakatsuki and Brumfield 2013).

To counter anti-US-military activists’ and Okinawan politicians’ claims, the US military in Okinawa has tried to frame itself as important to local, national, and regional security and as a good neighbor to Okinawans. It also emphasizes its contributions to Okinawa’s economy, specifically as one of the largest employers in the prefecture. On the issue of the Henoko construction, the US has framed the relocation of Futenma to Henoko as the only viable solution. It also frames this choice in terms of security, in contrast to activists’ and politicians’ claims that this base should be moved outside of Okinawa to relieve some of Okinawa’s “base burden.” In short, unlike in Yokosuka and other mainland communities, the US’s claims are a minority opinion.

[Troop Contact: Friendship Festivals and Base-Related Employment](#)

The discussion of local politicians and the US military above suggests that generally people in Okinawa are more likely to agree with anti-US-military activists’ frames (particularly about the Henoko construction) because many prominent Okinawan politicians in the past

decade have proffered similar anti-US-military framing. By the same token, we might expect the US's frames in Okinawa to not be as persuasive and its soft power efforts (like base festivals) in the community to fall flat. In Yokosuka and other host communities on the Japanese mainland, the local government and the US military contest activists' frames, undermining activists' credibility with the public. Therefore, in mainland communities, we should find that the US's community-building efforts are more likely to foster positive local perceptions.

There has been debate in the US base politics literature about the impact of US troop contact such as base festivals on host nation public opinion and protest. As discussed, the US military and its host nation allies spend considerable efforts on facilitating positive civilian-military relations through many types of troop contact. As such, this debate is important to US and host nation policymakers. Contact between members of the host nation public and US military personnel pertains to "troop visibility," the extent to which the host nation or host community is aware of the US military, is discussed in Chapter 2. A person's contact with the US military — both positive and negative — increases the former's visibility. Calder (2007) argues that high levels of interaction between host community members and US military personnel (operationalized as high population density in a host nation) will foster more negative perceptions of the US military and contention. On the other hand, Schober (2016) finds that Koreans who regularly interact with US military personnel are more likely to have positive perceptions of the US military presence (14). A more recent debate about the impact of US troop contact has revolved around Japan and Okinawa. In the most comprehensive study of US host nation public opinion to date, Allen et al. (2020) found that contact with US troops tends to facilitate *positive* public opinion of the US military presence. In their more recent book, the authors found that even seemingly negative forms of contact like crime are associated with

neutral (vs. negative) attitudes (Allen et al. 2022, 117). Furthermore, in Japan and other host nations, respondents who reported being the victims of US troop-related crime were more likely to have *positive opinions* of the US military, which may be because people may not base their opinions about the US military in general on their (negative) interactions with a specific individual (Allen et al. 2022, 110).⁴⁵ However, in a direct challenge to Allen et al. (2020)’s study, Hikotani et al. (2022) found that high levels of troop contact in Okinawa are associated with more *negative* public sentiment. This debate suggests that there is important subnational variation across host nation communities which national-level surveys such as those in Allen et al. (2020, 2022) cannot capture, which this chapter will explore further.

While this recent work in base politics has started to unpack the relationship between contact and host nation public opinion, most of them do not explore the impacts of different forms of contact with the US military beyond crime. In the realm of “positive contact,” some contact between the US military and the host nation public is strategic (on the parts of the US military and/or host community government) while others are more coincidental. For example, humanitarian projects like building schools in the local community are strategic while having a conversation with a US servicemember at a bar is more coincidental. Previous research has focused on the ways that some types of strategic contact, like the US military delivering humanitarian aid, influence host nation public opinion towards the US military. Flynn et al. (2019) found, for example, that when the US military delivers humanitarian aid, recipient communities may have more positive opinions of the US military. Residents in these communities may not only witness US military personnel delivering aid, but they may also make

⁴⁵ In South Korea and other host nations, experiencing crime was associated with *less positive* opinions of the US military. In the Philippines and the UK, experiencing crime was neither strongly associated with positive opinions nor negative opinions of the US military (Allen et al. 2022, 110).

personal connections with personnel, fostering positive perceptions of the US military. Flynn et al.'s (2019) study aligns with others that focus generally on the ways that governments, particularly the US government, try to win the “hearts and minds” of the public in another country through “soft power” strategies (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009, 2012; Goldsmith et al. 2014). Goldsmith et al. (2014) similarly find that the US’s humanitarian aid provision can foster more favorable opinions of the US in recipient countries, while Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) find that high-level visits by US officials can foster more favorable opinions of the US, depending on whether the public views the official as credible. However, beyond humanitarian aid provision, little research has yet been published about other “soft power” strategies that the US military may use to foster positive civilian-military relations in host communities specifically such as base festivals.

While the US military sponsors and even hosts many events in the local community as part of its strategy to build robust civilian-military relations, friendship days are perhaps unique in the fact that they make the base accessible to the broader public.⁴⁶ Granting citizens access to the base is important to facilitating positive relations with the host community for at least two reasons. First, as Allen et al. (2022) note, a lack of transparency about the nature of the US presence can give rise to rumors and lend credibility to anti-US-military framing. The authors give the example of the lack of transparency around a US military humanitarian operation in Colombia to build latrines fostering a narrative that the US military was in the country to build a secret spy base (Allen et al. 2022, 91). Similarly, interviewees in the Philippines relayed activists’ claim that the US military used its bases there (when they were in operation) to store

⁴⁶ Besides US military personnel, base workers, and others with a long-term permit, civilians may only enter a US base after an on-base sponsor applies for and is granted a visitor pass for the civilian. For this project, for example, I received a visitor day pass for a US base in Japan with the sponsorship of the Public Affairs Officer.

nuclear weapons (Interview, Philippines scholar, March 6, 2019; Interview, Philippines activist, February 13, 2019). Activists, like other civilians, did not have access to the US bases and thus could not verify (or disprove) their claims with their own eyes. Although the public cannot access all areas of a US base during a friendship day, the visit may provide them with some reassurance about what goes on within the base's walls.

Second, friendship festivals allow civilians to have ostensibly positive contact with US military personnel. It also exposes them to US military frames that the US is a good neighbor, is part of the community, and is important for host nation defense. In some sense, these events help “normalize” the presence of the US military in the host community and host nation at large. At these events, civilians (including children and their families) are allowed to see inside US ships and aircraft (including Osprey), watch boxing matches between military personnel, and even view some weapons (Interview, Japanese activists in Tokyo, June 17, 2022). A few interviewees expressed concern that these events normalized the violence of war and relayed that the Japan Peace Committee (J-Peace) and other organizations petitioned US military officials to not allow citizens to see violent things (such as weapons) on base (Interview, Japanese activists in Tokyo, June 17, 2022). They are concerned that for festival attendees, the US military goes from an abstract, potentially harmful entity to a tangible, benevolent one that hosts enjoyable family-friendly events in the community.

I propose that citizens who have attended such events are more likely to both have a positive opinion of US troops in Japan and are less likely to report participating in anti-US-military protest activities among both Japanese residents in general and Okinawans specifically. There are two possible reasons for this association. First, individuals who attend such events are exposed to US military frames about being a “good neighbor” to the host community and Japan

in general. In this sense, they are more likely to support the US military in Okinawa and Japan writ large. They are also more likely to have positive interactions with US troops themselves. Second, people who already have positive opinions of the US military are more likely to attend such events than those who have negative opinions. Therefore, this is not a necessarily a causal relationship but rather an associational one. This experience may also make it difficult for individuals to accept anti-US-military activists' claims that the US military presence (locally or nationally) is problematic, decreasing the likelihood that they will engage in anti-US-military activism. For individuals who have attended friendship festivals, the US military is not an abstract entity but rather an actor who hosts enjoyable events open to Japanese families and individuals.

I also posit that Japanese citizens who are either employed by the US military or work at businesses that US soldiers or their dependents frequent, what I term "base-related employment," are more likely to have a positive opinion of Japan's security alliance with the US and less likely to participate in anti-US-military activism. This is for two key reasons. First, one of the main benefits host nation communities receive in exchange for hosting a US military presence is economic benefits. While these benefits take a variety of forms, I focus here on job creation and employment, both by the US military itself and local businesses that US servicemembers and their families frequent. Base-related employment is one of the main advantages that the US government, pro-base host nation politicians, and other pro-base actors highlight when arguing for a continued or new US presence. Employment generally fosters positive host community opinions of the US military presence because the benefits of the US presence are more tangible to employees' (and their families') daily lives (Allen et al. 2020, 238).

Second, individuals engaged in base-related employment are more likely to have repeated interactions with US personnel. Previous studies suggest that one-time interactions may not have a large impact on people's opinions of the US military presence (Allen et al. 2022, 117). I thus hypothesize that repeated interactions with US troops vis-à-vis individuals' employment will facilitate more positive opinions of the US military in Japan in general and make individuals less likely to participate in anti-US-military activism. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that iterative interactions (though international institutions) can facilitate positive relationships between states partially because, in gaining more information about each other, states can be more certain about what another state will do and build trust among them (Keohane 1982; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). While it is not a perfect analogy, iterative interactions between US servicemembers and civilians can facilitate trust among them in a similar way. Through repeated contact with the US military, the host nation public gains more information about the local US troop presence, developing an opinion of it based on this sustained interaction instead of news stories or anti-US-military activists' frames. Those engaging in base-related employment are more likely to be exposed to the US military's framing of its own presence. Such individuals, for example, may be more likely to hear the narrative that the US military is in Japan to protect Japan, contrary to what some anti-US-military activists say. Long-term interactions shift the US military from an abstract "other" to something more personal and tangible; the boundaries between "us" and "them" become blurred. Thus, these individuals are less likely to be persuaded by anti-US-military activists' frames that the US military presence (which in their lives is their significant others, family members, employers, and/or co-workers) is problematic. Anti-US-military frames lose their "experiential credibility," as they make claims that contradict these individuals' daily lives and experiences and fail to resonate with these potential protesters.

However, I do not expect that base-related employment will have a significant impact on Okinawans' opinions about the importance of the US-Japan alliance or their participation in anti-US-military activism. Previous studies suggest that despite the fact that the US military is one of the largest employers in Okinawa, economic considerations do not appear to impact Okinawans' opinions of base politics more broadly. Kagotani and Yanai (2014) found “no evidence that material interests such as the size of municipal economies and base dependency form incentives to raise support for pro-base candidates” (109). More recently, Hikotani et al. (2022) found that, in contrast to previous studies' claims,⁴⁷ Okinawans are more likely to receive base-related benefits *but* they are also more likely to have negative opinions of the US military presence than Japanese citizens living on the mainland (344). The authors specifically operationalized “economic benefit” in terms of base-related employment, including one's own employer or whether someone close to a respondent engaged in base-related employment (Hikotani et al. 2022, 338). Interviewees corroborated these findings in Okinawa, one saying that Okinawans “know” that the US bases do not contribute much to the local economy; the view that Okinawa's economy is dependent on the bases is a “mainland perspective” (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, July 14, 2019).

Anecdotally, base-related employment does not appear to deter Okinawans from participating in anti-US-military protests. In fact, one of the leaders of a major civil society organization that opposed the Henoko construction (described in Chapter 3) initially, Society for the Protection of Life (*Inouchi o Mamoru Kai*), was a former base employee who once held pro-base views (Williams 2013, 976). It is not merely former Okinawan employees who participate in anti-US-military activism, however. One US official who was previously stationed in Okinawa

⁴⁷ Specifically Allen et al. (2020), discussed previously, and Cooley and Marten (2006), who find that base-related economic benefits have “secured Okinawa's majority acquiescence to the continuing U.S. presence” (568).

gave an example of an Okinawan base employee who also participated in anti-US-military protests due to peer and familial pressure to join (Interview, US military official in Yokosuka, June 15, 2022). Beyond peer or familial pressure, one reason that employment may neither foster more positive views of the US-Japan alliance among Okinawans nor deter them from participating in anti-US-military activism is anti-US-military activists' and Okinawan politicians' frames. As discussed in depth later in the chapter, many Okinawan politicians, including in the Okinawan prefectural government, have taken the position that the US military's contribution to Okinawa's economy is more modest than the US military, the Japanese government, and others claim. As Hikotani et al. (2022) accurately summarize, "the Okinawa government considers the US military presence as an obstacle to, *instead of a driver of*, their economic development" (emphasis added) (333).

Table 4.1 below provides a description of the key variables used to explore these theories. *Festival* and *Employment* are the key independent variables of interest and *Sec. Treaty*, *Troops*, and *Activism* as dependent variables in the ordered logistic and hurdle regression models, respectively. As with the models in the previous chapter, I also incorporated a series of control variables that pertain to respondents' characteristics across the regressions: *Party*, *Gender*, *Education*, *Age*, and *Income*.

Variable Name	Survey Question	Operationalization
<i>Festival</i>	“Have you ever had any of the following contacts with U.S. troops stationed in Japan? Select all that apply.”	1 if a respondent selected “Visiting U.S. military bases for events such as base festivals and open houses,” 0 if not
<i>Employment</i>	“Have you ever had any of the following contacts with U.S. troops stationed in Japan? Select all that apply.”	1 if a respondent selected “Working at U.S. Military Bases” <i>or</i> “Working for a company close to a U.S. military base, or a U.S. military person becomes a customer of your work,” 0 if neither, and 2 if both ⁴⁸
<i>Sec. Treaty</i>	“Japan currently has a security treaty with the United States. Do you think that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is useful for peace and security in Japan or not?”	Not at all important (1) to very important (4) ⁴⁹
<i>Troops</i>	“What impact do you think the presence of U.S. troops will have on the area where you live?”	Very negative (1) to very positive (5) ⁵⁰
<i>Activism</i>	“Have you ever participated in or will participate in any of the following activities? Select all that apply.”	No reported anti-US-military activism (0) to participated in all forms of anti-US-military activism (10)

Table 4.1: Key Variables

⁴⁸ There were only three respondents in the national sample and twelve in the Okinawa sample who reported having worked both on base and at a business that US military personnel or their dependent frequent.

⁴⁹ The survey included an option for “don’t know,” which has been excluded here for clarity.

⁵⁰ The survey included an option for “don’t know,” which has been excluded here for clarity.

Results:

	National Survey	Okinawa Survey	National Survey Alt	Okinawa Survey Alt
Festival	0.2342 (0.1469)	0.5675*** (0.1423)	0.4741*** (0.1379)	0.6046*** (0.1329)
Employment	-0.6790*** (0.2412)	0.1217 (0.1760)	0.0247 (0.2295)	0.3464** (0.1672)
Party	0.4369*** (0.0404)	0.3921*** (0.0689)	0.4175*** (0.0359)	0.4900*** (0.0641)
Gender	-0.5587*** (0.0771)	-0.4143*** (0.1310)	-0.6850*** (0.0695)	-0.0755 (0.1195)
Education	0.0012 (0.0281)	-0.0254 (0.0477)	-0.0671*** (0.0252)	-0.1375*** (0.0435)
Age	0.0108*** (0.0024)	-0.0014 (0.0056)	-0.0019 (0.0022)	-0.0160*** (0.0052)
Income	0.0265 (0.0211)	0.0301 (0.0407)	0.0309 (0.0191)	-0.0045 (0.0368)
1 2	-2.0509*** (0.1991)	-1.6908*** (0.3411)	-2.6558*** (0.1780)	-2.6011*** (0.3199)
2 3	-0.7356*** (0.1896)	-0.3410 (0.3344)	-1.1067*** (0.1688)	-1.2997*** (0.3096)
3 4	1.8650*** (0.1931)	1.9363*** (0.3425)	0.5627*** (0.1680)	0.2419 (0.3082)
5 6			2.5051*** (0.1783)	2.0894*** (0.3264)
AIC	5953.0810	2255.8935	8577.4946	2957.1482
BIC	6012.2490	2304.0059	8643.7536	3011.2973
Log Likelihood	-2966.5405	-1117.9468	-4277.7473	-1467.5741
Deviance	5933.0810	2235.8935	8555.4946	2935.1482
Num. obs.	2743	908	3052	1015

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table 4.2: Contact and Opinion of the US Military in Japan (Ordered Logit)

Table 4.2 above presents ordered logistic regression models using data from both surveys. The first two models (“National Survey” and “Okinawa Survey”) use *Sec Treaty* as the dependent variable and the last two models (“National Survey Alt” and “Okinawa Survey Alt”)

use *Troops* as the dependent variable.⁵¹ In the first two models, US base festival attendance does not appear to have a statistically significant association with public opinion about the US-Japan alliance among Japanese citizens in general but there is a significant relationship in the Okinawa sample. The last two models suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship between festival attendance and having positive opinions about US troops in one's community across both surveys. For most Japanese citizens, the US-Japan security alliance may be too abstract for them to associate it with base festival attendance. However, the linkage between base festivals and the US troops in their community – a manifestation of the security alliance – is more tangible; after all, it is the US troops in their community who are hosting the festivals. Okinawans who attend base festivals are both more likely to view the US-Japan alliance as important to Japanese security and have more positive opinions of the US troops in their community. Given the ubiquity of base politics in Okinawa (e.g., Okinawan governors and many municipal politicians run on anti-base platforms), Okinawans may have a better understanding of the security alliance and the fact that it is the alliance that enables US troops to be in their community.

There may be several reasons for this mostly positive and significant relationship. As mentioned, it may be a selection effect: those attending base festivals already tend to hold positive perceptions of the US military presence and agree that it is important for Japan. Similarly, it could also be that Okinawans who have some close association with the US military (e.g., they are married to a US soldier or a US soldier is in their family) are more likely to attend the festivals. Those in close contact with the US military may be more likely to hold positive opinions at best or at least less negative opinions. One interviewee, an Okinawan anti-US-

⁵¹ As a robustness check, Table A3.1 includes other model specifications with different operationalizations of the US military presence (another wording of the question about the US-Japan alliance and a question about respondents' opinions of US troops in Japan). The findings in these models mirror the ones presented here.

military activists, said that two of their nieces were married to US soldiers and one questioned the interviewee's activism: "you're against my husband's job?" (Interview, Okinawan activist, November 29, 2020). In other words, other forms of contact with the US military, which may themselves have an impact on individuals' opinions of the US presence, may also influence individuals' propensity to attend base festivals.

Base-related employment has a negative statistically significant relationship with opinions of the US-Japan alliance in the national-level survey with but is statistically insignificant in the Okinawa model. This result suggests that those who are engaged in base-related employment (predominantly among mainland Japanese citizens) are actually *less* likely to view the US-Japan security alliance as important to Japanese security than other individuals. However, the last two models suggest different relationships between base-related employment and opinions of US troops in respondents' communities in both samples. In the national sample, the relationship between employment and opinions of US troops is statistically insignificant while the relationship between these variables is positive and significant in the Okinawa sample. This suggests that among those engaging in base-related employment, a more tangible manifestation of the US-Japan alliance (troops in one's community) may be more likely to facilitate positive opinions of the US military than the more abstract US-Japan alliance. Troops in one's community may often be directly linked with local economic benefits; at a maximum, the community hosts a US base and at a minimum, troops may be visiting the community for tourism or joint-military exercises with the SDF. In this sense, the relationship between base-related employment and US troops in one's community is clearer than the linkage between employment and the US-Japan alliance. It may also be that employees support the US troops in

their community (as providers of economic benefits and even as friends, co-workers, and family members) but object to parts of the US-Japan alliance.

Focusing next on the relationship between civilian-military contact and anti-US-military activism, Table 4.3 below depicts the hurdle regression models of the relationships of base-festival attendance and employment with activism in both samples.⁵² The models suggest some interesting variation between the national and Okinawa samples in the relationship between US base festival attendance and anti-US-military activism. While there is no statistically significant relationship between *Festival* and *Activism* in the Okinawa sample, there is in the national sample. The statistically significant relationship suggests that not only is festival attendance associated with anti-US-military activism, it is associated with higher levels of activism. While this finding does not comport with the theory, it does align with some of my anti-US-military activist interviews. One activist from Yokosuka, a US base hosting community near Tokyo, mentioned that they often attended the base festivals with their family (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, October 16, 2022). An activist from Yokota, another US base hosting community outside of Tokyo, explained that their organization actually attended the festivals to protest outside of Air Force Base (AFB) Yokota “to bring more [public] awareness to all the other issues that are happening on the base” (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokota, October 29, 2022). The activist also shared a picture of such a protest, whereby anti-US-military protesters were seated in chairs outside the festival, holding protest signs, while a line of people trickled onto the base, some look at the protesters while others ignored them. In this sense, the base festivals may actually serve as an opportunity for anti-US-military activists to raise public

⁵² Predicted probability plots for these models can be found in Appendix 2.

awareness about base-related issues and rally people to their cause, engaging in a form of counterframing.

	National Survey	Okinawa Survey
Count: Festival	0.4412 ^{***} (0.1340)	-0.1518 (0.2143)
Count: Employment	0.1584 (0.1494)	0.0902 (0.2421)
Count: Party Ideology	-0.1063 [*] (0.0624)	-0.0553 (0.1123)
Count: Gender	-0.2816 ^{**} (0.1098)	-0.4208 ^{**} (0.2140)
Count: Age	-0.0068 [*] (0.0035)	-0.0045 (0.0092)
Count: Education	0.0427 (0.0409)	0.0447 (0.0751)
Count: Income	-0.0363 (0.0282)	0.0737 (0.0613)
Log(theta)	0.9728 ^{***} (0.2900)	-0.6669 (0.4595)
Zero: Festival	1.0581 ^{***} (0.1767)	0.2416 (0.1687)
Zero: Employment	2.2563 ^{***} (0.2642)	0.4527 ^{**} (0.1901)
Zero: Party Ideology	0.2139 ^{***} (0.0622)	-0.0401 (0.0846)
Zero: Gender	-0.0255 (0.1200)	-0.1981 (0.1629)
Zero: Age	-0.0179 ^{***} (0.0039)	0.0225 ^{***} (0.0071)
Zero: Education	0.0803 [*] (0.0443)	0.1598 ^{***} (0.0579)
Zero: Income	0.0599 [*] (0.0315)	0.0416 (0.0476)
AIC	3433.6529	1959.6075
Log Likelihood	-1699.8264	-962.8037
Num. obs.	3204	1061

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Table 4.3: Reported Anti-US-Military Activism by Survey (Hurdle)

Turning next to the relationship between base-related employment and anti-US-military activism, Table 4.3 suggests that respondents across both samples who engaged in base-related employment were more likely to participate in activism compared to non-employees, reflected in the zero models. One reason is that it is possible that the on-base interactions that Japanese employees have with US military personnel are not positive ones. Anecdotally, female base employees may face sexual harassment on-base (A. Johnson 2019, 210). Other historical

accounts suggest that base employees could be subject to unsafe working conditions and discrimination (Hutchcroft 1982).

Second, beyond headline-capturing high-profile crimes such as sexual assaults and murder, US troops are involved in a variety of crimes in host communities, including against local businesses and employees. In 2020, for example, a Marine stationed in Okinawa was charged with choking a taxi driver, robbing the driver, and stealing and crashing the taxi (Ichihashi and Burke 2020). In a 2016 incident, a drunk Marine was charged for throwing a glass at a bartender's head in Okinawa (Sumida and Burke 2016). These crimes occur not only in Okinawa, which has the highest concentration of US bases, but in mainland host communities as well. For example, in 2006, three crewmen from the *USS Kitty Hawk* were charged with robbery resulting in injury in Yokosuka for refusing to pay for their entire bill and fighting with the bar owner (Sumida and Batdorff 2006). In a more recent altercation, a Marine based at Combined Arms Training Center (CATC) Camp Fuji was arrested for assaulting a taxi driver and others after not paying his cab fare in Tokyo (Kusumoto 2019). Beyond crimes, many host communities were wary of US troops spreading COVID-19 at the height of the pandemic, in some cases accusing the US military of not taking sufficient measures to prevent the spread of the virus from troops into the local community (Gallo 2022). As we administered the survey in early 2022, it is possible that COVID-19 concerns may have impacted respondents' views. Such incidents conflict with the "good neighbor" image that the US (and many host community governments) tries to cultivate of itself among the local community. In this view, base-related employment may encourage anti-US-military activism. However, the models in Table 4.3 suggest that while base-related employment may be a good indicator of individuals' decisions to engage in anti-US-

military activism, it cannot predict what level of activism an individual will participate in, as the statistically insignificant coefficients for *Employment* indicate.

Conclusion

In the case of Yokosuka and many other host communities, anti-US-military activists face an uphill battle as they must contend with a strong partnership between the local government and the US military. The impact is that the public hears similar framing of the US military presence from these entities; activists' voices are discordant. This presents another hurdle to mobilizing the public against the US military. As I discuss in Chapter 5, a similar situation faces activists in the conservative stronghold in Daegu, South Korea. Activists in Okinawa, especially in recent years, encounter a different situation; local politicians (and even former Prime Minister Hatoyama) support activists' claims regarding the Henoko base construction, even participating in protests. In this instance, local politicians' claims legitimize and amplify activists' arguments, relegating the US military to the minority opinion. This pattern tends to be present when there is a high level of public protest mobilization and often not by coincidence. As Kim (2023) argues, "elites, however, do not exist as a mere background for activists; they have their own agency, preferences, and interests" and may partner with activists as an election strategy (12). As discussed in Chapter 6, many politicians were intimately involved with the anti-US-military movement in the Philippines in the late 1980s/early 1990s.

The survey findings generally suggest that base festivals and base-related employment are more likely to be associated with more negative views of the US-Japan security alliance and a greater likelihood that an individual will participate in anti-US-military activism. However, base festivals and employment have either little impact on views of US troops in one's

community (as is the case in the national sample) or are associated with more positive views. This suggests that people may not understand the benefits of the US-Japan alliance, but they understand the benefits of hosting a US troop presence. Base festivals and base-related employment can potentially facilitate more positive civilian-military relations, at least at the community level. At the same time, base festivals, an ostensibly positive form of contact between Japanese citizens and the US military, are associated with higher levels of anti-US-military activism among Japanese people in general (mostly people from the Japanese mainland). As discussed, the festivals present an opportunity for the US military to demonstrate to local communities that it is a “good neighbor” and to normalize its activities vis-à-vis allowing attendees to see military vehicles, aircraft, and even weapons. In this sense, the festivals are a vehicle for the US military’s frames. However, as mentioned previously, the festivals may also serve as windows of opportunity for anti-US-military activists to draw the public’s attention to base-related issues. Therefore, the framing contests that take place in such instances between the US military on-base and activists at its gates may also influence the public’s opinion of the alliance and their decision to engage in anti-US-military activism.

Chapter 5: Local Identity, Civilian-Military Relations, and Anti-Military Protests in South Korea

On a rainy summer day in 2021 around noon, a handful of activists in Gangjeong Village on Jeju Island did what they did every day except for Sundays: picked up flags with protest slogans on them and made a (small) human chain at the rotary outside the Jeju Civilian-Military Complex or Jeju Naval Base, which was completed in 2015. As one part of their near-daily ritual (after doing 100 bows and conducting Catholic Mass), the protesters marched to the gate of the base, carrying a stereo playing Korean⁵³ music. Although there were Korean soldiers at the base's gate, they hardly seemed concerned about the protesters temporarily hanging protest flags around the gate. The emcee informed me that the soldiers used to give the protesters a difficult time, but no longer (Jeju Field Notes, August 2021). While a small group of activists, many from mainland Korea or abroad, currently protest the base, a vibrant transnational social movement to stop its construction thrived here in the early 2010s. The movement is in some ways noticeably different from what it was during its peak in 2011-2012. After the base was completed in 2015, the movement largely demobilized as many participants, especially those from Jeju, stopped protesting. At the same time, however, many important elements of the movement remain to this day including the rituals like the Catholic Masses and 100 Bows, themselves byproducts of the scale shift that occurred at the peak of the movement, transforming the movement from a local movement to a national and transnational one (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 94). The movement in Jeju continues to problematize or frame the Jeju Naval Base⁵⁴ in mostly the same terms as it has in the past, as detailed later in this chapter: the base is destructive to the local environment, including

⁵³ In this chapter I use "South Korea/n" and "Korea/n" interchangeably.

⁵⁴ I adopt the English label for the installation, the Jeju Naval Base.

rare or endangered species; the base is undemocratic and was constructed without local consent; the base contradicts Jeju's designation as an "island of peace;" the base is actually a US base; and others. In short, the movement continues to employ frames that include elements of what C. J. Kim (2023) terms "ideological" and "nationalistic" framing, frames that include anti-militarism or sovereignty claims that are more abstract from people's everyday lives.

Protest activity around US Army Garrison (USAG) Camp Walker in Daegu is markedly different, as the installation itself is hard to identify albeit for the barbed wire atop its walls and the English-speaking services nearby (Daegu Field Notes, August 2021). Although Daegu residents have occasionally protested the US bases in Daegu (Camps Walker, Henry, and George), typically around issues such as noise pollution and local development, the relationship between the community and the local US presence is typically amicable.

These South Korean communities represent a similar pattern as Okinawa and Yokosuka in the previous chapters. First, as in Japan, activists' ability to problematize the base presence through historical grievance is an important source of variation. Frames that highlight histories of marginalization vis-à-vis the host nation's central government and/or the US are more likely to foster higher levels of protest mobilization against the US military or installations that the public perceives that the US military uses. In the case of Jeju, activists against the Jeju Naval Base have linked its construction to what is known as "4.3." During this violent episode in 1948, discussed in greater detail later in the chapter, the Korean government (vis-à-vis the police, the military, and other state agents) killed thousands of Jeju islanders branded as communist insurgents or collaborators, which the US military condoned in the name of suppressing communism in Korea (H. J. Kim 2014, 31). By contrast, Daegu's conflicting identities do not provide activists with adequate historical "material" with which to persuasively problematize the US military presence,

limiting activists to focus on “pragmatic” issues such as noise pollution and local development instead of broader “ideological” or “nationalistic” frames (C. J. Kim 2023).

Another crucial factor is the visibility of the US presence. Daegu’s bases are generally less visible to the public in that they have blended into the community over time, typically being more visible for positive reasons as the US military and Daegu city government conduct initiatives to strengthen civilian-military relations. In contrast, the construction of the Jeju Naval Base rendered the base highly visible to the public and provided activists with an opportunity to problematize the base. The Jeju case is distinct in this study as it shows what can happen to bases over time. While the base was highly visible when it was under construction, the base was much less visible after 2016 when construction was completed, despite openings for activists to draw public attention to the base. During its construction, activists and the Korean government engaged in a framing contest over whether the base belonged to the US or South Korea. Although activists proved to be right in that the US has used the base several times since the base’s completion, the local response was relatively mild as only a few small-scale protests occurred in reaction to the US’s port calls. However, the Jeju case is distinct in that it is a Korean base (albeit one that the US can access) and suggests that at least in some communities, the identity of the basing nation may not matter for protest mobilization. While Daegu shares many similarities with Yokosuka, activists have not been able to mobilize would-be protesters against the US bases to the same extent, even in cases where they are able to draw high negative visibility to the US presence.

An Overview of US Bases and Anti-US-Military Activism in South Korea

The relationship between the US military and South Korea began after the end of World War II in the late 1940s when the United States Army Military Government in Korea

(USAMGIK) governed the southern part of the Korean Peninsula (H. J. Kim 2014, 22). Very little anti-US-military activism occurred in South Korea for most of the Cold War era. Anti-US-military activism was challenging because the Korean government silenced those who were critical of the US military presence and may have otherwise mobilized against it (Smith 2006, 17; Yeo 2010, 1; 2011, 129). Additionally, the US military presence had a very clear objective: defend Korea from another attack from the North (Smith 2006, 13). Thus, many Koreans believed that the US presence was necessary for their national defense (Smith 2006, 17).

More broadly, however, the Korean political situation made any type of activism for most of the Cold War era difficult. South Korean was effectively authoritarian until 1987, despite the window-dressing of democratic processes such as elections. Beginning with Rhee Syngman, the first president of Korea after WWII, Korean leaders used the specter of the North Korean threat to justify the use of repressive measures, stifling civil liberties (Cooley 2008, 106). The repression of civil liberties increased under Park Chung Hee's regime from 1961 to 1979, through brutal police put-downs, imprisonment, university closures, and restrictive laws intended to keep the activities of pro-democracy student activists and intellectuals in check (P. Y. Chang 2008; N. Lee 2009). However, Park retained popular support largely because of Korea's rapid economic development through Park's state-led economic policies. While authoritarianism continued under Park's successor, Chun Doo Hwan, the pro-democracy movement grew stronger in the wake of the Kwangju Incident in 1980, which resulted in the deaths of many protesters and bystanders in the city of Kwangju at the hands of the Korean military. Following the event, students, intellectuals and laborers were able to gain an increasing amount of support to their cause, eventually drawing in opposition politicians, white collar workers, journalists and others into their coalition and the Korean public to their cause (M. Park 2008, 78). This event also

sparked anti-US sentiment in South Korea as the public believed the US government had approved the South Korean government deploying troops to Kwangju to stop the protesters (N. Lee 2009, 46). At the time, the South Korean military and the US military in South Korea was under a unified command structure, “under which the United States had operational control over the South Korean military” in war time (Hong 2008, 19–20). Eventually, because of escalating street protests and strikes, Chun conceded to holding direct presidential elections in 1987. Taken together, it is unsurprising that anti-US-military protests were rare before 1987, with the exception of the Kwangju Incident.

Anti-US-military activism blossomed after Korea’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s, as activism did in general. The major anti-US-military movements in the years immediately following democratization tended to be national-level ones related to incidents involving US Forces Korea (USFK). The US-Republic of Korea (ROK) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) enumerates the rules of jurisdiction when US troops commit crimes in South Korea, often drawing anti-US-military activists’ ire. From 1966, when the SOFA was signed, until 1991, the first time the countries amended it, the agreement had what was termed the “automatic waiver clause,” which said that South Korea needed to provide a 15-day notice to the US military that it intended to exercise its jurisdiction over a US servicemember accused of committing a crime or jurisdiction would automatically turn over to the US (Jung and Hwang 2003, 1113). In most instances, the Korean government did not exercise its right to prosecute US service members (B. D. Choi 2003, 303). The 1991 revision to the SOFA removed this automatic waiver clause and mandated that the US had to request jurisdiction from the Korean government, though the former would grant “sympathetic consideration” to the US’s waiver requests (Jung and Hwang 2003, 1112). However, South Korea typically granted the US’s requests, waiving its

right to jurisdiction 97% of the time in 1998 (Jung and Hwang 2003, 1130). Additionally, custody of the accused has long been a controversial issue, where the SOFA stipulated that US service members accused of a crime would be held in US custody until “the completion of all judicial proceedings and until Korea requested the transfer of custody” (Jung and Hwang 2003, 1121). Hence, the Korean government often could not take US servicemembers accused of crimes into custody until after trial, even in cases where Korean citizens were victims (Kawato 2015, 100). This changed in 2001, which now allows Korea to take custody if and when it indicts US troops, limited to cases of serious crimes like rape and murder (Jung and Hwang 2003, 1121–22).

Unsurprisingly, crimes attributed to the US military in South Korea have been a hot-button issue, not only in terms of the crimes themselves but also the consequences of these incidents. Crimes and their aftermath are often opportune moments for anti-US-military activists to remind the public that the US bases are there and that they are a problem that needs to be addressed. As discussed in Chapter 6, crimes attributed to the US military have served as openings in the political opportunity structure to rally the public and host nation policymakers to the anti-US-military cause. Indeed, in the case of the Philippines after the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), anti-US-military protests peaked following crimes attributed to the US military such as the murder of Jennifer Laude. As I discuss in the next chapter, these instances present activists with windows of opportunity to mobilize the public against the US military, even when the political opportunity structure is generally unfavorable to anti-US-military activism such as when the visibility of the troop presence is low and/or security threats are high.

Post-democratization, the first two major anti-US-military movements in South Korea occurred at a national-level after incidents (crimes and accidents) attributed to US military

personnel. The first followed the murder of Yun Kumi, a sex worker, in 1992 (Moon 2010, 113; Schober 2016, 11). The second episode occurred in 2002 when US servicemembers accidentally crushed two Korean girls on their way to a friend's birthday party with a US Army armored vehicle (Oh and Arrington 2007, 344). National civil society organizations based in Seoul such as the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD, *Chamyeoyeondae*) organized mass protests, though protests about these incidents occurred in other Korean cities as well. Additionally, in some cases, organizations formed coalitions about a particular incident. As a result of Yun Kumi's murder, for example, activists formed the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes against Civilians by US Troops (*Undong Ponbu*) in 1993 (Moon 2010, 113). High-profile incidents sometimes also coincide with a surge in anti-US sentiment in South Korea, as was the case following the deaths of the two girls in 2002. A 1994 survey, for example, suggested that two-thirds of Koreans had positive feelings towards the US while a 2003 survey showed that Koreans were more likely to have negative opinions of the US (Bong 2004, 154–55).

In addition to responses to incidents, anti-US-military activism in Korea about base-related environmental issues occurs. For example, activists raised concerns about the contamination of land that the US military has returned to Korean jurisdiction (C. J. Kim 2018, 346). As a result of activists' efforts, the SOFA was revised in 2001 to include a clause that states that "the US should remedy issues defined as known, imminent, and substantial endangerment (KISE) to human health and safety" (C. J. Kim 2018, 346). Environmentally focused anti-US-military activism has also occurred at a local level. One of the most prominent examples was the movement in Maehyang Village, southwest of Seoul, against the USFK's Kooni Firing Range in the mid-2000s. This movement ultimately garnered public attention at the national level and

pressured the Korean and US governments to relocate the range to another location (C. J. Kim 2018, 348; Yeo 2010, 5).

In Korea as in other host nations, contention against the US military often arises from what C. J. Kim (2023) terms “status quo disruption,” “when major changes occur to these long-standing installations, such as expansion, relocation, reduction, and closure,” creating a “sudden volatility [that] presents both a threat that disrupts the normality in base towns and opportunities for oppositional mobilization” (9). This change in the US basing presence (an opening in the political opportunity structure) often reminds the public of the US’s presence and presents anti-US-military activists an opportunity to problematize the presence and mobilize would-be protesters. “Status quo disruption” tends to impact specific areas, not, for example, the US military in the country in general. In Korea, this typically takes the form of base-related construction, i.e., physically altering some aspect of the US military presence. In this sense, activists can use these opportunities to draw negative high visibility to the US presence in Korea – in a particular community. However, in many instances, these local struggles become national ones, including the movement against the Jeju Naval Base.

A major anti-US-military protest episode occurred in the host community of Pyeongtaek in the mid-2000s because of this sort of status quo disruption: the expansion of Camp Humphreys. The Korean and US governments agreed that the US military would return Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul and enlarge its troop presence at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, a small city south of Seoul, sparking protests (Yeo 2011, 2). This movement not only involved local activists and residents, but also many from Seoul and elsewhere (Yeo 2010, 4). Since the movement in Pyeongtaek against Camp Humphrey’s expansion, two other movements emerged with many similarities to the former: the movement against the Jeju Naval Base and the

movement against the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) installation in Soseong Village. Like the Pyeongtaek movement, these movements emerged because of status quo disruption to the US military presence in their communities, rendering the presence highly visible. They also draw upon similar tactical strategies like obstructing construction through sit-ins. The tactical similarities are no coincidence, however, as many activists and national organizations became involved with these movements such as “People Who Open Peace and Unification,” also known as *Pyeongtongsa* (Y. S. Lee and Ju 2016). While the Jeju movement is one of the cases examined in depth in this chapter, I also discuss the movement in Pyeongtaek in Chapter 7 as a potential additional case for the study.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 below present a visual summary of anti-US-military protests from 1987 (the year of Korea’s democratization) to 2017. Figure 5.1 is a choropleth of all anti-US-military protests from 1987-2017 across South Korea’s provinces, with the points in red depicting the locations of the US bases. Note that the Jeju Naval Base is not included in Figure 5.1. As discussed in the next section, there is debate over the identity of this base; activists and some residents claim that the base is a US base, the US and Korean governments state that it is a Korean base. Given that the government position is that the base is Korean, I omit the location of the base but include the protest frequency. Figure 5.2 depicts the same information but disaggregates the frequency of protests by size. The regions that experienced the most anti-US-military protest correspond with the previous discussion about the major anti-US-military movements in Korea since 1987. Many protests occur in Seoul because of the US bases nearby, it is where foreign policy is made, and it is the epicenter of protests in Korea. Like anti-US-military protests in Japan and the Philippines, many protests occur in the capital that are not specifically about US bases in the area, as depicted in Figure 5.3 below. Jeju Island in the south also has a

high number of protests, largely driven by the ongoing movement against the Jeju Naval base, discussed in the next section. Gyeonggi Province in the west has both a high number of US bases and a high number of anti-US-military protests, largely driven by the movement against the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek and the movement against the Kooni Firing Range in Maehyang Village. In the east, the anti-THAAD protests are largely responsible for the higher number of protests in North Gyeongsang (Gyeongsangbuk). Outside of these four regions, the provinces are mostly shaded yellow or light green, representing low levels of anti-US-military protests, despite the presence of US bases in many of them.




Figure 5.1: Distribution of Anti-US-Military Protests and US Bases in South Korea, 1987-2017

These protest patterns also largely correlate with political ideology. Liberals tend to be more interested in facilitating a positive relationship with North Korea and critical of the US military presence while conservatives tend to hold more anti-communist views and often characterize critics of the US military presence as North Korean sympathizers. An examination of recent presidential election data suggests where we might expect higher levels of anti-US-military protests based on ideology. Voters in Seoul (the area with the highest number of

protests) voted for Moon Jae In, the liberal party's candidate, in the 2012 and 2017 elections, which suggests that Seoul is generally an area where we might expect higher anti-US-military contention (Republic of Korea National Election Commission 2017). Voters in Gyeonggi Province and Jeju (areas that also had high levels of anti-US-military protests) slightly favored Park Geun Hye over Moon in 2012 but voted for Moon in 2017, suggesting that these areas are not as liberal as Seoul but still liberal relative to more conservative areas. In contrast, Daegu (one of the cases under study), North Gyeongsang province, and South Gyeongsang province consistently voted for the conservative candidate in the 2012 and 2017 elections. It thus seems that political ideology is also an important factor in understanding where anti-US-military protests emerge, but it is not always predictive. As discussed above, North Gyeongsang province is traditionally a conservative area, yet mass anti-THAAD protests have occurred there. This is largely due to the involvement of activists from other areas travelling to Soseong Village and suggests that this feature of Korean civil society may facilitate anti-US-military movements even in places where they may otherwise fail to thrive.




Figure 5.2: Anti-US-Military Protests by Korean Host Province, 1987-2017

Figure 5.2 also presents another picture of anti-US-military protests in Korea focusing on the provinces and cities where there are US military bases with the addition of Jeju, as the naval base is officially a Korean one. This figure gives a glimpse into the size of the protests by province and city. This figure contrasted with Figure 5.1 presents some important observations. First, anti-US-military protests in Seoul are both frequent and often large with thousands of participants. As mentioned, these protests are at times in response to US bases in the area (such as Yongsan Garrison in Itaewon district) and at times part of movements against US bases elsewhere (such as the movements in Pyeongtaek, Jeju, and Soseong Village). Figure 5.3 below shows that while there are some protests in Seoul targeting US bases in the area or about national-level anti-US-military claims (left bar), there are also a significant number of protests there about other bases (right bar). Secondly, anti-US-military protests in Gyeonggi Province also had many large protests over the time period, again largely driven by the Pyeongtaek protests. Finally, while there were many protests in Jeju, few of them were large, as described previously.




Figure 5.3: Anti-US-Military Protests in Seoul, 1987-2017

Note that the left bar represents protests about Seoul-area bases or the US military presence in Korea more broadly, while the right bar represents protests about other bases.

As Figures 5.1 and 5.2 indicate, there are few anti-US-military protests in some host communities and several protests in others. In the sections that follow, I focus on the cases of Daegu and Jeju to understand under what conditions anti-US-military protests occur. The city of Daegu has low levels of protests despite the fact that US Army Garrison Daegu (consisting of three US bases) is one of the two major US Forces Korea (USFK) hubs, along with Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. This suggests that Daegu is typical of many Korean host communities. At the same time, as discussed in more detail later, there are many factors that would seemingly facilitate anti-US-military protest in Daegu, but do not. On the other hand, Jeju and the movement against the Jeju Naval Base is representative of anti-US-military movements in South Korea: triggered by a change in the status quo of the US presence (an opening in the political opportunity structure) involving both local and national activists. What is distinct about

this movement, however, is that it became a transnational movement and in that sense, the Jeju movement has drawn many comparisons to the anti-US-movement against the expansion of Camp Schwab in Henoko, Okinawa. Additionally, one of the key areas of contention over which activists and the Korean government waged a framing contest about the ownership of the base: is it an ROK base or a US one? While this is perhaps unique to the Korean context, it is similar to what activists in the Philippines have encountered in the VFA era where the US military has used Armed Forces of the Philippines bases where the US military itself has lower visibility. In the sections that follow, I begin with an examination of Jeju and the anti-Jeju Naval Base movement before turning to a discussion of Daegu and the US military.

Historical Marginalization and High Negative Visibility in Jeju

Jeju Island is a tourist island known for its plentiful beaches, UNESCO-designated Biosphere Reserve, and designation as an “Island of Peace” (R. Kim 2012b). However, signage in Gangjeong Village on the southern part of the island points to the “Jeju Civilian-Military Complex Port for Beautiful Tourism” (*Jeju mingunbokhaphyeong kwankwang mihang*) also known in English simply as the “Jeju Naval Base” (Jeju Field Notes, 2021). The Korean government began constructing the base in 2007, sparking a protest movement that expanded from the small village of Gangjeong to the international community. What caused this movement to emerge in Jeju? One factor is Jeju’s history with violence perpetrated by the Korean government and the US military’s complicity in that violence, namely during the events known as “4.3”, has made Jeju a fertile ground for anti-military protest mobilization. 4.3 encompasses “a series of Communist armed uprisings and counterinsurgency actions that occurred between 1947 and 1954,” of which a particularly violent clash between insurgents and police officers occurred on April 3, 1948 (H. J. Kim 2014, 2). Activists against the Jeju Naval Base have linked

its construction to 4.3. However, it is not the mere history of 4.3 that made protest against the base in Jeju more likely; it is the way that activists linked the construction of the base to this grievance. In this sense, the Jeju case bears a strong resemblance to the Okinawa, Japan case discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The symbolism of 4.3 proved to be an adaptable framing in that it has many different meanings and was used to refer to many different aspects of the base construction. While it has cultural resonance with Jeju islanders (and hence a high degree of narrative fidelity), it also resonated with people from mainland Korea due to national discussions around the remembrance of 4.3 at the same time. Additionally, the 4.3 frame mobilized international activists and would-be protesters due to the moral shocks from the event and the ways that activists in Jeju incorporated 4.3 into a broader frame about “peace and life.” Another factor is that the base was highly visible as a “disruption of the status quo” (C. J. Kim 2023). Activists problematized the new base as destroying endemic wildlife and potentially inviting violence to Korea’s “Island of Peace.”

Although the movement against the Jeju Naval Base began in Gangjeong around 2007, the origins of the movement date back as far as 2002 (Gwon 2013, 239). Prior to selecting Gangjeong as the site for the complex, the Korean Navy had also considered building it in two other villages on Jeju, Hwasun and Wimi (Gwon 2013, 239; Kim 2021, 265). However, many in these communities also opposed the construction of the base (Gwon 2013, 244–46; C. J. Kim 2021a, 265). The Korean government shifted its focus to Gangjeong village after 87 registered villagers (out of around 1,000) voted to request to be considered as the site for the base at a town meeting on the issue; the government selected the village as the site less than a month after the vote (Gwon 2013, 246). Many critics and anti-base activists cite the circumstances of Gangjeong’s selection as the location for the base as one of the core areas of contention (Gwon

2013, 247; Yeo 2018, 242). In the words of one activist, it was “an undemocratic decision” (Sunghwan Kim, n.d.). Amid protests by many Gangjeong villagers, the Korean and Jeju governments signed a memorandum of understanding in 2009 and broke ground at the base site in early 2010 (Gwon 2013, 249–51).

As several studies of the movement suggest, the movement was essentially a not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) movement by Jeju residents, mostly Gangjeong villagers, from 2007 until about 2011 (Gwon 2013, 239; Yeo 2018, 242; Koleilat 2019, 250; C. J. Kim 2021, 265). During this time, villagers formed the Gangjeong Anti-base Committee, and, later, civil society organizations on Jeju Island started the Jeju Pan-Island Committee for Stopping the Military Base and Realizing a Peaceful Island (JPIC) (Gwon 2013, 248; Sunghwan Kim, n.d.). Villagers went to the Jeju Provincial Government Office, held press conferences, held sit-ins, and fasted” and “went around Jeju Island informing the residents about the unjust and wrongful decisions” by the Korean government (Sunghwan Kim, n.d.). However, “the struggle [...] felt like a lonely one” as Korean mainstream media rarely covered it and thus mainland Koreans knew little about the Gangjeong movement (Gwon 2013, 239).

The movement expanded to a national-level and then transnational movement around 2011. Why did the movement expand from a NIMBY struggle to a national and transnational one in 2011? First, there was a danger that activists’ and Gangjeong Village officials’ would not be able to delay the construction on their own much longer (Sunghwan Kim, n.d.). One reason was that in 2010, the Korean navy requested that police remove protesters’ tents and “subsequently arrested 53 protesters, including village leaders” (Gwon 2013, 251). Another was that the Navy accelerated the construction in early 2011 (Gwon 2013, 251). While local activists and villagers had initially been reticent to enlist the help of outsiders, village mayor Dong Gyun Kang

eventually reached out to activists and civil society groups on the Korean mainland for their assistance in 2011 (Yeo 2018, 242–43; Koleilat 2019, 250).

Second, the movement broadened its frames to emphasize “peace and life,” based on “the trauma of Jeju 4/3 and the hope to maintain environmental preservation and peace in the Asia-Pacific region” (Gwon 2013, 254; Yeo 2018, 244). This is another parallel with movement against the Henoko construction in Okinawa. Activists drew upon a local traumatic experience and extended their frames to the essential “lesson” from the experience: protecting life. In addition to invoking 4.3 and its remembrance, activists in Jeju began framing their movement as one about environmental concerns. One environmental activist mentioned that they problematized the base by telling the public that “Jeju has a lot of soft corals; a lot of [them] are going to be extinct soon and need to be protected” and emphasizing that the government had not done proper environmental assessments on the impact of the construction on local marine life (Interview, Korean activist in Seoul, April 20, 2023). Activists also highlighted that the construction would (and did) destroy Gureombi rock, a rock formation that has cultural connotations in Gangjeong (Gwon 2013, 257; Kirk 2013, 100; C. J. Kim 2021a, 267).⁵⁵ Taken together, these developments had a significant impact on the complexion and the intensity of the movement.

The movement grew from a local one to a national one as activists and civil society groups of all stripes (including peace, anti-base, environmental, and religious groups) supported the Gangjeong movement (Gwon 2013, 252; Koleilat 2019, 250). Many mainland activists visited Gangjeong in response to the mayor’s request and several moved to Gangjeong to stand in solidarity with the villagers (Gwon 2013, 252; Koleilat 2019, 250). In fact, many of the

⁵⁵ For more details about the symbolism of Gureombi rock in the anti-Jeju naval base movement, see (C. J. Kim 2021a).

activists whom I interviewed had moved to Gangjeong from the Korean mainland or abroad around 2011 to support the movement, where they reside to this day. While mainland Korean activists traveled to Jeju to support the Gangjeong movement, they also brought Jeju to the mainland by staging various protests in Seoul (Interview, Korean activist in Jeju, November 10, 2021). In mid-2011, Jeju Island and mainland Korean organizations, including prominent national groups such as the PSPD, formed the “National Network of Korean Civil Society for Opposing the Naval Base on Jeju Island” (Yeo 2018, 243)). National groups such as the GKU formed local chapters in Jeju specifically to protest the base’s construction (Interview, Korean activist in Seoul, April 20, 2023). The Catholic church also began playing a key role in the movement, with many clergy members visiting or relocating to Gangjeong (Gwon 2013, 254; Yeo 2018, 243; Kolehlat 2019, 250). One interviewee, a Catholic priest from mainland Korea, said he felt compelled to join the movement because of his religious views and his role as a priest (Interview, Korean activist in Jeju, June 3, 2022). He recounted that he facilitated other Catholic clergymembers joining the movement in Gangjeong and helped build a community there; he resides in Gangjeong to this day (Interview, Korean activist in Jeju, June 3, 2022).

The movement soon became transnational as people from outside of Korea began hearing about the movement through various channels. Some well-connected Korean activists, like Choi Sung-hee, provided information about the struggle in Gangjeong to fellow members of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space (Space for Peace) (Yeo 2018, 242–43). Additionally, activists created social media accounts on a variety of platforms, including a movement website (“Save Jeju Now!”) with translations into other languages and an English-language newsletter, *The Gangjeong Village Story* (Gwon 2013, 253; Ryan 2014). One interviewee, a Korean citizen living abroad at the time, reported becoming aware of the

movement and later moving to Jeju to participate after learning about the movement through the Save Jeju Now! Website (Interview, Korean activist in Jeju, November 10, 2021). Like activists from the Korean mainland, many international activists traveled to Jeju in solidarity with the protesters and some moved there (Yeo 2018, 243). One international activist recounted that they “first heard about the Gangjeong peace movement from a visiting friend of a friend who had been to Gangjeong” and “remembered Gangjeong as an inspiring example of peace activism” (Email, American activist in Jeju, March 5, 2023). After moving to Seoul in 2013, they visited Gangjeong several times, “impressed by the energy that [they] could feel in the peace movement” (Email, American activist in Jeju, March 5, 2023). Eventually, they decided to move to Gangjeong in 2016 to work as part of the movement (Email, American activist in Jeju, March 5, 2023). In addition to receiving support from international civil society organizations, the movement attracted attention from high-profile international activists and celebrities. Activist Gloria Steinem, philosopher Noam Chomsky, actor Robert Redford, director Oliver Stone, and others publicly supported the movement through op-eds, blog posts, videos, and other media (R. Kim 2012a; Kirk 2013, 102–3). Thus, this movement drastically changed from a local movement in Jeju to a transnational one (Yeo 2018, 243).

Local Identity: 4.3 and “the Second 4.3”

As discussed in the previous section, the movement’s primary frame was that of “peace and life.” One part of this frame, as mentioned, was derived from villagers and activists’ concerns about the environmental destruction that the construction of the base may cause, of which Gureombi rock served as a symbol (Kirk 2013, 100; C. J. Kim 2021a, 267). The other major part of this frame pertains to Jeju’s history, namely the 4.3 Incident and its remembrance. A series of events, frequently called “4.3” or “4/3” (“sa-sam,” standing for April 3, 1948),

occurred in Jeju during Rhee Syngman's administration. H. J. Kim (2014) summarizes these events, which featured clashes between Communist insurgents and Korean military and police, at times with local civilians caught in the middle:

The counterinsurgency strategy was extremely brutal, involving mass arrests and detentions, forced relocations, torture, indiscriminate killings, and many large-scale massacres of civilians. The conflict resulted in an estimated thirty thousand deaths, approximately 10 percent of the total population of Jeju at the time. The massacres, however, were systematically hidden from the public, and demands for truth and justice were totally ignored throughout forty years of anti-Communist dictatorial and authoritarian rule. With democratization in 1987, however, local students, activists, and journalists openly embarked on a movement to reveal the truth. After many painstaking years of grassroots advocacy, the Jeju Commission, South Korea's first truth commission, was created in 2000. (2)

Much like the Battle of Okinawa in Japan, many families on Jeju were affected by the 4.3 events with family members arrested, tortured, killed, or "disappeared" (H. J. Kim 2014, 12). Some had family members that were members of the counterinsurgency (usually the police or military), some had family members who were insurgents, and some had family members who were accused of being insurgent sympathizers, which may or may not have been true. The facts around the incident did not come to light until after Korea's democratization and the establishment of the truth commission, which conducted a fact-finding mission about the episode. In their report, the commission found that "84.4 percent of the harm was said to be caused by state agents such as the police, the military, rightist youth groups including the Northwest Youth Association; 12.3 percent was said to be caused by the insurgents" (H. J. Kim 2014, 14). The "state agents" who conducted the counterinsurgency operations were not only from Jeju but also from the Korean mainland (H. J. Kim 2014, 34–35). Furthermore, the US military government (USAMGIK), which still governed Korea at the beginning of this episode, condoned the counterinsurgency operations (H. J. Kim 2014, 31).

As mentioned, 4.3 was rarely discussed prior to democratization for a variety of reasons: questioning the authoritarian government was taboo, Koreans on the mainland did not know about 4.3, and there was still tension over the episode among Jeju residents themselves. Since

democratization, even the name of the episode has been controversial, “variously labeled as a democratic movement, a popular uprising, massacres, riots, rebellion, revolt, an anti-American struggle, a unification movement, and simply 4.3” (H. J. Kim 2014, 35–36). In 2000, the Korean government passed the “Special Act on Discovering the Truth of the Jeju 4.3 Incident and the Restoration of Honor of Victims,” largely as a result of activists’ efforts (H. J. Kim 2014, 127). The law entailed establishing the Jeju Commission to uncover the facts around 4.3, which released the final version of the report on the episode in 2003 (H. J. Kim 2014, 145–46). Roh Moo Hyun, the president of Korea from 2003 to 2008, visited Jeju in 2003 and 2006 to issue an official state apology for the 4.3 events (H. J. Kim 2014, 153). Roh also officially designated Jeju as an “Island of Peace,” an attempt for Jeju people to move on from the painful past to a peaceful future (Gwon 2013, 241). Additionally, the Jeju commission also made a variety of recommendations with which the Korean government has mostly complied, including revising history textbooks to discuss “the abuses of state violence” during 4.3 and creating “the Jeju 4.3 Peace Memorial Park and Museum” (H. J. Kim 2014, 154–55).

The history of 4.3 in Jeju and Jeju’s subsequent designation as a “Island of Peace” have provided activists with ample material to draw upon to problematize the base’s construction and subsequent usage, linking these related events to the base (Gwon 2013, 243; Koleilat 2019, 249). Discussed in detail below, activists have referred to the construction of the base as “the second 4.3” (Gwon 2013, 243; Kirk 2013, 104). Although this framing draws upon Jeju’s cultural narratives, activists have deployed it in a way that is about peace and human rights more generally, garnering support not only from Jeju residents but from many people outside Jeju as well. Through invoking 4.3, activists remind people of an episode when the Korean *and* US governments victimized Jeju in the name of national security. For example, after the Jeju Naval

Base was completed and the US, South Korean, and other militaries began using it, activists continued to protest the base, stating that “Jeju should be an island of world peace that aims to overcome the pain of the Apr. 3 Incident [...] not a base for strategic assets of the US military” (H. J. Heo 2017).

Additionally, invoking 4.3 itself resonated not only with people in Jeju but also people in mainland Korea and beyond given the concurrent political developments around 4.3 and the activities of the Jeju Commission. The Jeju special law and the Jeju Commission’s fact-finding report came out in the early 2000s when the Korean military was considering various Jeju villages as sites for the naval base. President Roh’s declaration of Jeju as an “Island of Peace” occurred in 2005, only two years prior to the navy selecting Gangjeong as the base site, and the Jeju 4.3 Peace Memorial Park and Museum was completed in 2008, a year after the movement in Gangjeong started (H. J. Kim 2014, 11). In this sense, framing the Jeju base as “the second 4.3” resonated not only with Jeju residents but with people from the Korean mainland once they were aware of the base construction because 4.3 was in the Korean public discourse at the time. Furthermore, even international activists became aware of 4.3 and linked it to the base construction, largely through the diffusion of this frame from local activists (Yeo 2018, 244). For example, a retired priest who moved to Jeju from abroad to protest the base stated that the construction was particularly problematic in Jeju because it “has had a sad history of victimization,” alluding to 4.3 (Y. K. Chang and Rabirotff 2011). While 4.3 does not have the same cultural relevance to international activists or even activists from the Korean mainland, the moral shock upon learning about 4.3, even decades later, persuaded some to participate in the anti-base protests.

One of the reasons that the linkage of 4.3 to the base construction has been effective at mobilizing people from Gangjeong villagers to international activists is that its meaning is ambiguous and therefore malleable. “The second 4.3” seems to apply to at least three different parts of the Gangjeong movement. First, activists referred to the destruction of Gureombi rock during the construction as “the second 4.3” (C. J. Kim 2021a, 267). Second, activists invoked 4.3 to refer to how the construction divided Jeju islanders (Interview, Korean activist in Jeju, August 5, 2021). As discussed, 4.3 divided the island as many people were linked to either the counterinsurgency forces, the insurgents, and/or were victims of one of these groups. After islanders began talking about 4.3 more openly post-democratization, they still debated how to understand the episode: was it an uprising, a massacre, or an insurgency? While the Jeju special law, the Jeju Commission’s report, and subsequent efforts to bring justice to the victims have helped create more consensus about how to understand 4.3, the memory of 4.3 is still contested (Interview, Korean and American activists, August 11, 2021). Similarly, residents of Jeju and Gangjeong itself were divided over the base construction, with some adamantly in support of the base and others against it, leaving a “tremendous emotional chasm between relatives and neighbors” (Gwon 2013, 249).

Finally, activists often used “the second 4.3” to refer to the police presence in Gangjeong and the arrest of protesters. As mentioned, the Korean government (mostly through the military and police) arrested, killed, and/or “disappeared” insurgents and alleged insurgents linked to 4.3. The military and police forces were not only from Jeju but also from the Korean mainland. One of the major tactics of the Gangjeong movement during the construction of the base was to stage sit-ins at the construction site, thereby blocking construction. The obstruction of the base construction began in 2010 with the Gangjeong villagers (before mainland Korean and

international activists became involved) and continued throughout the movement, resulting in the arrests and prosecution of many protesters (Sunghwan Kim, n.d.; So-hyun Kim 2011; Yeo 2018, 245). The police presence at the construction site increased in 2011 and after that time “about 300 policemen [were] permanently stationed at the entrance” to the site (Gwon 2013, 255). Larger numbers of police and military forces were deployed to the construction site at various times. For example, the Korean government deployed 1,000 riot police to remove protesters who obstructed the construction site in September 2011 (Gwon 2013, 257; Jun 2015). In response to the deployment of the mainland police force, Gangjeong villagers stated, “Look at the riot police from the mainland! This is a second 4/3” (Gwon 2013, 257). Similarly, when asked about how 4.3 fits into the movement against the base, several interviewees cited the deployment of police to the construction site. For example, one journalist in Jeju stated that when the Korean government sent a large police force to Gangjeong during the protests, he “thought it looked like 4.3” (Interview, Korean journalist in Jeju, February 10, 2022). Another interviewee, the Catholic priest originally from the Korean mainland, also said that the “national violence” of the police from the mainland was why the episode was the “second 4.3” (Interview, Korean activist in Jeju, June 3, 2022). Thus, activists draw a connection between the violent counterinsurgency campaign that the Korean government conducted during the 4.3 episode and police response to the Gangjeong movement.

High Negative Visibility and the Framing Contest Over the Jeju Naval Base’s Ownership

The construction of the Jeju Naval Base is a typical example of what C. J. Kim (2023) terms “status quo disruption,” where changes in the status of the base provide a window of opportunity for activists to draw attention to it, rendering it highly visible in the public consciousness. The initial disruption was the beginning of the base’s construction. However, as

detailed in the sections above, the scale shift of the movement was a result of the Gangjeong Village mayor and activists' efforts. As discussed in the previous section, activists problematized the base through this "peace and life" frame, suggesting that the base could bring more trauma to the island like 4.3. Many other anti-base movements have emerged in response to this sort of change including the movement against the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek and the anti-THAAD protests in Soseong Village. In this sense, the political opportunity structure was favorable to activists against the Jeju Naval Base trying to mobilize would-be protesters to their cause.

That said, the Jeju case is unique in this study in that there are also aspects of the case that may lead to low troop visibility. In some sense, the Jeju base is essentially a Cooperative Security Location (CSL), a host nation base that the US military can use. As discussed in Chapter 2 and later in Chapter 6, these sorts of arrangements can be difficult for activists to mobilize public opposition against the US military presence because the public cannot really see it and thus, have no incentive to mobilize against a problem that they cannot identify. The US military presence in the Philippines over the past two decades has been characterized by the US's use of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) bases. I argue in the next chapter that the relatively lowered visibility of the US presence has significantly inhibited activists' mobilization efforts. While the finished Jeju Naval Base is generally a situation of low troop visibility (e.g., from 2016 onwards), the base was highly visible during its construction.

The cases of Jeju and other CSLs also address an important question: are host communities more likely to protest a foreign military base or a domestic one? Or does this distinction not matter? This is a question that remains largely unanswered to date in the base politics literature. It is also an increasingly important one as the US aims to spend fewer

resources on permanent bases and transition to “lighter footprints” globally. The Jeju case suggests that, on balance, the owner of the base may not make a difference in terms of protest in places that have been historically marginalized and experienced collective trauma, at least in terms of “disruptions of the status quo.” Jeju’s identity as the “Island of Peace” and the 4.3 experience suggest that any military base would likely be unwelcome and islanders generally unwilling to bear a base burden in the name of “national” security. Additionally, given Jeju’s historical place in the Korean periphery, Jeju residents may view even Korean bases as “foreign.”

Another issue is whether Jeju residents believed that the base belonged to the US or the Korean government. For its part, the US said very little on the topic and “referred all questions about the base to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, even those specific to potential U.S. military operations” (Y. K. Chang and Rabirotff 2011). It is perhaps partially the US’s silence on the matter that allowed activists the opportunity to cast doubt upon the base’s ownership and engage the Korean government in a framing contest over the issue. Activists began claiming that the Jeju Naval Base was actually a US base in 2008 (Interview, Korean Activist in Jeju, June 3, 2022). Activists made two key claims along these lines, questioning the purpose of the base. The first was that contrary to what the Korean government claimed, the base was not to protect South Korea from North Korea but rather for the US to counter China (Choe 2011; So-hyun Kim 2011; Ryan 2014). Activists’ main concern with shifting the base’s “target” from North Korea to China was that Jeju could be in middle of hostilities between the US and China if war ever broke out between the two (Y. K. Chang and Rabirotff 2011; Choe 2011). As Father Sunghwan Kim, a key figure in the Gangjeong movement wrote, “the purpose of the United States in using this Jeju Naval Base is to prevent the Chinese Navy from moving further into the Pacific Ocean. The United States wants to keep the Pacific Ocean under [its] own

control” (Sunghwan Kim, n.d.). Another activist stated that, “people have a hard time understanding that we need the base at a site that is the farthest away from North Korea” if the purpose of the Jeju Naval Base is to deter North Korea or respond to a North Korean attack (Lee 2012). Activists also claimed that the Jeju Naval Base was actually a US one because it could accommodate ships that the Korean navy did not have in its fleet (Ryan 2014; Koleilat 2019, 248). One activist stated, “we saw a blueprint and found this is a facility to hold an 80,000-tonne vessel [...] In South Korea we do not have this kind of vessel. The only country that has this kind of vessel is the United States” (Ryan 2014). Similarly, an interviewee said that the base was “clearly” built for the US because it can accommodate a nuclear aircraft and the Korean fleet does not have a nuclear vessel (Interview, Korean activist, August 5, 2021).

The Korean government (through the Ministry of Defense and the Navy) made several claims to frame the Jeju Naval Base as a base that is “unequivocally a South Korean one” (Yeo 2013). First, the Korean government stated that the base was to both safeguard Korean shipping routes and protect South Korea from North Korea, contrary to activists’ claims (So-hyun Kim 2011; Rabirotff 2011; Y. K. Chang and Rabirotff 2012; Yeo 2018, 248–49). As a spokesperson for the Korean navy stated, the base “is purely built with a defensive purpose in mind, of protecting (South Korean) maritime territories just as any sovereign nation does” (Rabirotff 2011). The government thus framed the Jeju Naval Base as important for Korea to protect itself and become less reliant on the US military for its defense (So-hyun Kim 2011; Yeo 2013). Second, the Korean government said that it would not make sense for the Jeju Naval Base to be a US one in that the US already has several naval and marine bases in Northeast Asia, including other bases in Korea (So-hyun Kim 2011). Finally, although the government clarified that the Jeju Naval Base was not a US base, it did acknowledge that the US could request to use the base and, if

approved, could dock ships there temporarily (So-hyun Kim 2011; Rabirotff 2011; Y. K. Chang and Rabirotff 2012). At a press conference about the base, a Korean naval officer stated that “the base is not intended for a certain country,” countering activists’ claims that the base was constructed with US ships in mind (Rabirotff 2011). Further, a press release from the Korean Ministry of National Defense stated that “South Korea could allow its key ally, the U.S., to use the base, albeit temporarily,” [...] “But many vessels from many countries, including China and Japan, can make calls at the Jeju port to join international military exercises or for other purposes” (Y. K. Chang and Rabirotff 2011). In this statement, the Korean government countered activists’ claims that the base was a US one in that, although the US can use the base, many other countries could request access as well.

It is not clear to what extent Jeju residents believed that the Jeju Naval Base was owned by the US during the base’s construction. Several interviewees believed that locals associated the base with the US. One activist stated, for example, that the Korean Navy’s claim that the base was Korean would “work on” other Korean communities, but not people in Jeju who viewed the US and Korean bases as “one and the same” as the US could use South Korean bases (Interview, Korean activist in Seoul, September 7, 2021). Other interviewees believed that residents knew the difference and it impacted their perceptions of the base. As one interviewee stated, if the Jeju Naval Base was a US base, “all of Jeju [would] rise up” due to the US’s complicity in the 4.3 episode (Interview, Korean and American activists in Jeju, August 11, 2021). Still others thought that Jeju citizens knew the base was Korean, but still protested it. A local journalist said that residents viewed the base as belonging to Korea, but they opposed the base anyway (Interview, Korean journalist in Jeju, September 7, 2021). What is perhaps the most telling is that activists eventually proved to be correct in that the US military has used the base several times since the

base's completion in 2016 with only a few small protests in response (Fichtl 2017; H. J. Heo 2017). While there may be many reasons for the comparatively mild response to US ships docking at the naval base (such as movement fatigue), it suggests that Jeju residents are not necessarily more outraged that the US is using the base.

Conflicting Local Identities and “Good Neighbors” in Daegu

While several Korean host communities have made news headlines for anti-US-military protests, others, like Daegu, rarely capture international, national, or even local media attention. As one Daegu reporter relayed, “the US military base is not much of an issue in Daegu. Unlike other regions, protests or demonstrations against the US bases are minimal [...] there really isn't [local response or public opinion about US bases in Daegu]” (Statement, Korean journalist in Daegu, June 14, 2022). Why has Daegu witnessed few anti-US-military protests when so many other host communities have? In some sense, the lower levels of anti-US-military protests in Daegu are surprising in that there are conditions present in Daegu that facilitate high levels of protest mobilization in other communities such as Jeju. As one activist remarked, Daegu is a “city of revolution” where at least two major contentious episodes occurred in the years after the split of the Korean Peninsula (Interview, Korean and American activists in Jeju, August 11, 2021). When asked about activism in Daegu, another activist pointed to a specific contentious episode, the October Revolution in 1946 (Interview, Korean activist in Jeju, August 5, 2021). Furthermore, these episodes, the 10.1 (1946) and the 2.28 (1960) movements, were anti-government movements, the former directed at the USAMGIK administration, and the latter directed at the Korean government under Rhee Syngman. However, these events never appear in activists' anti-US-military frames.

Second, protest follows “disruptions of the status quo” to the US base presence in Daegu sometimes but not always. For example, Daegu, along with the city of Pyeongtaek, was designated in 2004 as a hub for the US Army in South Korea, “an ominous development for base opponents [that] suggests that the bases here [...] are likely to stay indefinitely” (C. J. Kim 2023, 88). Yet, mass protest did not accompany Daegu’s designation as a US military hub in the country. Mass protests have also not followed crimes attributed to the US military in Daegu’s vicinity. For example, in 2009, a US soldier living in Camp George in Daegu was convicted of having murdered his wife, but there was little public reaction (Fisher 2009). Although the soldier’s wife was not Korean, activists in other communities may have seized on these types of events to problematize the local US presence in terms of safety concerns and domestic violence. On the other hand, protests have emerged in Daegu on other occasions. For example, when the US and Korean central government announced a plan to designate a protection zone around the US bases in Daegu, limiting civilian construction around the bases, both the Daegu local government and local citizens protested (Lim 2009). Taken together, this mix of reactions underlines the point that the emergence of anti-US-military protests is not a matter of merely openings in the political opportunity structure but requires activists’ publicly identifying these moments as times to act collectively.

One reason that anti-US-military activism in Daegu has been less pronounced than in other communities is that Daegu’s identity has evolved from one as a “city of revolution” to the “textile city” and the stronghold of conservative politicians like presidents Park Chung Hee and Park Geun Hye. It has shifted from a city whose residents fought against the Korean national government (and US government) to one that is central to the Korean government and Korean national identity. This identity shift limits the ability of anti-US-military activists to draw on

historical grievances against the Korean and/or US governments and link them to the US bases in Daegu in the present. In other contexts, including Jeju and Okinawa, Japan, the ability of activists to draw on narratives of grievance, emphasizing a local collective identity and history, and using them to problematize contemporary militarization has played a key role in mobilizing would-be protesters. Furthermore, the broader underlying themes of these narratives such as peace and life allow activists to extend their frames and draw national and international support. By contrast, Daegu's contemporary identity constrains activists' framing repertoire, limiting activists to "pragmatic framing" that focuses on "not-in-my-backyard" (NIMBY) base-related issues such as noise pollution and economic development.

Secondly, the US military bases in Daegu (Camps George, Henry, and Walker) have been part of the community since the 1950s and as such have "managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community" (Enloe 1989, 66). In this sense, hosting foreign military bases and troops has become normalized in Daegu and most residents do not often think about them. It is challenging for activists to frame the bases as harmful to the community when most people do not think about the US military presence in their backyard or at least do not think about the US military as a problem for the community. This lowered visibility lessens the credibility of activists' frames, inhibiting them from resonating with local residents and undermining their ability to mobilize would-be protesters. The visibility of the US is at times heightened but typically in a positive way, a byproduct of the cooperative relationship between the USFK in Daegu and the Daegu city government and public relations management. As discussed in the sections below, the US military and Daegu city government may raise the visibility of the US presence to highlight the ways that the US military is a "good neighbor," through programs such as festivals on the US bases or English-language classes. The relationship between the US

military presence in Daegu and the local community is similar to what we see in many – though not all – host communities with long-standing bases. In this study, the Daegu case is most similar to the community of Yokosuka, Japan, where the visibility of the bases is generally low except when the US engages in community-building activities, making it more publicly visible in a positive way. In both cases, protest does occur on occasion, typically when there are opportunities for activists to problematize the US presence – and they choose to do so.

Anti-US-Activism in Daegu

As Figures 5.1 and 5.2 suggest, the Daegu community generally has an amicable relationship with the US military with few anti-US-military protests. However, residents have at times raised concerns about base-related problems, most notably noise pollution and impediments to local economic development. One of the key activists in Daegu, Cha Tae-bong, formed the “US Military Base Noise Damage Countermeasures Committee” (*Migunhelgi So-eumpeohae Daechaekwi*) in 1990 and has served as the chairperson of the organization (Baek 2010; K. I. Park 2010). Cha, along with other members of the organization, have organized protests about the noise pollution, filed civil complaints against the Korean government and US military, organized signature drives, and written several letters of complaint to various leaders including Korean presidents, US base officials, and the Korean Ministry of National Defense (Y. H. Kim 2008; K. I. Park 2010; C. J. Kim 2023, 88–89). Activists including Cha have also raised concerns about the impact that the US bases have on local economic development, contending that the bases take up prime real estate in the city and that base-related ordinances about nearby development hinder businesses in the vicinity (Noh 2007; Baek 2010; H. R. Lee 2010). Organizations have held demonstrations about these developmental issues and organized city-wide discussions around questions such as “should the U.S. military bases blocking Daegu’s

development be left as they are?” (*Daegubaljeon galomagneun migunkiji idaelo dueoya hana?*) (한겨레 [*The Hankyoreh*] 2009; Baek 2010; H. R. Lee 2010). These organizations have included both groups that originated locally (such as Cha’s US Military Base Noise Damage Countermeasures Committee) and Daegu-based chapters of national organizations such as Pyeongtongsa and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU, *Minjunochong*) (Baek 2010; H. R. Lee 2010). Activists in Daegu have thus tended to focus on problems specific to the local US military presence, employing what C. J. Kim (2023) terms “pragmatic” framing. This is a notable contrast to some other host communities like Jeju where anti-US-military activism has moved beyond local issues to broader ones like peace and sovereignty (ideological and nationalistic frames), often drawing in supporters from other host communities in Korea and abroad.

Local Identity: 10.1, 2.28, and the Korean War

Why has the US military in Daegu provoked relatively low levels of protest? And why have anti-US-military activists tended to frame base-related issues as local problems instead of connecting them to broader themes? One part of the answer to both questions is that the political opportunity structure, in the sense of local history and identity, makes protesting the US military presence difficult. Although there is “material” in Daegu’s history that is seemingly ripe for framing the US bases in the present as a problem in need of solving, activists have not drawn on historical frames because the evolution of Daegu’s identity makes them unlikely to mobilize potential protesters. Linking past movements to current ones can effectively mobilize people because “once a revolution has occurred and acquired a name, both the name and the one or more representations of the process become available as signals, models, threats, and/or aspirations for later actors” (Mosinger et al. 2022, 3). One contentious episode involving both the

US military and Korean central government, discussed in greater detail below, was the “Daegu October Incident,” also known as the “Autumn Uprising of 1946” and “10.1.” Another was the 2.28 student-led movement for democracy in 1960. However, the utility of these events for activists are limited by the way that they are remembered, discussed in greater detail below. Finally, the city also has a history as the site of a crucial Korean War battle in which UN forces prevailed over North Korean troops. Naturally, this history generally makes anti-US-military activism difficult in Daegu. Thus, the evolution of Daegu’s identity limits the utility of broader historical frames, making pragmatic frames about quotidian base-related issues more likely to resonate with the public.

The Daegu October Incident occurred in 1946 (two years before 4.3 in Jeju), when the US military governed South Korea under the USAMGIK. The USAMGIK adopted many policies that aggrieved Korean peasants such as “the reestablishment of the old Japanese system, delay in social and land reform, continued abuse of police power, rice collection, [and] rice rationing” (Shin 1994, 1605). In response to these developments, hundreds of railroad workers went on strike in Daegu on October 1, 1946 and demanded greater rice rations (Shin 1994, 1605). During the strike, a police officer killed a striker, which set off a days-long conflict between locals and the police, resulting in the deaths of 38 policemen, the declaration of martial law, and the arrests of many residents (Shin 1994, 1605–6). After the episode in Daegu, peasant uprisings began to spread throughout the country (Shin 1994, 1605–6). The meaning of 10.1, like many similar incidents in Korean history, including 4.3 in Jeju, is contested to this day: was this a communist uprising or a citizen movement against a repressive US military government? (*Hankyoreh* 2013). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Korea (TRCK) ultimately settled on calling it the “Daegu October Incident,” a more neutral term than an

“uprising,” “riot”, “resistance,” or “people’s movement” (*Hankyoreh* 2013). Although the TRCK did suggest in 2010 that the Korean government compensate 60 families of those who were arrested during the episode and killed, contention over how to remember 10.1 persists both nationally and locally (*Hankyoreh* 2013). The event is not memorialized in Daegu the way that the 2.28 movement is, which, as discussed later, has been enshrined in a museum and a national holiday as of 2018. Indeed, mention of 10.1 is notably absent from the Daegu’s Modern History Museum, particularly the “Nation-Saving Spirit” exhibit which includes the 2.28 movement and other developments in the city’s recent history (“A Journey in Time through the Modern History of Daegu,” n.d.). Thus, in a conservative stronghold like Daegu, invoking this episode to protest the US military presence would likely fail to mobilize the public, given that Korean conservatives are more likely to view it and similar historical events (like 4.3) as a communist uprising (*Hankyoreh* 2013).

While the 10.1 episode’s meaning is contested and thus, often glossed over even in Daegu, the 2.28 movement is celebrated. This is unsurprising in that this movement, the subsequent April Revolution, and later pro-democracy movements have become an important part of the Korean national story. The pro-democracy student movement in Daegu, known as “2.28” (protests started on February 28, 1960), was the first social movement for democracy in Korea (“2·28민주운동기념사업회 [The 2.28 Movement...]” n.d.). The movement, like its successors in other cities, emphasized democracy and human rights in light of Rhee Syngman’s repressive policies (*The February 28th Democracy Movement* 2020, 134-135). The immediate catalyst of the 2.28 movement involved the March 1960 presidential election. To prevent students in Daegu from attending the opposition party’s vice presidential candidate’s (Jang Myeon’s) rally, Rhee effectively forced students to attend school on Sunday, February 28, which

was unusual (“2·28민주운동기념사업회 [The 2.28 Movement...]” n.d.). In response, students rose up against Rhee’s order, marching out of their respective schools and into the streets (“2·28민주운동기념사업회 [The 2.28 Movement...]” n.d.). The student movement inspired journalists, who “struggled with the life-threatening dictatorship of Rhee,” to report on the movement, thereby disseminating information about it to the rest of Korea (“2·28민주운동기념사업회 [The 2.28 Movement...]” n.d.). Protests against the Rhee regime spread to other cities such as Masan, Daejeon, Busan, Seoul, and many other towns across the country, becoming known as the April Revolution (“2·28민주운동기념사업회 [The 2.28 Movement...]” n.d.). Although Rhee and his party’s vice-presidential candidate won the election in March, Rhee ultimately resigned in April 1960 because of the widespread protests against his administration.

Anti-US-military activists do not invoke the 2.28 movement, a movement against the repressive central government in its day, in their frames, nor would it be effective to do so given the way that meaning of the movement has shifted over time. Unlike other historical contentious episodes like 4.3 in Jeju, the movement no longer invokes a sense of “othering” between the Korean government or society and Daegu. The 2.28 movement was one movement among many on the Korean mainland for democracy. Indeed, in the decades since the movement, Daegu has assumed a central place in Korean national identity, despite not being the capital city. Only a few years after the 2.28 movement and Rhee’s resignation, Park Chung-Hee, a resident of Daegu, staged a coup, claiming that the coup “was a continuation of the 4.19 student revolution [...] a necessary correction for the corruption and ineptness of Syngman Rhee’s presidency” (P. Y. Chang 2015, 50). Daegu became central to Park’s regime (and that of subsequent conservative politicians) and developed rapidly from 1960 to 1980, becoming the textile hub of Korea (Joo

and Seo 2018, 128). In short, Daegu, unlike places like Jeju, is not peripheral to Korean politics or national identity. Daegu's place as part of Korea's "core" makes it difficult for activists to draw upon an event like the 2.28 movement and link it to contemporary issues with the US military presence. In communities like Jeju and Okinawa, Japan, the history of marginalization by their central governments facilitates a local resistance to "bearing the burden" of hosting military bases in the name of national security. The 2.28 movement appears to be a source of local pride in Daegu given that the movement is memorialized with a museum and a monument and Daegu residents led a campaign to make February 28 a Korean national holiday, which it did in 2018 ("2·28 민주운동기념사업회 [The 2.28 Movement...]" n.d.).

Lastly, Daegu also has an identity as a location of a critical Korean War battle, which may undermine activists' efforts to problematize the US base presence, especially if they invoke historical framing. One of major early battles during the Korean War was the Battle of Daegu in 1950, part of the Battle of the Pusan Perimeter ("Holding the Pusan Perimeter" n.d.). North Korean and United Nations forces clashed along the Nakdong River as the Northern forces attempted to move south into Pusan ("Holding the Pusan Perimeter" n.d.). The US-led UN forces in Daegu, under the command of General Walker (for whom Camp Walker is named), ultimately prevented North Korean forces from taking the city ("The Taegu Front" n.d., 358). Daegu has memorialized this battle in the ("낙동강승전기념관 [Nakdong River Victory Memorial Hall]" n.d.). Both the fact that the city has publicly memorialized the battle by creating a museum and that the museum's name emphasizes that the UN troops defeated the North Korean offensive suggest that this is a point of pride in Daegu and part of the city's identity. As such, this official narrative makes it generally difficult for activists to problematize the US military presence, especially using a historical lens.

Troop Visibility and “Good Neighbors”

The visibility of the US military in Daegu is relatively low as it has been a part of the community since the Korean War. The military bases in Daegu (known collectively as US Army Garrison Daegu, or USAG), like many bases in Korea and elsewhere, predate the US-Korea security alliance. In this case, the Imperial Japanese Army constructed them when Japan occupied Korea (“History: US Army Garrison Daegu” n.d.). After the end of Japanese occupation, Camp Henry was briefly under the control of the Republic of Korea Army and became a US base after the Korean War, renamed for a “Korean War Medal of Honor recipient” (“History: US Army Garrison Daegu” n.d.). The US used Camp Walker, the biggest base in Daegu, for its operations in the area during the Korean War and it officially became a US base in 1951 when it was renamed after the commander of the Eighth Army (the regiment of the US army in Korea), who died the previous year (“History: US Army Garrison Daegu” n.d.). This sort of history has important implications for the visibility of the US military presence in the host community. Unlike the Jeju Naval Base or even the expansion of a preexisting base like Camp Humphreys, the US did not need to construct bases in Daegu. Furthermore, given that the US assumed ownership of this base during wartime, Daegu residents at the time and possibly now may have seen the US presence as necessary for South Korean security. As a result, “for many [Daegu residents], the three Army bases in the district blend into the background” (C. J. Kim 2023, 3).

However, the USAG has been more visible at times to local residents, usually for positive reasons. A Filipino scholar of the US bases in the Philippines once wrote that the US military deployment to the Philippines in the early 2000s, “has indeed managed to stay almost invisible – except when it is out performing goodwill missions such as providing dental services or building

schools” (Docena 2007b, 72). This quote is emblematic of the US military presence in many host communities around the globe, including Daegu and Yokosuka, Japan (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). The US military, in partnership with the Daegu city government, has engaged in a variety of projects to build civilian-military relations and enhance its “soft power” such as the “Good Neighbor Program.” As part of this program, US soldiers in Daegu participate in goodwill activities like “help[ing] serve hot meals to underprivileged, elderly citizens, and volunteering [...] with Habitat for Humanity to renovate older homes to improve living conditions for residents in and around Daegu” (P. K. Kim 2019). Additionally, the US military hosts various events on the bases in Daegu as it does in many other host communities, often allowing local residents to come onto the base. Camp Walker, for example, has hosted open houses that include live music, food vendors, and activities for children (Fisher 2009). As with open houses elsewhere, attendees can also watch various displays of military vehicles and equipment (Fisher 2009). As a spokesperson for USAG Daegu stated about an open house at Camp Walker in 2009, the purpose of such events is to “demonstrate good will and enhance relations with the local populace” (Fisher 2009). The US military in Daegu has thus tried to integrate into the community and forge positive civilian-military relations. The result is that the base presence is not often in the public consciousness (and when it is, it is usually a positive connotation), which makes it difficult for anti-US-base activists to mobilize would-be protesters.

The low visibility of the US bases in Daegu is partially a byproduct of the generally cooperative relationship between Daegu’s city government and the US military. As one interviewee, a Korean military officer, commented, there tends to be fewer protests in host communities where there is a good relationship between the US military and the local government (Interview, Korean naval officer in Seoul, September 1, 2021). One manifestation of

the general harmony in the relationship are the various initiatives that Daegu conducts with the US military to facilitate positive civilian-military relations. One area in which the US military and Daegu have cooperated is in English language education, common in many host communities. A survey that the Korean central government commissioned of US base host communities indicates that English classes are more popular among local residents than any other exchange activities with the US military (S. H. Choi and Na 2019, 64). Respondents, including Daegu citizens, indicated that English classes are preferable because they benefit local children and are an easy way for locals to make a connection with the US military (S. H. Choi and Na 2019, 64). At a city level, these classes may provide Daegu and Nam-Gu especially the opportunity to develop as an English-speaking area, appealing to Koreans and foreign residents alike (besides US military personnel) and reviving the local economy (Noh 2007). Thus unsurprisingly, the Daegu government partnered with the US military's Good Neighbors Program to offer English language and other programing to the community (“보도자료 [Press Release]” 2013). One such program is the “English Fairy Tales Read by USFK” (*juhanmigun-i ilg-eojuneun yeong-eo donghwa*) where US soldiers and local college students read English-language storybooks for free to local children from five-months-old to third grade multiple times a week (“보도자료 [Press Release]” 2013). Of this agreement with the US military, the mayor of Daegu stated that the program will “increase the image of the city through strengthening skinship,⁵⁶ leading to [the] expansion of investment attraction and job creation” (“보도자료 [Press Release]” 2013).

⁵⁶ “Skinship” (*seukinship*) is a Korean term that is a portmanteau of “skin” and “kinship” which refers to physical contact and touch between friends or family, such as holding hands (McCurry 2021).

However, one area of contention between the Daegu city government and the US military and Korean central government is over the land that the US bases occupies. The Daegu government, like activists and local residents, contended that the US bases were an impediment to the city's development, particularly in the Nam-Gu district where they are located, and called for the return of some of the bases so that the returned land could be used for urban development (Noh 2007). Additionally, the Daegu government, along with local residents and activists, protested the proposed military protection zone around the US bases (Lim 2009). At the same time however, the Daegu government emphasizes cooperation and consensus-building to issues when they arise in its relationship with the US military. In the case of relocating part of Camp Walker, for example, the mayor of Daegu stated that “we achieved the feat of relocating USFK military facilities [...] by forming a consensus through consultations with various organizations including the Ministry of National Defense as well as the US military”) (“캠프워커 서편도로 및 47 보급소 부지 한 번에 돌려받는다 [Camp Walker West Road...” 2021). Thus, even when there is contention in the relationship, and the base presence may be more publicly visible and negative, the city also tries to find compromise with the US military to maintain a positive relationship.

Conclusion

Two major sources of protest variation across host communities are local identity and base visibility. In Jeju, the local history of marginalization by the Korean and US governments during 4.3 provided activists with a useful tool to mobilize people locally, nationally, and internationally against the Jeju Naval Base. Furthermore, the construction, as a status quo disruption, provided activists an opportunity to problematize the base through the theme of

“peace and life.” It is unclear to what extent the framing contest between the Korean government and activists over the base’s ownership impacted Jeju Islanders’ perceptions of the base or their propensity to protest it. However, it does not appear that base ownership or use made much of a difference to residents, given that the US has used it since the base’s completion with little fanfare. This comparatively mild reaction is worth exploring in the future as US port calls to the Jeju Naval Base represent changes to the status quo of the base, opportunities when activists typically can rally public opposition.

In Daegu, historical framing would be less successful in problematizing the US base presence due to its amicable history with the US and its position in the “core” of Korean politics. Thus, it is unsurprising that Daegu activists have framed the base in terms of “quotidian disruptions” like noise pollution, which may be less persuasive to would-be protesters. Additionally, “pragmatic” framing does not lend itself as well to the sort of frame extension that took place in Jeju, drawing in participants from outside the community. At the same time, the US military presence in Daegu has generally low troop visibility because the bases are long-standing, blend into the communal “background” most of the time. However, the base presence at times becomes highly visible and positive when the US military and Daegu city government engage in a variety of “soft power” initiatives to facilitate positive civilian-military relations.

One important policy implication that the comparison of Jeju and Daegu suggests is that states need to think more carefully about their basing sites. The US and its host nation partners often select “localities far from the center of national power” to host a US base (Smith 2006, 3) 3). This is because these localities tend to have fewer residents than “centers of national power,” thereby diminishing the risks of residents being harmed by the military presence (such as helicopter crashes) and public dissent against it. However, one of the overlooked consequences

of these siting decisions is that they are also often communities that have been historically in the political, social, or economic periphery. This historical marginalization by the host nation central government (and in some cases, the US government as well) provides activists with ample culturally resonant material with which to build effective frames that problematize the US military presence. This dynamic is true not just in Jeju but also Okinawa, Japan, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Although troop visibility is also important, I contend that the potential for movements to arise against the US military is higher in such communities.

Chapter 6: Out of Sight, Out of Mind: National-Level Anti-US-Military Activism in the Philippines

The US' relationship with the Philippines is perhaps one of the most interesting and complicated relationships the US has with any of its host nations. On one hand, the Philippines public has consistently had a favorable opinion towards the US military in the country. Even though the Philippines Senate voted 12-11 not to renew its basing agreement with the US in 1991,⁵⁷ effectively closing the US's Subic Naval Base, opinion polls suggest that most of the public supported maintaining the US presence (Kraft 1993, 7). During the early 2000s, opinion polls show that net trust⁵⁸ in the US was over 50%, with few exceptions (Rood 2012). Similarly, the Pew Global Attitudes Survey found that 90% of respondents in the Philippines held favorable views of the US in the 2010s, a higher percentage than for any other country in the Pew survey (Hiebert et al. 2015, 3). Most recently, Allen et al. (2020) found that 76% of Filipino respondents had a favorable opinion of the US military presence in their country, higher than any other country in the survey.

On the other hand, the Philippines witnessed one of the only cases to date where activists led a successful campaign to oust the US military.⁵⁹ The Philippines' anti-US-base movement in the 1980s and 1990s gained traction from the emergence of the People Power Revolution in the 1980s, which aimed to oust President Ferdinand Marcos after over 20 years of dictatorial rule (Hedman 2006). Activists claimed that a major source of Marcos's power was the US's longstanding support, thus calls for the removal of the US bases (which would undermine

⁵⁷ Also known as the Military Bases Agreement or MBA.

⁵⁸ The Social Weather Stations measure "net trust" as "Much trust minus Little trust correctly rounded" (Rood 2012).

⁵⁹ Fitz-Henry (2015) details another successful movement: the anti-US-base movement in Ecuador.

Marcos's power) grew. After Marcos's ouster in 1986 and the signing of the new Philippines constitution in 1987, the new Philippines Senate, partially occupied by former People Power activists, was faced with a pressing issue: whether to renew the US basing agreement (MBA) set to expire in 1991. Activists in the Anti-Treaty Movement actively lobbied senators to vote against renewing the agreement; some changed their pro-base stances and voted against the agreement. Activists and anti-US-base senators, decrying the US military presence as an infringement on Filipino sovereignty, also took to the streets, rallying frequent protests of as many as 15,000 people. In the end, the Philippines Senate voted to end the MBA with the US.

Since this movement, however, activists have been less successful not only in creating any policy change, but in rallying a critical mass of protesters. Since the late 1990s, the Philippines has concluded a series of agreements with the US to maintain a US presence in the country, including the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), signed in 1998, and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), signed in 2014. The result of these agreements is that while there are US military troops in the Philippines, no base or other facility that is explicitly designated as belonging to the US; rather, the US uses facilities belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) (Cruz De Castro 2003, 979–82). In this context, Filipino activists against the US military presence have been markedly less successful than in the past, both in terms of achieving their goal of ousting the US military yet again and mobilizing the public, despite similarly framing the presence as a violation of Filipino sovereignty. Figure 6.1 suggests there have generally been fewer protests in the VFA era, with episodes of contention, bounded sequences of continuous interaction per Tilly and Tarrow (2007, 36), tending only to erupt around crimes attributed to the US military.




Figure 6.1: Anti-US-Military Protests in the Philippines by Year, 1987-2016

What accounts for the variation in anti-US-military mobilization across this period? I argue that one of the major reasons that activists’ sovereignty frames (or what Kim and Boas (2020) and Kim (2023) term “nationalistic” frames) no longer resonate as well with the public as they once did is because the political opportunity structure shifted and left fewer opportunities for activists’ claims to persuade the public to protest the US military. Several different developments undermined activists’ claims in the VFA-era. First, the shift from permanent, identifiable US bases before 1992 to “visiting” US forces is inherently more challenging for activists’ protest mobilization efforts; the US military presence currently in the Philippines is simply less visible to the public. As discussed in Chapter 2, the visibility of the US presence is crucial to activists’ frames’ credibility; if activists assert that there is a US military presence and the public does not see it, it is unlikely that the public will believe that it is there or, more importantly, that it is a problem that needs to be addressed. Along with no permanent US bases, the US troops presence in the VFA era is markedly smaller, going from around 13,000 troops in

1990 (the year before the Senate vote about the US's basing access) to no more than 5,000 per year since 1999 (Allen et al. 2021).⁶⁰ The lowered visibility is not simply because there are no longer identifiable US bases and fewer troops; the Philippines government and the US military actively downplay the continued US presence, emphasizing that it is “temporary.” At times, however, they highlight the US “doing good” in the community, from humanitarian efforts such as building roads to helping with disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Yolanda. This high positive visibility is also an obstacle for anti-US-military activists as it undermines their claims that the US military presence is a detriment to the Philippines.

However, there are windows of opportunity where activists can draw public attention to the US military presence, heightening its visibility. In the VFA era, protests have emerged in the wake of crimes attributed to US troops in the Philippines, such as Jennifer Laude's murder in 2014. The phenomenon of high-profile crimes and accidents attributed to the US military presence providing an opening for anti-US-military activists to bring negative attention to the US is well-documented in the base politics literature beyond the Philippines. For example, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, scholars and journalists have chronicled the proliferation of protests following the rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by US soldiers and the deaths of two Korean school girls who were run over by a US military vehicle (Akibayashi 2002; Angst 2003). However, few if any studies have examined this phenomenon in host nations that have cooperative security locations (CSLs) or forward operating locations (FOLs) where the US does not maintain its own permanent basing presence.

Second, activists' frames no longer align with national political elites' frames about the US military presence in the country. Between 1987 and 1992, there was division in the

⁶⁰ A bar graph of the number of US troops in the Philippines per year can be found in Appendix 4.

Philippines government regarding the US base presence. Some politicians, including President Aquino, publicly declared that the Philippines should maintain its US basing presence while others, mostly in the Senate, raised similar concerns to the activists about Filipino sovereignty. When there are multiple frames emanating from the national government, with some politicians against or unconvinced about the necessity for the US military presence, the public receives anti-US-military framing from both activists and host nation politicians. In this sense, there was a framing coalition between activists and some Philippines politicians, with the latter at times participating in anti-US-military rallies (Lao 1988). The division among Philippines politicians on the topic of the US military in the Philippines was perhaps most evident in the 1991 Senate vote not to renew the US's basing agreement by a count of 12-11.

In the VFA-era however, most national-level politicians believe that the US military presence is necessary for the Philippines's security (Yeo 2011a, 185–86). Perhaps most indicative of this shift was the fact that several members of the “Magnificent Dozen,” the 12 senators who voted against renewal, who remained in politics in the late 1990s openly supported the VFA. This most notably included Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and President Joseph Estrada, who, in fact, negotiated and ratified the VFA (G.R. No. 138570 2000). The shift in elite support for the US military presence, despite continued concerns about dependency on the US and Filipino sovereignty, is largely driven by increasing perceived security threats (both external and internal) and economic considerations. Activists, however, claimed that external “threats” (namely China's claims to territory in the West Philippines Sea⁶¹) are really about the US's own rivalry with China and that the VFA is a precursor to renewing a US basing presence in the Philippines. Therefore, anti-US-military activists' frames that the VFA and the US's

⁶¹ Also called the South China Sea.

continued military presence in the Philippines is problematic does not align with other actors' frames. However, there is more alignment between these narratives in cases where the US military receives public negative attention, as in the Jennifer Laude case.

The Philippines cases presented here, anti-US-military episodes of contention during the timespans of 1987-1992, 1998-2002, and 2014-2015, represent national-level variation in frame resonance. These cases all represent times where we might expect high levels of mobilization. In the former period, public awareness about the US base presence was high due to the prior People Power Revolution and the looming expiration date of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA). In the second period, public awareness about the VFA would have been at its highest while negotiations about the agreement and its subsequent ratification were in the news. Finally, public awareness about the US military presence was high following the murder of Laude.

The Philippines's example suggests that host nations who are former colonies may be especially susceptible to activists' frames that emphasize the colonial past and hosting a foreign military presence as a sovereignty violation. Such framing may be acutely salient when the host nation was previously a colony of the base nation, as in the case of the Philippines and the US. This parallels the discussion of historical marginalization in Okinawa and Jeju in the previous chapters; a history of colonialization and/or marginalization lends itself well to anti-US-military framing, especially if the US perpetrated the colonization or marginalization. In this particular case, the Philippines has a distinctive canon of nationalist literature that emphasizes a distinctive Filipino national identity that needs to free itself from foreign control. For activists, this means that frames that emphasize preserving Filipino sovereignty and depict the US military presence as a form of neo-colonialism have a high level of narrative fidelity; they comport with cultural understandings of the Philippines' history.

At the same time, however, national-level variation in the Philippines suggests that frame resonance is as much or more about the political opportunity structures within which activists' frames are received than the content of the frames themselves. As the example above and the subsequent sections suggest, anti-US-military activists' frames in the Philippines have not changed significantly over time; they emphasize concerns related to the US military in the Philippines in terms of Filipino sovereignty. They also take advantage of openings in the political opportunity structure such as by crimes committed by US military personnel to bring attention to the continued US military presence in the country and negative externalities such as crime and prostitution. However, most of the time the US military presence in the VFA-era is either invisible to the public or highly visible in its soft-power efforts – by design.

What these cases also suggest, more broadly, is that concepts and connotations have different meanings over time, as a result of contextual shifts. In the Philippines, “sovereignty” is the concept that underlies much of anti-US-military activists and politicians' claims. This concept is especially salient in a host nation like the Philippines where it gave its previous colonizer, the US, basing access as a condition of its independence. In the words of one former US official, “the frustration of working in the Philippines is high because one constantly has to exorcise these old ghosts and mindsets [of colonialism], which never are very far away” (G. E. Martin 1999, 237). In the earlier period of this study, when nationalism was running high, activists and Philippine politicians against the continued US base presence invoked the need for an “independent foreign policy” and to exert the Philippines' independence from the US' influence, at times characterizing the basing presence as “neo-colonial.” In this sense, sovereignty had more of a Westphalian meaning, the “exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory” (Krasner 1999 as quoted in Yeo 2014, 45). Around the time of

the VFA negotiations, anti-US-military activists and many Philippine politicians had divergent ideas about the meaning of sovereignty and how best to preserve it. While activists held similar views of the detriment of US troops to Philippines sovereignty as they had in the past, many Philippines politicians supported the VFA as a way of preserving Philippines sovereignty considering increasing tensions in the West Philippines Sea. This is perhaps best exemplified by the shift of several high-profile politicians, such as former President Joseph Estrada and Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado, shifting their positions from opposing the US bases to approving the VFA. Two high-profile crimes attributed to the US troops' presence in the VFA era, the "Nicole"⁶² and Jennifer Laude cases, highlight a more inward-facing meaning of sovereignty involving host nation governments' rights of jurisdiction over crimes that have been committed within their borders. "Domestic sovereignty" is therefore also important to host nation governments and publics alike: "from the perspective of the public, the inability of their own government to seek "justice" for crimes, pain, or suffering inflicted by members of a foreign military, violates the state's authority to consolidate political control within its own borders" (Yeo 2014, 45). While sovereignty is likely important to any host nation, especially regarding the ability to try foreign troops for crimes committed on its soil, this is likely especially salient to host nations with a colonial experience and is likely to underpin much of the discourse around a basing presence.

A Brief History of US-Philippines Relations

The foundation of the US-Philippines relationship is colonialism. The Philippines was a US colony between 1898, when the US defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War and gained

⁶² The media, civil society, and others did not use the victim's real name, Suzette Nicholas, instead referring to the alleged victim as "Nicole."

ownership of the Philippines, and 1946 (Smith 2006, 12). At the beginning of the US colonial period, the US military established its base in Subic Bay, the location of a former Spanish base, which would become one of its most important bases in the country and the region at large (Smith 2006, 12). Thus, the US military established its presence in the Philippines as an occupying/colonial force.

After World War II and Japan's occupation of the Philippines, the US granted Filipino independence but wanted to maintain its military bases in the country (Smith 2006, 12). The US and the newly independent Philippines government accordingly concluded the Military Base Agreement 1947, the first agreement establishing the US military presence in the Philippines as a sovereign state (Cooley 2008, 58). Despite and perhaps in light of Filipino independence, concerns mounted in the Philippines about the implications of the continuity of the US military presence for Filipino sovereignty at the same time that Filipino nationalist discourse made a resurgence. A key figure in Filipino nationalist discourse, Senator Claro Recto, emphasized the infringement of US bases on Filipino sovereignty on multiple occasions. For example, during a commencement speech in Manila in 1949, Recto stated that, "we sacrificed our sovereignty over strategic bases within our frontiers" (Recto as quoted in Agoncillo 1974, 47). This emphasis on Filipino sovereignty has remained a key claim of opponents of the US military presence in the Philippines. In addition to increasing nationalist anti-US rhetoric, protest movements calling for changes to the US military presence emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, largely in response to the US's war in Vietnam (Interview, Philippines activist, February 19, 2019; Interview, former Philippines senator, March 5, 2019).

First Contentious Episode: The Anti-Treaty Movement and the Senate Vote

As Figure 6.1 demonstrates, activists were successful in mobilizing the public *en masse* between 1987 and 1992 when the renewal of the Philippines' MBA with the US was the subject of debate, as several large protests indicate. Activists' frames invoked the Philippines historical marginalization vis-a-vis its experience as a colony of the US and thus had a high level of narrative fidelity. Further, these frames resonated also because of a favorable political opportunity structure. One favorable element in the political opportunity structure was the heightened visibility of the US bases themselves, discussed in greater detail below. Another factor was the lack of a clear external security threat to the Philippines. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the rationale for maintaining US bases to protect the Philippines from external threats was unclear. While the US was wary of China, the Philippines at the time had a good relationship with the Middle Kingdom (G. E. Martin 1999, 185). While there were pressing internal threats during this time, such as from the New People's Army (NPA), the militant branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the AFP was responsible for addressing such internal threats (G. E. Martin 1999, 135). This ambiguity of purpose, at least for Filipino interests, also provided an opening for activists and some Philippines politicians to publicly question the necessity of a continued US basing presence. Activists' frames also had a greater degree of resonance in this period because, as discussed later, several Philippines legislators echoed the same sentiments.

Several movements were involved with anti-US-base activism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These included movements focused specifically on the bases, such as the Anti-Bases Coalition and Anti-Treaty Movement, and movements focused on broader issues such as Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU, or May 1st Movement), often but not always working together. I

focus primarily on anti-base activism after 1987 because anti-base sentiment became intertwined with anti-Marcos sentiment during the People Power Revolution. Not all those who participated in the People Power Revolution were in favor of base removal. Nevertheless, even after the People Power Revolution ended, a mass movement focused on removing the US bases remained.

The Anti-Treaty Movement was a broad coalition led by the National Democrats and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan, “the New Patriotic Alliance”), consisting of students, religious leaders, women’s groups, environmental groups, labor groups, peace groups, politicians, and intellectuals (Yeo 2011a, 51–52). One pattern that multiple activists noted was that the participation of women and women’s groups increased at the beginning of this period (Interview, Philippines activist, February 26, 2019; Interview, Philippines activist, March 12, 2019; Interview, Philippines activist, August 16, 2022). Some women’s rights organizations, like Buklod, were formed at the beginning of this period in the wake of the People Power Movement and the opening of democratic space (Interview, Philippines activist, February 26, 2019). Activists broadcast their framing of the US bases as a sovereignty violation in a variety of ways, including through protests, speeches, “educational pamphlets, small-group discussions, and some big gatherings in schools and church premises. Some activists were able to persuade radio announcers to interview leaders of the anti-bases movement” (Interview, Philippines activist, December 1, 2020). Multiple activists also reported professors, especially at the University of the Philippines, teaching about the US base presence as a violation of Filipino sovereignty (Interview, Philippines activist, December 1, 2020; Interview, Philippines activist, August 16, 2022). In the words of one activist, professors “helped us understand the bases as anti-sovereignty” (Interview, Philippines activist, August 16, 2022).

The Anti-Treaty Movement, among others, primarily used frames that emphasized the colonial legacy of the US-Philippines relationship and claimed that the continuity of the bases was problematic because they not only perpetuated the Philippines' dependency on the US but violated the 1987 constitution. I argue that these frames mobilized the public primarily because the US base presence was visible and these frames invoked a sense of historical marginalization vis-à-vis the US that existed in popular discourse. First, the bases were highly visible to the national public because participants in the People Power Revolution of 1986 claimed that the US government, through the terms of the MBA, had propped up the Marcos regime. In this sense, the bases (a symbol of the US's influence in the Philippines) was a target of a previous movement, with some People Power activists shifting their efforts from democratization to the MBA. Additionally, the 1987 constitution made it illegal for the US (or any other foreign power) to maintain bases in the Philippines without Senate approval beyond 1991; any extension of the MBA would require such approval. Finally, the agreement was set to expire in 1991 unless the Senate voted to renew it.⁶³ This visibility of the US military presence is important for framing because frames' first core task is to "diagnose" a problem (Snow and Benford 1988, 199). Part of the key "problem" in anti-base activists' frames was that US bases existed in the Philippines and that they undermined Filipino sovereignty. Furthermore, if a US military presence is "invisible," activists' frames will lack empirical credibility and thus resonance because would-be supporters will not believe there is a problem as they cannot see it.

Second, while activists highlighted base-related issues such as prostitution and crimes committed by US military personnel, their key claim was that the US base presence undermined

⁶³ The US-Philippines MBA is distinct from the basing agreements that the US has concluded with Japan and South Korea (and many other host nations) because of its expiry dates. Other Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) do not have expiration dates.

Filipino sovereignty and perpetuated the legacy of the colonial relationship between the US and the Philippines. As one activist noted:

The Anti-Treaty Treaty Movement called on the people to reject the renewal of the Bases Treaty because the bases were an affront to Philippine sovereignty, it was a magnet for attacks from US's enemies, it was causing serious health problems, it exacerbated social problems within and around the bases and the treatment of crimes committed by servicemen and civilian personnel only underlined the neo-colonial relations between the US and the Philippines. (Email, Philippines activist, August 15, 2022)

This framing of the continued base presence as a sovereignty violation resonated with the Filipino public especially because it had a high level of narrative fidelity; issues of sovereignty, especially vis-à-vis the US, were credible because they invoke a colonial history that was known to most Filipinos. Claims about bases as a sovereignty violation are particularly salient in a host nation like the Philippines, which struggled for sovereignty and independence under two colonizers, including specifically the US. Furthermore, as previously, the agreement to grant the US continued basing access was a condition of the Philippines' independence from the US; in effect, the bases *were* an artifact of the former colonial relationship between the two countries as activists claimed. As discussed in the next section, sovereignty concerns were important even to those Filipinos who were amenable to a continued US presence; it was the prognosis or the solution to this problem that differed. Additionally, activists' claims aligned, at least to some extent, to those of many Philippines politicians at the national level who also believed that the Philippines should end its basing agreement with the US. I contend that hearing similar messages from different actors, especially those in positions of political power, lends credibility to the claim and thus makes the frame more likely to resonate.

Activists' anti-base frames were successful in mobilizing the public in part because they aligned with those of some Philippines politicians, namely some anti-base senators.

At the beginning of this period, several senators believed that the continuity of the US military presence was unnecessary for Filipino security, while others supported renewing the basing

agreement or were unsure about it. These conditions are more favorable for activists in that at least some part of the national government's base discourse supported activists' claims.

There were two key beliefs that underpinned the anti-base position. First, many Philippine government officials believed that in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Philippines faced no significant external security threats. For example, the Secretary of National Defense, Fidel Ramos, "in a 1988 speech stated that the U.S. bases played an important role in deterring an external threat, but he also acknowledged that he did not believe much of a threat existed" (Berry 1990, 320). Secondly, like the anti-US-military activists, Philippines politicians against the renewal of the US basing agreement believed that the agreement perpetuated the colonial relationship between the two countries and undermined Filipino sovereignty. Senator Teofisto Guingona, for example, stated that "we want friendship with America. [...] But we do not want servitude. We do not want an agreement that debases us as a nation. We do not want terms that degrade our dignity as a people" (Guingona as quoted in Yeo 2011, 52).

For its part, the US government strove to maintain its basing access, necessary for its own interests and "regional stability." As it did in the VFA era as well, the US conducted various activities to facilitate positive relationships between its basing presence and the communities that hosted the bases (Olongapo and Angeles) such as holding medical clinics and "holding discussions in schools and community organizations" (G. E. Martin 1999, 158). The US's stance regarding its bases in the Philippines became more complicated after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. However, "in general, the U.S. military stance was a do or die one; that they had to keep the bases because the Seventh Fleet could not operate in the Pacific without Subic" (G. E. Martin 1999, 179). Clark Air Base closed before the Senate vote on the

MBA due to the eruption of nearby Mt. Pinatubo, which rendered it inoperable. Subic, however, was especially important to the US military as a naval ship repair facility between East and Southeast Asia (Teare 1998, 189)

Second Contentious Episode: The Visiting Forces Agreement

After the US military left the Philippines following the Philippine Senate's vote not to renew its basing treaty, it returned to the country in 1999 through the VFA (Cruz De Castro 2003, 980). This agreement provided legal standing for large joint-military exercises, allowed US naval ships to use Philippine ports, enumerated jurisdictional rights over US military personnel in instances of crimes committed while in the Philippines, and, perhaps most notably, provided a legal justification for US troops to return to the Philippines (Banlaoi 2002, 299; Cruz De Castro 2003, 979–80). It was different from the MBA in that it did not allow the US to maintain permanent bases in the Philippines. Activists' underlying claims regarding the VFA and renewal of the US military presence in the Philippines were similar to those of activists in the late 1980s and early 1990s in that they focused on sovereignty issues. However, there were also many differences that, I argue, undermined activists' frame's effectiveness at mobilizing the public against the US military. First, there were shifts in the political opportunity structure, namely changes in the visibility of the presence and the Philippine's security environment, which made mobilizing the public against the VFA and the renewed US presence difficult. Second, while some politicians opposed the VFA, a majority of them, particularly at the national level, supported the agreement. Most notably, members of the "Magnificent Dozen," including President Joseph Estrada and Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado, supported the VFA, highlighting security concerns and the potential benefits of a strengthened alliance with the

US. In contrast to the previous period, Filipino politicians largely did not echo the same sentiments as anti-US-military activists, thus activists were largely alone in their claims about the VFA. A final obstacle came from among the activists themselves, namely the split of the Philippines left, which undermined the credibility of the anti-VFA activists. Taken together, this meant that activists were faced with an unfavorable political opportunity structure in which their framing of VFA did not resonate.

There were many similarities between activists' strategies against the VFA and those of their predecessors despite the fact that the former were markedly less successful in mobilizing the public and influencing policy makers. Several social movements participated in activism against the VFA and related activities including the *Balikatan* 2002-1 joint military exercise, discussed in more detail below. Similar to the previous period, some movements formed in reaction to the VFA, such as *Kilusan Laban sa VFA* (Kill the VFA) and *Junk the VFA*, while others protested the VFA as part of a broader struggle such as *Gabriela*, a women's rights network (Simbulan 2009, 157). Many of these movements worked together to oppose the return of the US military to the Philippines and in some cases worked transnationally with other movements and organizations in other host nations and territories (Interview, Philippines activist, December 1, 2020). Like in previous movements, participants came from various sectors although many were students (Interview, Philippines activist, December 1, 2020; Interview, Philippines activist, August 16, 2022).

Movements opposing the VFA employed similar strategies and frames as the Anti-Treaty Movement and others during the previous period. They also used similar methods to disseminate their messages to the public. One activist stated that they did this even better than their predecessors:

I think the anti-VFA campaigners knew better how to formulate slogans. I think, they were more

colorful, creative with their placards and paraphernalia during the rallies and marches. They presented their arguments well in official statements, in forums and in taking as guests during TV and radio programs and special study courses. (Email, Philippines activist, August 15, 2022)

Previous movements like the Anti-Treaty Movement provided the basis of activists' contentious repertoire and in this sense, it is perhaps unsurprising that activists would improve on previous strategies. One interviewee who was involved in the anti-VFA movement commented that the Anti-Treaty Movement was inspiring as "one of those rare cases of victory" and provided the basis for the frames activists employed against the VFA (Interview, Philippines scholar, August 10, 2022).

While activists emphasized problems such as crimes, accidents, and environmental degradation, the main underlying claim was that the return of the US military to the Philippines (in any form) undermined Filipino sovereignty. Activists argued that the VFA was a precursor to the reestablishment of US bases in the Philippines. Emblematic of this sentiment, the Scrap the VFA! Movement stated that "the word visiting has been a ploy to hide the real intent of the agreement, which is the eventual permanent military presence in the Philippines especially in Mindanao" ("About SCRAP VFA! Movement" 2013). Activists, as they did in the previous period, argued that the VFA was reminiscent of the colonial relationship between the US and the Philippines. For example, the VFA "is an affront to our national sovereignty and is one of the instruments that maintain the country's neo-colonial status vis a vis the United States" ("About SCRAP VFA! Movement" 2013). In this regard, activists claimed that the VFA was not in the interests of the Philippines, but rather solely in the US's interests.

Activists argued that both the US and Philippines governments tried to undercut public opposition to the US troops by minimizing the visibility of the US military presence as much as possible and emphasizing that the presence was temporary. For example, one interviewee stated that the US military presence was "kept almost a secret" and that one "hardly see[s] the hand of

the US” (Interview, Philippines activist, December 1, 2020). Additionally, multiple interviewees mentioned the emphasis on “visiting” US troops (Interview, Philippines activist, February 19, 2019; Interview, Philippines activist, March 12, 2019). As one put it, “‘VFA’ is more innocuous” than the label of “‘SOFA’” (Status of Forces Agreement), which the US has negotiated with several host nations in which it maintains permanent bases such as Japan and South Korea (Interview, Philippines activist, March 12, 2019). And, from an activist perspective, the lack of US bases made protest organizing difficult in that there was not an obvious place to stage demonstrations against the US military. As one activist asked rhetorically, “how can you have open demonstrations when there is no base?” (Interview, Philippines activist, September 30, 2022).

Many activists argued that the lowered visibility of the US military presence and the emphasis on “visiting” troops was misleading to the public. First, activists contended that the VFA was unconstitutional on various counts, including that the Philippines Senate had to ratify the treaty, that the US could bring in nuclear weapons under the VFA (which the constitution explicitly prohibits), and that the Philippines should have an independent foreign policy (Patag 2020; “About SCRAP VFA! Movement” 2013) Second, activists claimed that the “temporary” nature of the US troops meant that there was uncertainty about their location. As one interviewee stated, “no bases means that the military can go anywhere” (Interview, Philippines activist, March 12, 2019). Finally, activists argued that even though the US and Philippines government claimed that the US military was in a “non-combat role,” US troops were actually participating in active combat. One scholar stated that “eyewitnesses of the encounters claimed to have seen US troops actually join the Filipino soldiers in operations at the immediate vicinity of the

fighting (Docena 2007a, 14). An interviewee echoed that sentiment, stating that the US military was “do[ing] more than advising” (Interview, Philippines activist, December 1, 2020).

However, several factors rendered activists’ sovereignty frames less persuasive than in the past. First, as mentioned, the US troops in the VFA era were generally less visible because of the lack of permanent US bases and the smaller troop presence. Taken together, it was generally difficult for civilians to see the US military in their communities. This lowered visibility undermined the credibility of activists’ frames; if the public does not see the problem, they are not likely to mobilize against it. Second, the Philippines’ external security environment changed in the 1990s. Perhaps the most important development was the territorial disputes between China and the Philippines, as well as several other Southeast Asian states, over the Spratly Islands in the West Philippines Sea. Most notably, in 1995, the Philippines discovered that China had begun building facilities on Mischief Reef, an islet in the region which both countries claim (Zha and Valencia 2001, 88–89). Tensions escalated in the following years, as the Philippines destroyed Chinese boundaries markers around Scarborough Shoal (another disputed islet) in 1997 and China expanded its facilities on Mischief Reef in 1998 (Zha and Valencia 2001, 87–89). In this sense, for many Filipinos, there was a clear reason for hosting a US military presence.

The shifts in the political opportunity structure also shifted many Philippine politicians’ views and frames about hosting a renewed US military presence. In Yeo’s (2011) terminology, Philippine policymakers went from sharing a weak security consensus (where there was little perceived threat to Filipino external security) in the previous period to a stronger one in the mid- to late-1990s that enabled the passage of the VFA. This shift in external threat perception is perhaps nowhere as noticeable as through the actions and words of former Senator and President Joseph Estrada. Although Estrada was one of the “Magnificent Dozen” who voted not to renew

the MBA with the US, he was the president who ratified the VFA in 1998. After Estrada signed the VFA but before the Senate voted on it, he stated that “‘It's good for us to have an ally, a superpower partner so our security would be safeguarded’” (*Associated Press International* 1999). Estrada also directly addressed claims about the VFA undermining Filipino sovereignty, stating that, “‘We are not surrendering our sovereignty with the VFA’ [...] ‘This time, our sovereignty is not in question, what I am after now is the security of our country’” (*Associated Press International* 1999). In this sense, the VFA was not framed as a violation of the Philippines’ sovereignty but rather as a tool to preserve it. The Philippines Senate subsequently concurred with the VFA in 1999, with some other members of the “Magnificent Dozen” voting to approve the VFA (G.R. No. 138570 2000).

Beyond justifying the VFA and the return of the US military for security reasons, the Philippines government at various times countered the claims that anti-US-military activists made. Arguably the biggest issue around the signing of the VFA was whether the president, instead of the Senate, could ratify an agreement that allowed foreign troops to be stationed in the Philippines. When President Estrada signed the VFA between the Philippines and the US, he also ratified it (i.e., formally accepted it on behalf of the Philippines). Activists and other opponents claimed that Estrada had acted unconstitutionally and that it was up to the Senate to ratify the agreement; activists ultimately filed a petition with the Philippine Supreme Court in 1999 (Patag 2020). The Philippine government defended Estrada’s actions and stated that the VFA is “not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of American military,” and thus did not require Senate ratification (Patag 2020). The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that while Section 25 does not view *temporary* vs. *permanent* stationing of foreign troops differently, Estrada was within his constitutional rights as president to ratify the

VFA (G.R. No. 138570 2000). For anti-US-military activists, this meant not only did the Philippines (and US) government directly counter their claims about the agreement being unconstitutional, but the Philippines Supreme Court ruled that the VFA was legally ratified. In effect, these counter-claims and court ruling undermined the credibility and resonance of activists' frames, ruling the Estrada was correct and the activists were wrong.

Similarly, the Philippines government emphasized that the renewed US military presence was *temporary* and not a permanent arrangement as it had been with the US bases. Although the Supreme Court ultimately argued that there was no difference constitutionally in terms of allowing *troops* vs. *bases*, the government made this distinction to ameliorate public opinion regarding hosting another US presence. Additionally, it was the framing of the renewed US presence as “visiting” that made it more palatable to politicians who previously opposed the US bases, including members of the “Magnificent Dozen” (Yeo 2012, 862). Similarly, the Philippines government stated that it would “never allow the establishment of foreign military bases in the country” (Banlaoi 2002, 308). This was an important claim that both aligned with the US's claims but also countered activists' claims that the VFA was a precursor to reestablishing US bases in the Philippines. To further assuage potential public concerns about the VFA, the Philippines government also emphasized that the US troops would only play a non-combat advisory role (Docena 2007a, 12).

The US military framed its renewed presence to the Philippines public in a variety of ways that highlighted the benefits of its presence (rendering it highly visible but in a positive light) and countered some of the anti-US-military activists' (and other opponents of the VFA) claims, particularly about the ways in which the agreement violates Filipino sovereignty. First, despite the territorial disputes between the Philippines and China leading up to the convening of

the VFA, US officials stated that its renewed presence in the Philippines was intended to combat terrorism. For example, the former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, said that the larger *Balikatan* 2002-1 exercise was “‘not an issue about China’ but an issue ‘about our presence in the region to promote stability and... good commerce’” (Myers as quoted in Banlaoi 2002, 307).

Secondly, the US military conducted various activities to “win hearts and minds” in the Philippines, such as “goodwill missions such as providing dental services or building schools” itself, especially in the southern region of Mindanao (Docena 2007b, 72). In addition to conducting such operations itself, US troops also trained AFP members to perform such services. For example, US troops embarked on several projects in which it trained the AFP to “build and improve such things as roads, bridges, shelters, and other forms of hardened infrastructure” and “to better treat and care for various (human and animal/livestock) medical conditions, ailments, and injuries” (Farris 2009, 36). Perhaps more important than conducting these activities was bringing public attention to them to demonstrate to the Filipino public the benefits of maintaining a US military presence.

Third, the US contended that its presence in the Philippines under the VFA was consistent with the Philippines constitution. As mentioned previously, foreign bases in the Philippines became illegal with the passage of the 1987 Constitution. The US argued that “a correct reading of the Philippine Constitution reveals that it prohibits only the stationing of foreign forces in the Philippines after the 1991 expiration of the Philippines-U.S. agreement on military bases” and argued that it did not preclude US troops from conducting combat operations (Docena 2007a, 10). However, one of the key ways that the US (and the Philippines government) tried to placate public sentiment was to have US troops only in supporting roles to the AFP in joint military

exercises and other operations (Farris 2009, 30). Thus, the US, in a sense, framed its presence as respecting the Philippines' sovereignty.

Finally, the US repeatedly stated that the VFA and the larger *Balikatan* exercises were not precursors to the establishment of US bases in the Philippines, despite activists' claims (Cruz De Castro 2003, 984). A US military official, for example, stated that "We [the Americans] will be in temporary bases [only] working with our Philippine allies" (Blair as quoted in Banlaoi 2002, 308). As mentioned previously, these "temporary bases" were located within the AFP's own bases and facilities (Smith 2006, 38). Additionally, as one interviewee stated, troops' movements are restricted and they are not allowed into populated areas often, particularly in Mindanao, the region where the US military primarily operated (Interview, US Marine formerly stationed in the Philippines, January 14, 2021). One of the major impacts of this arrangement is that the US military presence is largely invisible and many Filipinos are unaware of it – except when the US opts to highlight its presence in a positive light.

Another important development that likely impacted activists' ability to mobilize the public emerged from within the movement itself. As Caouette (2004) and Boudreau (2018) detail, the Philippines left, the segment of society that was primarily against the US military presence, began to split following the democratic election of Cory Aquino in 1987. As the Philippines democratized and the space for civil society opened, more NGOs began to emerge (Boudreau 2018, 73). NGOs, who often received funding from the state or international sources, largely refrained from engaging in street protests, unlike social movements in the past (Boudreau 2018, 77). While more radical leftist groups like National Democracy (ND) continued to engage in protests, others in the center left and on the right "ceded main elements of their representation in [broad-based social movements] to NGO personnel" (Boudreau 2018, 78).

As mentioned, this split impacted the anti-base movement in the late 1980s in that many people who participated in the People Power Movement did not participate in the Anti-Treaty Movement, including Aquino herself. However, there was still a significant portion of the left who participated in the movement, as evidenced by the success of the movement and the large number of protests. The left splintered further after the MBA debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, specifically among groups on the far left. As result, there were multiple anti-VFA movements, at times competing with one another for venues and supporters, despite using similar frames (Interview, Philippines activist, March 12, 2019). One activist provided an example of this division:

The organization that first mobilized in against the VFA was the Kilusan sa Pambansang Demokrasya (Kilusan or KPD). Its first big mobilization was a *laktayan* or a march through four provinces of Central Luzon. This mobilization went on smoothly in Bataan, Zambales and Pampanga. But when the march was at its final stage in Bulacan, it was challenged by the mobilization of Bayan. The Bayan group was boasting of a bigger membership then in Bulacan. Bayan members tried to block the Kilusan so there was tension. (At that period, some Bayan members turn[ed] violent at times against Kilusan members). Kilusan had to alter the route of the march. (Email, Philippines activist, August 15, 2022)

Although these movements employed similar frames to problematize the VFA, their division undermined their credibility with the public (and likely with policymakers as well), diluting the potency of their message.

Third Contentious Episode: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and the Jennifer Laude Case

The shift of the US military presence in the Philippines from permanent bases that the US used exclusively to US troops' temporary use of AFP bases under the VFA (and later EDCA) has undermined the visibility of the US military in the country, except when the US or the Philippines government draws attention to the US being a "good neighbor." The lowered visibility of the presence has made anti-US-military activists' claims that there is a problematic

US military presence in the Philippines less credible and less likely to mobilize the public to protest. Furthermore, various actors in the Philippines government have countered activists' claims about the VFA and EDCA, making activists' goals of policy change unlikely and likely discouraging the public from joining protests against the renewed US presence. In this sense, the political opportunity structure that activists face in the VFA era is more closed than in the past. However, as Gamson and Meyer (1996) note, there are often moments where the political opportunity structure opens, providing activists the opportunity for greater mobilization and/or a greater likelihood for meeting their goals. The murder of Jennifer Laude in 2014 provided anti-US-military activists with such an opportunity. Prior to Laude's murder, the US and the Philippines were negotiating EDCA and thus, the US military presence was already more visible in the public discourse as activist groups such as Bayan made public statements about the alleged problems with the agreement and US troops in the Philippines more broadly.

However, protest mobilization emerged that year following a response to activists' effort to raise public awareness about the problems of the US military presence. Several interviewees relayed that such moments of crimes are times in which mobilization against the US military has tended to peak in the VFA era, one stating that "some of my friends asked what the VFA was only at that time" (Interview, Philippines activist, September 10, 2022). While activists' frames were multifaceted as in the past, the underlying issue was concerns about Filipino sovereignty and the Philippines' jurisdiction over the perpetrator. Thus, despite the use of sovereignty frames, which have been less successful in the VFA era, and a generally unfavorable political opportunity structure, activists were able to capitalize on an opportunity to draw public attention to the US military presence, thereby increasing its visibility. Additionally, the Laude case and other crimes attributed to the US military presence provide an opening for activists to rehash their previous

claims about the negative consequences of hosting US troops and about the agreements that grant the US basing access, the VFA and EDCA.

The political opportunity structure around anti-US-military activism in the Philippines prior to Jennifer Laude's murder was relatively favorable to activists' frames in some respects. As mentioned, the US troop presence was already more visible to the public eye, as the two countries negotiated the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in early 2014. This agreement emerged in the context of continued tension in the West Philippine Sea between the Philippines and China over territorial claims such as Scarborough Shoal (Cruz De Castro 2016, 491). For its part, the Philippines government desired a more explicit guarantee from the US that any attack on the Philippines, on the mainland or its outlying islands, would trigger an automatic response from the US as well, especially in light of the Philippines' escalating tensions with China (Cruz De Castro 2016, 495). Under EDCA, US troops could be deployed to the Philippines for a longer period than under the VFA, "based in agreed locations within AFP facilities" in which they could store their equipment (Cruz De Castro 2016, 486). US and Philippines officials believed that an expanded US troop presences would not only help modernize the AFP through joint training, but also through the US's extended capacity for disaster response (Cruz De Castro 2016, 496). The latter was particularly salient as the US military played a key role in disaster relief following the devastation from Hurricane Yolanda in 2013 (Hiebert et al. 2015, 12).

EDCA was officially signed on April 28, 2014 (Cruz De Castro 2016, 496). During and after the negotiations, anti-US-military activists and politicians publicly raised their concerns about the agreement and the continued US military presence in the Philippines in general. Activists, led primarily by Bayan, took to the streets in protest after the two countries signed the

agreement and during President Obama's visit to the Philippines in April ("Obama: Security Pact..."). Additionally, opponents of the US military presence in Philippines filed lawsuits against EDCA, as they had against the VFA. Bayan and two former members of the Magnificent Twelve, Senators Saguisag and Tañada, filed two separate lawsuits against the agreement weeks after it was signed, arguing that the agreement was not constitutional as the Philippine Senate had not voted on the agreement (Cruz De Castro 2016, 497). Bayan's secretary-general, Renato Reyes, publicly stated that EDCA was a "myth" in that the US would benefit much more from the agreement than the Philippines and accused the Philippines government of "working overtime to spread lies and misfortune" about EDCA (Lozada 2014a). The Supreme Court of the Philippines did not decide constitutionality of the agreement until 2016 and thus, the status of the US military in the Philippines was again up in the air at the time of Jennifer Laude's murder, which occurred six months later.

As with most anti-US-military contention, activists' claims about Jennifer Laude's murder were multifaceted, reflecting the different types of civil society groups involved. The nature of the case and the identity of the victim determined the types of groups that were involved and the types of frames they deployed. Jennifer Laude was a transgender Filipina who was murdered by Lance Corporal Joseph Scott Pemberton, a US marine. In this case, some of the usual suspects of anti-US-military activism, including Bayan and Gabriela, were involved, the latter especially because the case was a violent crime against a female. Additionally, LGBTQ groups, like Kapederasyon, participated due to Laude's status as a transgender Filipina and the implications of the case regarding the treatment of LGBTQ people in the Philippines (Macatuno 2014). Activists engaged in a variety of activities to raise awareness about Laude's murder and the broader issues surrounding the US military in the Philippines, both nationally and

transnationally. Gabriela, for example, encouraged people to take to the streets or engage in social media activism through a Facebook post:

Hold actions, light candles in front of Philippine embassies and consulates in your country,
take photos of yourselves with the calls below and post so the world will know.
Justice for Jennifer!
End US militarism and violence!
Junk VFA and EDCA!
US Out of the Philippines and Asia Pacific! (GABRIELA 2014)

One interviewee, an activist from a women's rights group near Subic, reported that their group held events to memorialize Jennifer (Interview, Philippines activist, February 26, 2019).

Activists, as well as some Philippines policy makers, linked the Laude case to the case of "Nicole" in 2005. "Nicole," was allegedly raped in Subic by a US marine; while a Philippines court initially found the suspect guilty, he was acquitted after "Nicole" recanted her testimony (*Rappler* 2015) During this case, activists raised two key concerns about the VFA: that it allowed such crimes to occur by virtue of allowing US troops back in the country and that it did not grant enough jurisdiction to the Philippines over the accused (Depasupil 2008). By linking these cases together after Laude's murder in 2014, activists not only evoked the previous public outcry and emotions that accompanied the "Nicole" case but also cited both episodes as evidence that the VFA and the newly signed EDCA were problematic. Such cases provide opportunities for activists not only to bring the public's awareness to the US military presence but also to provide supporting evidence to their arguments about why the Philippines government should abrogate the VFA and EDCA, thus raising their credibility. For example, Bayan's Secretary General, Renato Reyes, Jr., stated that "the Edca would increase the possibility of more Nicoles and Jennifers as US troops will be staying here indefinitely" (Quismundo 2014b). Gabriela vice chair, Gert Ranjo-Libang, similarly stated that "the case of Laude and 'Nicole' are arguments against VFA and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the US and the

Philippines [...] All of them are proof that anywhere the US troops are present, cases of violence against women are not far behind” (Patag 2020).

Activists also raised concerns about jurisdiction over Pemberton, invoking domestic sovereignty issues. The VFA stipulates which countries has jurisdiction over US troops in the country, essentially:

the Philippines will take primary jurisdiction over US military personnel who commit or are accused of a crime in the country, unless the offense is related to US security or is only punishable under US law. On the other hand, the US takes primary jurisdiction over their personnel if they commit offenses against US property or security or against fellow US personnel and their property. They also have primary jurisdiction over their personnel in offenses committed in the performance of official duty. Both the US and the Philippines can request from each other to waive their primary jurisdiction in a particular case. (Gregorio 2020)

In both the “Nicole” and Laude cases, while the Philippines justice system tried the accused US marines, they remained under US custody during their respective trials (Cayabyab 2014; Sabillo 2014). In both cases, anti-US-military activists and some Philippines politicians cited the tension between jurisdictional and custody rights during trial as evidence of inequality in the VFA (and EDCA in the Laude case). Some groups, like Bayan, explicitly framed US custody of Pemberton and the VFA writ large as a violation of Filipino sovereignty: “the VFA by design favors the US. It is an affront to our sovereignty and our entire legal system. It protects US servicemen from our legal processes by placing them beyond the reach of the Philippine judicial system” (Lozada 2014b). Some groups went so far as to not only blame the US for the jurisdictional issues, but the Philippines government for not being more assertive in gaining custody of Pemberton. Gabriela, for example, stated that, “it looks like the US is harboring the criminal. Just like before. [...] Someone died here Under the VFA (Visiting Forces Agreement), the Philippine government may ask for custody. Our government is really inutile” (Quismundo 2014a).

The issue of domestic sovereignty was central to the US and Philippines government’s claims as well. For its part, the US government offered its condolences to Jennifer Laude’s

family while also asserting that it was abiding by the stipulations of the VFA regarding jurisdiction. For example, the US embassy issued an official statement, saying that the US offers its "deepest condolences to the family and friends of the deceased" and that it will "abide by the VFA, which stipulates that custody of a suspect remains with the US throughout the judicial process. [...] Justice is best served through the rule of law, which in cases involving US service members, includes the VFA" (Macatuno and Avendaño 2014). In this statement, the US was countering activists' claims that it does not have the right to custody over Pemberton. Perhaps more importantly, by emphasizing "justice" and the "rule of law" enshrined in the VFA, the US framed its conduct as respecting Philippines' sovereignty. The US Ambassador to the Philippines at the time, Philip Goldberg, further emphasized that it was the VFA that allowed justice to be done by "facilitat[ing] the investigation into Laude's killing" (Casauay 2014). Goldberg also stressed that it was the VFA that allowed US troops in the country to effectively assist with disaster relief in the wake of Typhoon Yolanda the previous year (Casauay 2014). In this sense, the US countered activists' strategy of bringing negative visibility to the US presence and the VFA by highlighting the positive things it has done in the Philippines through the VFA.

There was some divergence within the Philippines central government on this issue, both across and within the different branches. The executive branch expressed its concerns about the crime and the Philippines' jurisdictional rights. Then-Communications Secretary Herminio Coloma Jr. stated that "it is unacceptable to us that is why we now have a stronger bases to review the provisions of the agreement to ensure that national interest and justice for our citizens will prevail" (Sabillo 2014). Like activists' statements, the executive branch also at times linked the Laude case with the "Nicole" case, during which the US and the Philippines government also contested jurisdictional rights over the suspect. The Executive Director of the Presidential

Commission on the VFA, Eduardo Oban Jr., stated that “we said right away that we would not accept for [Pemberton] to be brought to the US Embassy just like Daniel Smith,” the marine accused of raping “Nicole” (Santos 2014). Taken together, such statements, likely aimed at the Philippines public, suggest that the executive branch strove to preserve the Philippines’ domestic sovereignty vis-à-vis the US and to protect its citizens. Statements that implied that the government was “standing up” to the US countered claims that the VFA was simply an unequal agreement through which the US exerted its will over the Philippines government. Further, the executive branch confirmed that the VFA was necessary for the Philippines external sovereignty. Coloma also asserted that “the VFA is part of the national defense structure that is why it is still in place and being implemented” (Sabillo 2014).

Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, a progressive politician, called for the abrogation of the VFA because the agreement was a “historic document of inequity between a colonizer and its former colony” and that the Philippines was “a stillborn state because our umbilical cord from the US has never been cut” (Francisco 2014). Citing the tension between the right to jurisdiction and the right to custody, the former senator stated that “if the Philippines will consider the crime as an extraordinary case, it can request the US for custody. The US, nonetheless, is only required to take the Philippine position “into full account,” although it may ultimately not comply with the Philippines’ request (*ABS-CBN News* 2014). Further, Santiago and critics of the VFA in the legislature argued that the VFA has not lived up to its promise. Calling the agreement a “failure,” Santiago stated that the VFA, contrary to the US’ and executive branches’ claims, did not guarantee that the US would come to the Philippines’ aid if there was a clash with China over the West Philippines Sea (Francisco 2014). She also argued that the VFA had not modernized the AFP as promised (*ABS-CBN News* 2014). Thus, for Santiago and other left-leaning legislators,

the VFA preserved neither the Philippines' external nor internal sovereignty. It privileged the US in cases of crimes committed by US soldiers on Philippine soil but did not offer guarantees that the US would help the Philippines maintain its territorial integrity if conflict broke out over the Philippines' and China's competing maritime claims.

Conclusion

This chapter argues that a major reason why protests against the US military in the Philippines have been fewer and smaller around the implementation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) than protests prior to the closure of the US bases in 1992 is that activists' frames do not resonate as much with the political opportunity structure. In each time period, national-level activists framed the US presence as a violation of Filipino sovereignty for mostly similar reasons: concerns that the US military presence violated the 1987 constitution and an overall call for an independent foreign policy free from outside interference. Additionally, in the Laude case, activists decried the VFA and EDCA as violating Filipino sovereignty by allowing the US to maintain custody of troops accused of committing crimes in the Philippines prior to the court ruling. Sovereignty frames are generally compelling in host nations like the Philippines when they have a history of colonization. In this case, the Philippines' history of being a US colony is directly related to the US' base presence; it was a condition of Filipino independence, as detailed previously. Thus, anti-US-military frames in the Philippines that invoke this historical relationship, both indirectly and indirectly, are likely to have a high degree of narrative fidelity and are more likely to mobilize people.

However, as this chapter also demonstrates, such frames, even though they may have a high degree of narrative fidelity, may not mobilize many people. Despite activists' use of frames

emphasizing the colonial relationship between the Philippines and the US, there were fewer and smaller protests around the implementation of the VFA and subsequent years. This is not only surprising given that anti-US-base activists and Philippine politicians at the national level pushed for ending the US' basing agreement (the MBA) only years before, but the negotiations around the VFA in 1998 and 1999 represented a time when activists would have had more luck mobilizing people against the VFA given the public's greater awareness of the US military's return to the Philippines. However, activists were more successful at mobilizing the public against the US military following high-profile crimes committed by US military personnel, such as the Laude murder.

Across these cases, a major difference was that the political opportunity structure around the US presence was less favorable to this framing than in the past. A key reason for this shift was the change in the Philippines' security environment, most notably the lack of an external threat with the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and escalating tensions between China and the Philippines over the Spratly Islands in the mid- to late-1990s. Additionally, the move from permanent bases attributable to the US to a temporary "visiting" presence in which US troops could use AFP bases made the presence less visible. While activists framed the renewed US presence as a sovereignty violation and called for its removal, the US and Philippines governments both downplayed the presence and framed it as a "visiting." The result is that the public was (and is) generally less aware of the presence. Additionally, when the US and Philippines governments are not downplaying the US's presence, they are emphasizing the benefits of hosting a US presence vis-à-vis the US's humanitarian projects and assistance in disaster relief. Thus, even when the public was aware of US troops in the Philippines, they saw them as less problematic than the previous basing presence. For activists, these conditions of low

and high positive visibility meant that their frames had less credibility (they largely did not comport with would-be protesters daily experiences) and were thus less likely to mobilize. However, crimes like the Laude murder provide activists with a window of opportunity, even in an unfavorable political opportunity structure, for activists to draw public attention to the US military presence and problematize it.

Additionally, while many national-level Philippine politicians shared and amplified anti-base activists' frames in the former period (some adopting the anti-base position through activists' own efforts), few did in the latter period, with even a few senators switching from anti-base views to pro-VFA views. The impact is that activists' frame that the VFA and the renewed US military presence in the Philippines was a violation of Filipino sovereignty was largely unsupported by the frames of the national government.

An examination of anti-US-military activism in the Philippines provides insights for both social movement scholars and base politics scholars alike. For the former, anti-US-military activism shows that a frame can effectively mobilize people at one time within a particular political opportunity structure but be less effective when the structure shifts. In the Philippines, the political opportunity structure not only changed, but the activists themselves changed, despite using many of the same tactics as their predecessors in the Anti-Treaty Movement. While, as mentioned, activists against the VFA innovated on the strategies that their predecessors had used to transmit their frames, they largely framed the US military presence in the same way. Given that these frames were not as potent in the latter period, activists may have been better off innovating or using entirely new frames. Thus, contentious repertoires may be a double-edged sword: while they provide a blueprint for activists' strategies, they may also limit activists' creativity in coming up with new ones that may work better under different conditions.

In terms of base politics, the comparison of these episodes showcases how and why more informal agreements can undermine activists' efforts to rally would-be protesters against a US military presence. While the inability of the anti-VFA activists to rally the public *en masse* is partially due to changes within anti-US-military community itself, the lowered troop visibility played a major role. When US troops are largely out of the public eye, they are “out of sight, out of mind.”

Chapter 7: Paths Forward in Base Politics Research

Although the public in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines generally favor a US military presence, this study shows that anti-US-military movements occur in certain contexts, though not all. In this study, I offer several insights not solely about anti-US-military activism and base politics but social movements in general. Below, I summarize these findings. The first is that identity matters to protest mobilization, both as a political opportunity structure and in terms of providing activists with cultural stock from which to craft resonant frames. In the case of anti-US-military activism, some communities are generally more favorable to the US military and others are not based on their identity. Second, the visibility of a US military presence impacts activists' ability to mobilize the public. Low visibility presents a challenge to activists. Additionally, high positive visibility, a result of the US's community-building soft power strategies, is also generally problematic for activists. However, when activists can exploit openings in the political opportunity structure to problematize the base (such as construction projects or base-related crimes), they can create high negative visibility, which increases their potential for mobilizing would-be protesters. The nature of troop visibility suggests that there are aspects of political opportunity structures that are themselves subject to framing. Finally, framing contests and what I term framing coalitions matter for protest mobilization. In several cases, host nation politicians' frames align with and boost activists' frames, increasing their potential to mobilize. In other cases, politicians contest activists' claims, making it more difficult for the latter to mobilize would-be protesters. While the social movement literature has typically conceptualized framing contests as the purview of social movements, this study shows that other actors engage in similar strategies. Overall, these findings show how intertwined frames are with

political opportunity structures and how difficult it is to tease apart their impacts on protest mobilization.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study and avenues for future research. While activists, host nation politicians, and the US military are major actors in base politics, the media also play a distinct role in framing and shaping public opinion, thus it is another actor to consider incorporating into a future version of this study. Second, while this study has operationalized protest through street demonstrations, a broader measurement incorporating less intensive forms of protest like signature campaigns may yield a more comprehensive picture of anti-US-military activism. Third, I highlight several potential cases to add to the study to strengthen it and make the findings more generalizable. Fourth, I describe one of the major unforeseen fieldwork findings, local-national-transnational activist linkages, and discuss the necessity to take these linkages into consideration when examining protest variation. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the outlook of these anti-US-military movements, highlighting the difficulties they face in meeting their goals.

Taking Identity Seriously

The first finding of this study is that identity matters for protest mobilization. Taking identity seriously is especially crucial when trying to understand movements like anti-US-military movements that are often rooted in a particular place. Identity can help or hinder activists' efforts in two related ways. Places that have been historically marginalized at the hands of their own national governments and the US government, such as Okinawa (Chapters 3 and 4) and Jeju (Chapter 5), are generally more likely to oppose a US military presence (or, in the Jeju case, even their own military). These places have traditionally occupied peripheral positions in

their respective countries' politics and often see themselves as separate from the Japanese and Korean "nations." By contrast, places that have historically been part of the political "core" and have long-standing identities as military host cities like Yokosuka (Chapters 3 and 4) and Daegu (Chapter 5) are generally less favorable to anti-US-military activists. In this sense, these are examples of open and closed political opportunity structures.

Additionally, a place's identity impacts activists' framing choices. For frames to resonate and mobilize people, they need to possess narrative fidelity or align with cultural narratives (as discussed in Chapter 2). In cases like Okinawa and Jeju, activists have a wide range of cultural narratives or stock to draw upon to problematize their respective bases because of their histories of marginalization. In Okinawa, activists remind people of times that the Japanese and/or the US government sacrificed, exploited, and/or betrayed Okinawans, invoking historical episodes such as the Battle of Okinawa, the land expropriation under the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), and Okinawa's return to Japanese rule. They use these events to problematize the Henoko construction plan and the US base presence in general, reminding people that the Japanese and US governments cannot be trusted. In Jeju, activists remind people of the collective trauma from the 4.3 incident in their frames against the Jeju Naval Base. As in Okinawa, they invoke this event to remind people that the Korean and US governments (whom they allege is actually responsible for the base) cannot be trusted.

Beyond reminding people about past grievances, though, emerge key themes that activists also invoke in their frames. In both cases, we see frames emphasizing the importance of life (derived from the traumas of the Battle of Okinawa and 4.3), which may manifest in environmental frames and even framing about future generations of people. Similarly, anti-militarism and pacifism are key themes that emerge from these events that activists employ in

their frames. As discussed in Chapter 3, activists at times say that the lesson of the Battle of Okinawa is that militaries do not protect lives, they only bring war.

In cases like Yokosuka and Daegu, however, local identity limits activists' framing choices because these communities do not have the same history of animosity with their central governments or the US. Yokosuka has an identity as a proud naval city in the proximity of Tokyo, thus activists cannot draw upon its identity to problematize CFA Yokosuka. However, they had some initial success in drawing upon Japan's history as a target of nuclear weapons when they problematized nuclear-powered aircraft carriers docking in Yokosuka. Although Daegu has had some historical animosity with the Korean government in the past (*vis-à-vis* anti-government protest movements under authoritarianism), this identity changed over time as it became central to Korean politics as the hometown of several prominent conservative politicians and a major manufacturing center during Korea's rapid industrialization. It was also the site of a major Korean War battle. Thus, Daegu's identity does not lend itself to anti-US-military framing and activists have had to problematize the US presence in different ways.

These findings have two important implications for the base politics and social movement literature. First, as mentioned in Chapter 2, some studies in the base politics literature have categorized anti-US-military activist frames into "pragmatic" (issues tangible to people's lives like noise pollution and environmental degradation), "nationalistic" (sovereignty issues), and "ideological" (pacifist) framing (Calder 2007; Kim and Boas 2020; Kim 2023). Most recently, Kim and Boas (2020) and Kim (2023) found that pragmatic frames are more like to mobilize would-be protesters. However, what the current study suggests is that ideological frames are more likely to occur in places with high levels of protest mobilization like Okinawa and Jeju, and pragmatic frames in places with lower levels of protest like Yokosuka and Daegu. In the case of

the Philippines, nationalistic framing successfully mobilized protesters — for a time. These findings are not necessarily contradictory, however. Part of the issue, as discussed previously, is a selection effect. If activists want their frames to resonate with the public, they will choose the ones that they think are most likely to mobilize people, and in places like Okinawa and Jeju, ideological ones will work, while in places like Yokosuka and Daegu, they are unlikely to work. Therefore, activists in these communities turn to more pragmatic framing.

Additionally, anti-US-military framing is often a combination of multiple types of framing. In Okinawa and Jeju, for example, pragmatic frames about environmental degradation are intertwined with ideological frames about the necessity to preserve life – derived from the traumas of the Battle of Okinawa and 4.3. In the Philippines, activists in the late 1980s and early 1990s used nationalistic framing to problematize the US bases, often intertwined with more pragmatic framing more tangible issues related to the bases like crime. Furthermore, the public likely does not differentiate between different framing categories; they too understand everyday issues as intertwined with larger ideological concerns or nationalism. Thus, I argue, teasing apart frame types in anti-US-military activism is not a useful analytical exercise as they are often intertwined in reality.

Additionally, this study may help refine our conceptualizations of political opportunity structures. I concur that the term “political opportunity structure” has been the object of conceptual stretching to the extent that “used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all” (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 275). However, a place’s identity, history, and culture are important components of political opportunity structures that need to be examined along with overtly political structures and attributes such as political institutions and political ideology. Although “political opportunity structure” encompasses many things, it may still be analytically

superior to splicing the term into a variety of “opportunity structures” like “cultural opportunity structures,” “discursive opportunity structures,” “organizational opportunity structures,” and others (Opp 2009, 172). As in this study, perhaps one strategy is to identify and examine the elements in the political opportunity structure that limit or allow protest mobilization such as identity, troop visibility, and security threats, rather than delineate various “structures.” By only focusing on certain aspects of the political opportunity structure that one theorizes to matter for mobilization, one may avoid categorizing every exogenous factor as part of the political opportunity structure.

For policy makers, this is a cautionary tale about base siting decisions or any siting issue (e.g., nuclear power plants). “Mainland” communities are generally more amenable to hosting a military base, whether it belongs to a foreign military like the US or the domestic military. Conversely, anti-military protests are perhaps more likely in geographically peripheral areas, which often are historically in the political, social, and economic periphery as well. These communities, like Okinawa and Jeju, often have an identity that they perceive as distinct from their country’s national identity, in part because of this history. Therefore, many people in these communities are willing to bear the costs of hosting a military base in the name of “national security.” As discussed in this section, activists will also draw on this history of marginalization to mobilize protest against the base. Although these locations can be appealing for strategic reasons, policy makers should weigh the costs of potential mass protest with these benefits.

Making the Invisible Visible

A second key insight from the current study is that there are aspects of political opportunity structures that are themselves subject to framing. In this case, that aspect is what I term troop visibility. While there are real changes that happen in the political opportunity

structure (e.g., new bases being built, crimes happening, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers docking, etc.), it is up to activists to interpret and problematize these changes to mobilize the public. Conversely, the US and local governments can interpret these changes and either emphasize why they are positive developments or attempt to downplay them (as a sort of public image management in the cases of crimes). The cases in the study variously show how low visibility, high negative visibility, and high positive visibility encourage or discourage protest mobilization.

In this study, there are two conditions where troop visibility is relatively low. The first condition is in communities with long-standing bases and nothing happens to draw public attention to the bases, for either positive or negative reasons. This is the case most of the time in the host communities of Daegu and Yokosuka, whose bases date back to WWII and earlier. The second condition occurs when US troops use a host nation's base instead of their own permanent base, as is the case in the Philippines in the VFA era. In this instance, people are generally unaware of the US presence with some exceptions, discussed below. As discussed in Chapter 6, this low visibility is no accident (the US generally tries to downplay its presence) and is related to the Philippine government's framing of the US presence as "temporary." Additionally, the Jeju Naval Base's visibility has also dramatically decreased since the base's completion in 2016, even when US ships dock at the base. As I argue in Chapter 2, low visibility is problematic for activists because at a minimum, they may not be aware that there are US troops and hence, no problem in need of solving. Additionally, they may be vaguely aware that there are US troops, but "forget" about them as they do not stand out in their daily lives as a problem in need of a resolution. It is about, as one interviewee put it, "becom[ing] more numb to the bases" over time (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022).

High troop visibility can either be positive or negative. The US and the local government can raise the visibility of the troop presence for positive reasons, demonstrating to the public that the US is a “good neighbor.” In Daegu and Yokosuka, the US military presence becomes more visible to the public when the US and/or the local government draws attention to it vis-à-vis community-building activities such as teaching English in the community or base festivals. In the VFA era in the Philippines, the US has also engaged in a variety of community-building and humanitarian projects especially in Mindanao, drawing positive attention to its presence when it so chooses. Additionally, the US and host governments draw public attention to the US’s presence when it is assisting in unplanned situations such as disaster relief following Hurricane Yolanda’s destruction in the Philippines and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster in Japan.

Conversely, activists may try to bring negative attention to the US troop presence. Activists in Okinawa and Jeju problematized the construction projects in those communities, engaging in framing contests with their national governments and the US (in the case of Okinawa) over the necessity of the construction. In both instances, the construction was generally a case of high negative visibility as most citizens opposed the projects and, in their opinions, the way their national governments ignored local opinion. In the Philippines in the late 1980s and early 1990s, troop visibility was high and negative. In the preceding years, the People Power Movement had ousted President Ferdinand Marcos and as discussed in Chapter 6, many on the left linked Marcos’ longevity in office with the US’s support vis-à-vis the bases. Thus, the bases were already the focus of national discourse when the government adopted a new constitution which effectively outlawed foreign bases and when the US-Philippines Military Basing Agreement (MBA) was up for renewal.

Perhaps the most instructive cases, however, are the ones that show how changes in the troop presence can present opportunities for activists to draw negative public attention to the presence, heightening the US's visibility. The situation in Yokosuka, for example, is generally the same as in Daegu where the visibility of the base is generally low except for when the US engages in community-building activities. One exception, however, was the arrival of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers beginning in the mid-2000s. In these instances, especially around the first few visits, activists successfully drew negative public attention to the issue and the US base, suggesting that the carriers were unsafe and violated Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principles. As a result, anti-US-military activists in Yokosuka were able to mobilize many more people to protest than usual. Similarly, troop visibility in the Philippines in the VFA-era is generally low except when the US and/or Philippines government draws positive attention to the US presence. However, activists can draw negative attention to the US military in the wake of a crime attributable to US troops, such as the murder of Jennifer Laude, showing the public the negative consequences of hosting a US presence. While activists in both cases faced difficult political opportunity structures in part because of the low or high positive troop visibility, they successfully acted upon openings in the structure, drawing negative attention to the US presence and mobilizing the public.

The implication for policy makers is that downplaying the US troop presence is a double-edged sword. On one hand, low troop visibility makes it challenging for activists to mobilize the public against the military en masse, consistent with previous base politics studies (Gresh 2015; Bitar 2016). On the other hand, as Allen et al. (2022) argue, the US loses out on facilitating more positive public perceptions of its presence when it does not engage in community-building activities; in this case, "out of sight, out of mind" is not necessarily beneficial for the US.

However, Chapter 4's quantitative findings suggest that the impacts of community-building activities like base festivals on civilian-military relations, which make the US presence more visible, may be more modest. While they were associated with more positive opinions of the US-Japan security alliance and US troops in one's community, base festivals were associated with higher levels of anti-US-military activism among respondents predominantly living in mainland Japan. As discussed in Chapter 4, this may be because activists also use these instances of heightened visibility to problematize the US presence, protesting outside the gates of the festival and attempting to persuade attendees of the negative aspects of the bases. Additionally, base-related employment, a seemingly obvious manifestation of the economic benefit related to the US military presence, is not consistently related to positive opinions of the US military. These findings suggest that when people conceive of the US presence as a tangible entity (i.e., US troops in their community) instead of a more abstract security arrangement (i.e., the US-Japan security alliance), they are more likely to associate it with economic benefits like employment. Thus, as with activists' frames, it is the linkage between economic benefits and the US presence in one's community that facilitates positive local opinions.

Countering and Coalescing with Activists

The third finding is that we need to conceptualize base politics as an issue over which framing contests occur between activists and various other actors. Social movement scholars have traditionally conceptualized framing contests as taking place between two movements on different sides of a debate (for example, the pro-choice and pro-life reproductive movements). The current study shows, however, that framing contests and counter framing are not limited to social movements. Other actors, including the state, engage in contesting activists' frames by

providing the public with their own interpretations of a particular issue. I concur with Kim (2023) that the state is not merely a structure but rather an actor with its own preferences. In the case of anti-US-military activism, both host nation governments and the US government/military need to be understood as agents, not merely objects of framing. Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 2, “the state” itself needs to be analytically unpacked as it is not monolithic and different elements of “the state” may proffer different frames. In this study, the state was disaggregated both in terms of national vs. local governments and among national-level politicians. In the cases of Okinawa and, to some extent, Jeju, local governments’ frames contrasted starkly with those of their national governments, disagreeing with the Henoko expansion project and the Jeju Naval Base construction, respectively. In the Philippines in the late 1980s and 1990s, the national government was divided in terms of renewing the US’s basing access.

On a related note, host nation governmental support can be a huge boon to activists’ mobilization efforts. As the current study shows, host nation politicians do not always contest anti-US-military activists’ frames; in fact, they may proffer very similar frames, what I term frame synchronicity. This is a boost to activists’ efforts because it legitimizes their messages and provides yet another voice transmitting a similar message, perhaps reaching and persuading more would-be protesters. In Okinawa, local politicians, especially at the prefectural level, have played key roles in the All-Okinawa movement against the Henoko construction. In the Philippines, several senators ultimately adopted the frame that the US should not retain its basing access in the Philippines in the 1990s, despite President Cory Aquino’s pro-American counter-framing. This is not to suggest that every Okinawan politician is vocally against the Henoko construction, nor that every senator in the Philippines was against the US bases. Further, the Jeju case suggests that politicians’ support is not a necessary condition for protest mobilization, given that there

were many times when Jeju governors supported the base's construction, adopting similar framing as the national government. It also shows how fleeting political allyship can be; it is a boon while activists have it, but they should not count on it to last forever.

The insight that politicians can either counter or synchronize their frames to activists' frames likely pertains to other social movements as well, ranging from other localized not-in-my-backyard-(NIMBY) movements to national-level movements like anti-Free Trade Agreement (FTA) movements. While political allies generally helped the anti-US-military movements in this study, Kim (2023) points out that politicians have a variety of incentives for supporting these movements, ranging from opportunism to genuinely believing in the cause (12). This aspect raises the important question of when do political allies join hands with anti-US-military movements? While some may be among the first joiners, many likely begin supporting the cause after it becomes popular in an effort to appeal to voters. In this sense, while the support is useful for the movement, activists should not rely on politicians to get the movement "off the ground."

[“Neither a Monolith nor a Parrot:” The Role of the Media in Anti-US-Military Protest Mobilization](#)

In an article about anti-US-military movements, Vine (2019) catalogs at least 19 different types of actors involved in US base politics (170). Of these, the current study focused on four of the most important ones: the US military, host nation national politicians, host nation local politicians, and anti-US-military movements themselves. However, another important actor not directly addressed in this study is host nation media. As Kim (2017) notes, host nation media is “neither a monolith nor a parrot.” Media outlets vary widely in their coverage of base politics and may not be mere conduits of governments' or even activists' framing but rather proffer their

own interpretations of base-related issues (Kim 2017, 185). Furthermore, framing coalitions between activists' and the media can bolster activists' frames and perhaps garner broader public support; contests with media framing, however, can undermine activists' frames (Kim 2017, 313–17). While the media is somewhat accounted for in this study (*vis-à-vis* interviews with journalists and media reports), a more systematic analysis of the media's role in base politics will strengthen the next version of this study.

Beyond how the media frame base-related issues is their choice to report on these issues at all, which would likely impact protest mobilization. Several interviewees suggested that there are some issues, including crimes and even protests, that the media chooses not to report. One activist in Yokosuka, Japan said that the media did not cover a lot of crimes attributed to the US military (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, May 26, 2022). Another stated that the rape of Catherine Fisher, an Australian actress, by a US naval officer in Yokosuka received “very little media coverage” in Japan (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, July 19, 2019). Activists near Tokyo mentioned that the media did not cover the joint military exercises conducted by the US military and the SDF at a nearby SDF base (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, May 30, 2022). Jeju activists said that the media has stopped reporting on US ships docking at the Jeju Naval Base (Interview, Korean and American activists in Jeju, August 11, 2021). As mentioned in Chapter 5, a reporter in Daegu, South Korea relayed that they typically do not cover anti-US-military protests (Statement, Korean journalist in Daegu, June 14, 2022). Similarly, an activist in the Philippines said that anti-US-military protests in the VFA era are underreported in the media (Interview, Philippines activist, August 16, 2022). Therefore, incorporating the role of the media more systematically into the analysis in the future will provide a more complete picture of the causes of anti-US-military protest variation.

Improving Upon and Moving Beyond Protest Data

In this study, high and low levels of protest, the main dependent variable, are operationalized through protest counts and protester numbers (by province/prefecture in the South Korean and Japanese cases). This is undoubtedly a good starting point for understanding protest patterns, but there are ways to improve the measurement of the dependent variable in future iterations of this project. First, I plan to improve the protest data itself. As discussed in Chapter 1, none of the preexisting protest datasets, including ones focused on anti-US-military protests, fit this project. Thus, I constructed an original protest dataset relying primarily on newspaper sources. Another type of data that could be used in tandem with this data is protest permit data. For most protests in these countries, organizers must file a protest permit with local authorities, with some exceptions. In the Philippines, protest organizers do *not* need to file for permits if the protest takes place in a “freedom park” (like “free speech zones” in the US, a public square designated for protests) or on private property (where protesters would need to get the owner’s consent) (*Batas Pambansa Bilang 880...*, 1985). In Japan, organizers must identify where the protest is taking place, what the protest is about, and how many participants they anticipate (Shinomoto 2021). While theoretically such protests should be captured in the media, they may not, and thus this information could serve as a good way to cross-check the information from news reports. Additionally, many of the news reports do not contain any estimate of the number of protesters and this data would at least provide an idea of how many people organizers were predicting would attend, although it may differ from the actual numbers. And, as mentioned in the previous section, some interviewees have suggested that media outlets do not cover some protest events.

That said, street protests and sit-ins are only one form of protest, one that comes at a high “cost” for participants as, at a minimum, they must make the effort to physically show up for a cause (at a maximum, they may also risk violence or arrest). However, there are many forms of protest that require less effort from participants. As discussed in Chapter 3, individuals also participate in anti-US-military activism by signing petitions, the most common form of activism reported by Japanese and Okinawan survey respondents. Are there cases where activists focus their efforts more on, for example, gaining residents’ signatures versus trying to persuade them to participate in street protests? And when we take this form of protest into account, are protest patterns in these countries different? The cases of Yokosuka, Japan, and Daegu, South Korea suggest that, indeed, signature campaigns are important to consider to get a holistic view of host-community protest against the US military. Although there are generally fewer protests in these communities than others, activists have at times gone on signature drives in addition to organizing protests (Kim 2023, 75-78, 88-89). In Yokosuka, for example, when activists first worked to oppose the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in the 2000s, they held two signature campaigns in 2007 and 2008 to request the city to hold a referendum on the carriers, garnering 40,000 and 50,000 signatures, respectively (Kim 2023, 75–78). Therefore, this study will include petitions in future analyses to provide a more comprehensive understanding of anti-US-military protest.

Additional Cases

This study has relied primarily on the logic of paired case comparison to understand variation in anti-US-military movements, with variation on the dependent variable, anti-US-military protests. Across the three host nations, I have examined six cases: four focused on contention around permanent US bases and two around bases to which the US has access. To

strengthen the study, however, a future version would rely on multiple cases or data points in addition to collecting more data on some of the cases in the current study (including Daegu, Jeju, and Yokosuka). There are many host communities and bases across each of these countries, some of which are generally understudied, which would add more nuance in terms of the key independent variables, local history and identity, the visibility of the US presence, and the interaction between various actors' frames. More cases would also allow me to control for some potential causes of variation, such as different US military branches. In addition to US base host communities, I would also examine communities that host their own country's military bases, adding to the cases of the Jeju Naval Base and national-level anti-US-mobilization in the Philippines in the VFA era. This would help unpack how host nation public opinion towards its own military varies from opinion towards a foreign base, if at all, and disentangle anti-US-military activism from anti-militarization and peace movements. This examination is increasingly important as the US military conducts joint exercises with host nation militaries at their own bases and generally gains greater basing access at host nation bases, blurring the line between what is a "US base" and what is not. Several host communities and bases may be added to the future version of this project, which I highlight below:

Japan

First, Yokota AFB in Japan occupies land in at least six different host communities in Western Tokyo (Akishima, Fussa, Hamura, Mizuho, Musashimurayama, and Tachikawa), which adds an interesting layer of nuance. Do all of the local politicians in these communities have the same stances on the base? If not, how does variation in local politicians' stances impact anti-US-military activism? Yokota would also be a fruitful addition as it is an Air Force base, unlike any

base in the current study. One official based in Yokota, for example, mentioned that, in their opinion, one of the reasons that there was more opposition to the US military in Okinawa than in mainland host communities was that Marines “carry themselves differently” (Interview, US military official in Yokota, July 16, 2019). If host nation publics also perceive US service branches differently, that could also account for some protest variation. Additionally, Yokota partially occupies the town of Tachikawa, the site of one of the largest and most successful anti-US-military movements in Japan, the Sunagawa Struggle (Wright 2015). As discussed in the study, a history of activism can encourage future activism. While some protest against the US base does occur, it does not match the level of the Sunagawa Struggle. However, the US has deployed Osprey helicopters to Yokota and residents have protested them. In that sense, Yokota AFB and its host communities remain an important case to study in the future.

Another Japanese host community that I plan on adding to the study is that of Miyako Island, Okinawa. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the All-Okinawa Movement is primarily focused on stopping the construction in Henoko on Okinawa Prefecture’s mainland, Okinawa Island. However, the prefecture encompasses several smaller islands as well, including some close to the Taiwan Strait like Miyako Island. Since 2019, the Japanese government has been constructing a SDF munitions facility on the island (what activists term a “missile base”), the target of local protest (*Ryukyu Shimpō* 2019; *Okinawa Times* 2021). This movement and Miyako more broadly would add interesting nuance to the study. First, it is ostensibly an SDF base, not a US one, which is different from the other Japanese bases in the study. Second, there are interesting inter-Okinawan dynamics at play that may impact protest mobilization. Miyako Island, like many of the other outlying islands in Okinawa Prefecture, was in the political periphery vis-à-vis Okinawa Island when the prefecture was the Ryukyu Kingdom. (Okinawa

Island was the seat of power in the Ryukyu Kingdom). One interviewee, a third-generation Okinawan, mentioned that Miyako Island residents are subjected to “inter-Okinawan” discrimination in part because prisoners used to be sent from Okinawa Island to Miyako Island (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, June 28, 2022). Thus, the Japanese national government has historically marginalized Okinawa Prefecture while Okinawa Island has historically marginalized outlying islands within the prefecture like Miyako. It is unclear how much assistance All-Okinawa Movement activists or politicians would assist this movement, or how much help Miyako protesters would accept. On one hand, some prominent Okinawan activists have travelled to Miyako to sit in solidarity with the protesters; for example, I was not able to interview one All-Okinawa Movement activist when I was on Okinawa Island as they had travelled to Miyako Island to join the protest. At the same time, the All-Okinawa Movement’s singular focus on the Henoko construction may prevent it from devoting significant resources to supporting other causes and, more practically, one can only travel to Miyako by plane, making it more difficult for would-be protesters from the Okinawan mainland to participate (“Miyako Island” n.d.). This movement will be an important one to watch in the coming years, especially as tensions rise in the nearby Taiwan Strait.

South Korea

Turning next to potential South Korean cases for the future version of this study, another important South Korean base community is that of Pyeongtaek. Although many scholars have studied the movement in the mid-2000s against the expansion of USAG Camp Humphreys, there are still important insights that this case can offer, especially in comparison with other communities and anti-US-military movements. One of the frames that activists used drew upon a traumatic event in Korean history: the Kwangju Massacre or Kwangju Uprising in 1980 (denoted

in Korea as 5.18). A pro-democracy protest in Kwangju ended with the Korean government sending in troops, which ultimately resulted in the deaths of 200 to 2,000 (H. Choi 1991, 176). As discussed in Chapter 5, this was a critical juncture for the pro-democracy movement and an episode sparked anti-US sentiment because of the US's involvement. Anti-US-military activists opposing the expansion of Camp Humphreys invoked this event to problematize the Korean government forcibly removing protesters from the land on which the base was to be expanded, including many local farmers (Fisher 2006). Father Mun Jeong-Hyeon, a prominent Korean peace activist, stated that "the public would see military action as a reminder of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising in which government troops killed a large number of pro-democracy protesters" (Fisher 2006). This sort of framing is similar to the 4.3 framing that activists in Jeju used less than ten years later. It suggests that this strategy of historical framing and problematizing police action against protesters may be part of a Korean contentious repertoire that diffuses to different sites and is locally adapted. For example, Jeju residents undoubtedly also understand the significance of 5.18, but 4.3 would likely resonate more with locals.

Another parallel that the Pyeongtaek movement has with the Jeju movement is that activists from national-level organizations moved to Pyeongtaek to join the movement. While some studies have mentioned that activists moved to Pyeongtaek to join with local protesters, they have not adequately explored this tactic (Yeo 2010; Kim 2017). When did it originate? What is the rationale? When do organizations deploy it? And how do individual activists decide for which movements they wish to relocate? This tactic indeed bears a high "cost" for those who do it as it requires them to uproot their lives to participate in a movement, living in another community for seemingly months or years. Thus, there is still more that the Pyeongtaek case has to contribute to our understanding of anti-US-military activism.

One other South Korean community that I may add to the study is Changwon, a coastal city in South Gyeongsang Province, hosts CFA Chinhae (Jinhae), the US's only naval installation in South Korea. Changwon shares some similarities with Daegu: there have not been a lot of anti-US-military protests and the region is generally conservative.

The Philippines

The episodes of contention in the Philippines in the current study are unique in that they are, according to some activists, two phases of the same national-level movement. Unlike the Japanese and Korean cases in the study, the Philippines cases do not explore subnational variation. The future version of the study will include subnational cases as well. One key case is the host community of Olongapo, Zambales province, the former home of Naval Base Subic Bay, the last permanent US base in the Philippines. As discussed in Chapter 6, national-level anti-US-military movements were partially responsible for Subic's closure as activists successfully campaigned the Philippines Senate to vote to close the base. However, some accounts suggest that, although there were anti-US-military activists and groups in Olongapo, the city generally *wanted* the base to stay open. Olongapo's mayor, Richard (Dick) Gordon (later a senator), was a vocal proponent of the US military presence, at times clashing with anti-US-military activists. One activist based in Olongapo, for example, recounted how the mayor labelled their organization "communist" to delegitimize the group and blocked outsiders from coming to Olongapo to protest Subic in 1989 (Interview, Philippines activist, February 26, 2019). Anecdotal evidence also suggests Olongapo residents were more in favor of maintaining the US military presence (which was eventually reduced to only the Subic base) than Filipinos in general (Hutchcroft 1982, 37; Interview, Philippines activist, February 26, 2019). In this sense, the

Olongapo case is similar to the town of Manta, Ecuador that Fitz-Henry (2015) details, where local opinion was in favor of maintaining the base (the only US base in Ecuador) but anti-US-military activists received support from national-level activists and eventually President Rafael Correa, leading to the base's closure. In both cases, the lack of local support ultimately did not matter as local anti-US-military activists had national-level allies. Additionally, while the movement against the naval base in Jeju benefitted from local opposition to the base, it was like the anti-US-military movement in Olongapo in that the connection to outside activists boosted the movement, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Another case that I will include in the future is the case of Zamboanga City on the southern island of Mindanao. After the US and the Philippines governments signed the VFA (detailed in Chapter 6) and the US's War on Terror started, the US deployed troops to Zamboanga City and other towns in the region for joint-military exercises (Tadem 2020). While the US does not have its own bases, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) allowed it to create camps within AFP bases in Zamboanga (Tadem 2020). In some sense, if there were anti-US-military protests in the VFA era, they should be in places like Zamboanga City where the US military was located. However, there were few anti-US-military protests here even after US troops began coming to the city. Why did Zamboanga residents not oppose the US presence and, at times, actively oppose anti-US-military activist?

While I need to collect more data about this case, there are some preliminary answers consistent with the theory in the current study. First, the region of Mindanao in general has been marginalized vis-à-vis the Philippines central government and as in Okinawa and Jeju, its relationship with the national government and the Filipino nation is generally poor. At the same time, Mindanao has a better relationship with the US, arguably, than its own government, a stark

contrast with Okinawa and Jeju who have historically had a poor relationship with the US. One interviewee, a scholar from Zamboanga, said that Mindanao would rather be part of the US than be administered by the Philippines central government and “trusts the US more than Manila” (Interview, Philippines scholar, November 19, 2020). Perhaps a manifestation of this trust was the US’s involvement in the peace negotiations between the Philippines central government and a major rebel group based in Mindanao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in the early 2000s— at the behest of the MILF (Interview, Philippines scholar, October 27, 2020; Interview, Philippines scholar, November 19, 2020).

Moreover, anti-US-military activism was generally not well-received in Zamboanga and Mindanao more broadly. In one instance, Zamboanga residents attacked anti-US-military activists from Manila who came to the city to protest the US military presence (*Agence France Presse* 2002). In addition to Mindanao citizens’ support for the US, activists were not successful in mobilizing opposition because their frames did not resonate in Mindanao. As discussed in Chapter 6, activists continued to problematize the US military presence as a violation of Filipino sovereignty. The problem in Mindanao is precisely that it has historically been at the political, social, and economy periphery in the Philippines, not really a part of the Filipino “nation” (Abinales 2004, 2). Thus, activists’ appeals to gain Filipino “independence” from the US by abrogating the VFA do not resonate in Mindanao as Mindanao residents do not see themselves as part of the Filipino identity. Finally, even though the US military presence in the early 2000s was primarily in Mindanao, it was mostly invisible (Interview, Philippines scholar, November 19, 2020; Interview, US servicemember in the Philippines, January 29, 2021). However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the US military did at times engage in community-building activities, making its presence more visible but positive. The US presence also became more visible and positive after

it assisted the AFP in freeing Zamboanga City from the Moro National Liberation Front's (MNLF) siege of the city in 2013 (Interview, US servicemember in the Philippines, January 29, 2021). Thus, although more data is needed, Zamboanga City will be an interesting addition to the study.

A final case that will likely be added to the study is the case of Cagayan province, one of the northernmost provinces in the Philippines. As discussed in Chapter 6, the US and the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2014, which officially granted the US access to five AFP bases. In light of the escalating tensions with China in recent years, the Philippines agreed to grant the US access to four more bases in 2023, including two in Cagayan province ("New EDCA Sites Named in the Philippines" n.d.). Based on the theory in the current study, we would expect protests to occur over such an announcement because it is a time when the public will be more aware of the (future) US military presence and provides an opportunity for activists to problematize the presence, despite a generally unfavorable political opportunity structure. Protests against the EDCA designation have started happening in Cagayan, some drawing as many as 7,000 people (Palatino 2023). Furthermore, as in Okinawa, the governor of Cagayan has publicly voiced his opposition to the US presence, expressing concern over "jeopardizing Chinese investment and becoming a target in a conflict over Taiwan" (*Al Jazeera* 2023). Another parallel that this case has with Okinawa is the conflict between the governor's position and that of the central government. This case will be an important one to include in the study as it continues to unfold.

How local is “local”? Local, National, and Transnational Linkages

To understand variation in anti-US-military protest mobilization, an examination of activists, public sentiment, and politicians at the local level is undoubtedly important. However, in an increasingly interconnected world, one needs to also understand local connections to national and even transnational actors. In virtually every interview with activists, interviewees mentioned either learning from another movement or even visiting one. Many activists mentioned exchanging ideas with activists from other places, typically other communities in their own country or other countries including the three in the current study. For example, an activist in Yokosuka mentioned that PFAs (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances) were recently discovered in their water from CFA Yokosuka (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022). They had started collaborating with Okinawan activists about this issue, given their experienced protesting US base-related PFAs contamination in Okinawa (Interview, Japanese activist in Yokosuka, November 18, 2022). An Okinawan activist said that their group, who protested the construction of US helipads elsewhere in Okinawa, learned about holding sit-ins from the activists protesting the Henoko construction, the focus of the All-Okinawa Movement (Interview, Okinawan activist, December 5, 2022). A Korean activist involved with the Pyeongtaek movement described earlier in this chapter also recalled learning from the Okinawan activists in Henoko (Interview, Korean activist in Pyeongtaek, April 24, 2023). Additionally, a key activist in the Philippines who participated in the Anti-Treaty Movement mentioned that activists from other countries often ask them for advice about ousting the US military, given their movement’s success in doing so (Interview, Philippines activist, February 19, 2019). While these are not the only examples of interviewees who reported learning from

other movements, they paint a picture of the types of information activists exchange with each other and how tactics diffuse from one location to another.

Beyond exchanging ideas, many respondents also mentioned visiting other anti-US-military movements or even joining protests. Some activists, like one Japanese interviewee, live in one place (like Tokyo) and participate in a movement in another location (Okinawa) (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, May 13, 2022). One activist from the Philippines mentioned visiting Jeju in solidarity with the movement against the naval base and spoke about how inspired they felt by the Jeju activists (Interview, Philippines activist, February 19, 2019). Additionally, national organizations (typically based in a country's capital city) either start local chapters or encourage members to join local movements. For example, the Japan Peace Committee (J-Peace), one of the national-level organizations in Japan that engage in anti-US-military activism, encourages its members to open local chapters (one such chapter is the Kanagawa Peace Committee) (Interview, Japanese activist in Tokyo, June 30, 2022). Additionally, the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and Green Korea United (GKU), two Korean organizations that participate in anti-US-military activism, also has local chapters including in Daegu and Jeju (Interview, Korean activist in Seoul, September 7, 2021; Interview, Korean activist in Seoul, April 20, 2023). One Korean activist even mentioned that the PSPD asked members to go to Jeju and live there in solidarity with the movement against the naval base (Interview, Korean activist in Seoul, September 7, 2021). As mentioned previously, activists also moved to Pyeongtaek in the mid-2000s to support the movement against Camp Humphreys as well (Interview, Korean activist in Pyeongtaek, April 24, 2023). Outsiders' protest participation is important to consider both in terms of assessing protester numbers and the relationship between a movement and the local government. In the Pyeongtaek

and Jeju movements, for example, both the local and national governments at times characterized protesters as “outside agitators,” undermining their credibility with the public (Y. S. Lee and Ju 2016).

While some studies in the base politics literature have touched upon or, in rare cases, directly examined the impact of linkages between local, national, and/or transnational activism, our understanding of these linkages remains incomplete. Kim’s (2023) recent study, for example, explores protest variation across US military host communities, with a focus on various local actors. In her consideration of anti-US-military activism, however, she understates the influence of national and transnational activists on local activism against specific US bases. Kim does concede, that “what constitutes ‘local,’ though, can be ambiguous at times,” noting the presence of outside protesters in the movement against the Camp Humphreys expansion in Pyeongtaek, South Korea (2023, 19). However, the author does not address the impact of these protesters on local activism in terms of their influence on activist strategy (including framing) or their presence at demonstrations, which is especially important to consider if one measures protest levels by the number of participants as Kim (2023) does. Yeo’s (2006) and Fitz-Henry’s (2015) studies perhaps go the furthest in showing how local-national linkages can assist and change an anti-US-military movement as well as the risks of these linkages, such as possibly alienating locals. However, even these accounts leave unanswered questions about strategy. When do local movements decide to reach out to national organizations and when do national organizations offer to help? How do they decide what kind of assistance to offer? At an individual level, why do people decide to participate in protests about or even in a community outside of their own? Local-national-transnational linkages are important to understand regardless of what level of

activism one is examining, and it is an area in need of further research in base politics and anti-militarization movements more broadly.

Conclusion: Insurmountable Obstacles for Anti-US-Military Movement Success?

Of the episodes of contention addressed in this study, only one of them, the Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has been successful in achieving their goals of changing the US's basing access (and, in the case of Jeju, host nation basing access as well). Even in this case, the US military returned to the Philippines less than ten years later vis-à-vis the VFA. Two other movements, the All-Okinawa Movement (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) and the movement against the Jeju Naval Base (Chapter 5), achieved relatively high levels of protest mobilization, but have not ostensibly met their goals. In both cases, activists delayed base-related construction projects, at times even temporarily stopping them. Ultimately, however, their local governments have acquiesced to pressure from the national government to continue the projects. In Jeju, the Jeju government granted the Korean government permission early on to build the naval base in Gangjeong Village. One governor, Keun-Min Woo, requested that the Korean government stop the construction in 2011, at the height of the protests, as the provincial government believed that the Korean government's design was flawed (Gwon 2013, 258). Ultimately, however, the Korean government modified their design and continued with the construction – with the consent of the Jeju government (Gwon 2013, 258). Although activists gained a potential ally in Governor Woo, who prioritized compromise on the naval base issue, he too ultimately went along with the Korean government's plans. While protests against the naval base continue, the movement largely demobilized when the base was completed.

In Okinawa, prefectural governors have at times taken a stand against the central government, most notably Masahide Ota, Takeshi Onaga, and Denny Tamaki. As discussed in Chapter 4, these politicians were indispensable allies to anti-US-military activists in Okinawa. However, Okinawans have not always elected governors who are wary of the US military presence, even in more recent years. Most significantly, Okinawans elected LDP-backed Hirokazu Nakaima in 2006 and again in 2010, when he defeated prominent anti-base politician, Yoichi Iha (Johnston 2010). Nakaima is notorious among opponents of the Henoko relocation plan for granting the Japanese and US governments permission to build part of the base in Oura Bay (Yoshikawa 2017, 8). Although his successors, Onaga and Tamaki, have tried to revoke the permit, Japanese courts have ultimately ruled that Nakaima's approval stands and that the construction is legal (Yoshikawa 2017, 8; McCormack and Norimatsu 2018, 280–86). This case shows when activists' opponents come to power, they can create significant obstacles and long-lasting damage to activists' goals, even after they leave office. Although Okinawans have elected the last two governors on the platform of opposing the Henoko construction, it may be a matter of time before voters grow tired of anti-base politicians' inability to deliver on these promises. If and when that happens, Okinawan activists will be deprived of a significant ally.

What is striking and perhaps more disturbing for anti-US-military activists is that in each country, there are cases where the heads of state held views favorable to activists' causes. Although these instances appeared to be optimal for anti-US-military movements, ultimately nothing changed. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Okinawan movement against the Henoko construction seemingly gained an important ally when Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was elected to office in 2009. However, he ultimately could not deliver on his promise to stop the construction and relocate MCAS Futenma outside of the prefecture, costing him his job (Kim

2017, 184). President Rodrigo Duterte was, in one sense, a boon for the anti-US-military cause in the Philippines given his desire for the country to be more independent from the US and, in 2020, his threat to abrogate the VFA (which never materialized) (Yeo 2020). (At the same time, Duterte was never a “friend” to civil society or the media in the Philippines due to his repressive “war on drugs,” which resulted in many extrajudicial killings (Conde 2020)). In South Korea, President Moon Jae-In vocally criticized South Korea’s agreement with the US to install THAAD systems during his presidential campaign (B. Martin 2017, 1). After he came into power in 2017, however, he quickly changed his position and agreed to abide by the countries’ THAAD agreement (B. Martin 2017, 1).

In all three cases, the US exerted significant pressure on these leaders to maintain the US’s basing access and previous bilateral agreements. Additionally, leaders faced pressure from within their own governments and even military to take a less hostile stance towards the US. These cases show that, even when anti-US-military activists have friends in high places, it is difficult for these movements to meet their goals. However, the appearance or perhaps illusion of a key ally seems to benefit these movements in terms of protest mobilization, providing an initial feeling of hope that they will be successful and, when these leaders ultimately fail to change the status of the US military in their countries, a catalyzing feeling of outrage. After all, these events, such as Hatoyama’s inability to alter the Henoko construction plan in Okinawa, are examples of the “moral shocks” discussed in Chapter 3, and activists can channel public outrage into action (Jasper 1998, 410). In locally based movements like the All-Okinawa Movement, such moral shocks serve as yet another reminder that the central government cannot be trusted.

Overall, it seems that anti-US-military movement successes in terms of meeting their goals are the exception, not the rule. International and domestic developments suggest that

activists in the three countries will face an increasingly difficult political opportunity structure in which to make their claims. The security environment in East and Southeast Asia becomes ever more tense over anxieties about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, potential clashes with China over Taiwan and various maritime claims, and North Korea's continued provocative behavior. Domestically, the electorates in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines have all voted conservative, pro-US candidates into office (Fumio Kishida, Yoon Suk Yeol, and Ferdinand "Bongbong" Romualdez Marcos, Jr., respectively). Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 1, the public in all three countries generally have favorable views of the US military in their country. Furthermore, in Japan, many activists expressed concern over the possibility of the government revising Article 9 and formally recognizing the SDF as Japan's military force (offensive and defensive) (Interviews, Japanese activists in Tokyo, June 4, 2022; June 17, 2022; June 30, 2022). The Philippines, as mentioned in the previous section, concluded an agreement with the US to extend the US's basing access from four to nine AFP bases under EDCA, considering rising tensions with China in the West Philippines Sea. However, the Philippines also perhaps offers a glimmer of hope for anti-US-military activists. As mentioned, at least one community – the province of Cagayan – has, with the support of its governor, begun protesting the future US military presence in two of its AFP bases (Palatino 2023). This shows that even in contexts that are generally unfavorable for activists, they can mobilize the public – if they choose the right framing at the right time.

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Appendix 1: Survey and Interview Details




Figure A1.1: Survey Respondents' Characteristics in Reference to the Japanese Population (National Survey)

Survey Instrument (Japanese national sample)

Below is the survey instrument used in the quantitative analyses in Chapters 3 and 4, translated into English for clarity. Note that this survey is identical to the Okinawa survey except that the Okinawa survey asks for respondents' town of residence, rather than prefecture. Please note that question 13 is a survey experiment not used in this dissertation.

Group: Embedded data and web services

Embedded Data

Q_BallotBoxStuffingValue will be set from Panel or URL.

Q_RecaptchaScoreValue will be set from Panel or URL.

rid Value will be set from Panel or URL.

pidValue will be set from Panel or URL.

SUPPLIER_IDValue will be set from Panel or URL.

SUPNAMEValue will be set from Panel or URL.

WebService: GET - https://horiuchi.org/php/hht2_f35.php - Fire and Forget

Block: Introduction (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch

If

If choose one of the following choices: If you select "I do not agree to participate", the survey will end immediately. ... I do not agree to participate is selected.

End Survey: Advanced

Group: Attitudes toward the US and Japan

Standard: Attitudes toward US and China - Intro (1 Question)

Block Randomizer: 2 -

Standard: Attitudes toward US government and people (2 Questions)

Standard: Attitudes toward the Chinese government and people (2 Questions)

Standard: Attitudes toward US presence in Japan (2 Questions)

Group: Standard questions about political attitudes

Standard: Political attitudes - Intro (1 Question)

Standard: Political attitudes - policy support and trust (3 Questions)

Standard: Interest in politics (1 Question)

Block Randomizer: 2 -

Standard: Political attitudes - partisanship (3 Questions)

Standard: Political attitudes - ideology (1 Question)

Standard: Political attitudes - turnout (1 Question)

Group: Basic demographics

Standard: Basic demographics (6 Questions)

Standard: Conjoint Analysis (21 Questions)
Group: US-Japan relations and US-base issues
Standard: US-Japan relations and US-base issues - intro (1 Question)
Block Randomizer: 1 - Evenly Present Elements
Group: Framing experiment - control
Embedded Data frame = control
Group: Framing experiment - COVID19
Standard: COVID19 (4 Questions)
Embedded Data frame = covid19
Group: Framing experiment - historical statement
Block Randomizer: 1 - Evenly Present Elements
Embedded Data opinion = by the Japan government at the time of the return of Okinawa Embedded Data opinion = When the United States was under control of Okinawa after World War II, by the U.S. military Embedded Data opinion = During the so-called Battle of Okinawa during World War II, by the Japan government
Standard: Historical statement (4 Questions)
Embedded Data frame = historical statement
Group: Outcome questions
Block Randomizer: 2 -
Standard: The Okinawa Survey (1 Question) Standard: The NHK Survey and the Okinawa Survey (1 Question)
Standard: Another question on Okinawa (1 Question)
Block Randomizer: 2 -

Standard: US bases - Question 1 (1 Question)
Standard: US bases - Question 2 (1 Question)

Standard: Final open-ended question (1 Question)

Group: Debriefing

Branch: New Branch

If

If frame Is Equal to covid19

Standard: Debriefing - treated (2 Questions)

Branch: New Branch

If

If frame Is Not Equal to covid19

Standard: Debriefing - control (2 Questions)

End Survey: Advanced

Page Break

Start of Block: Introduction

Q1.1 This survey is a public opinion survey on security conducted jointly by researchers from Dartmouth University, the State University of New York at Albany, and Waseda University. The results of this survey are reported through research institutes, academic societies, academic journals, and other publications, but no personally identifiable information is recorded or made public. Data is stored indefinitely in a secure state under the control of a computer system. However, please understand that any online work cannot completely eliminate the risk of being accessed by others.

Participation in this survey is voluntary and may be discontinued at any time in the middle of responding. The survey takes approximately 10 minutes.

If you have any questions, please email yusaku.horiuchi@dartmouth.edu, cwillis@albany.edu or tago@waseda.jp.



Q1.2 Please choose one of the following choices: If you select "I do not agree to participate", the survey will end immediately.

- ☐ I agree to participate (1)
- ☐ I do not agree to participate (2)

Page Break

End of Block: Introduction

Start of Block: Attitudes toward US and China - Intro

Q2.1 First of all, I would like to ask for your opinion on the relationship between Japan and other countries.

Page Break



Q3.1 What do you think of the U.S. government in general?

- ☐ Very positive (1)
 - ☐ Somewhat positive (2)
 - ☐ Neither (3)
 - ☐ Somewhat negative (4)
 - ☐ Very negative (5)
 - ☐ I don't know/don't want to answer (6)
-



Q3.2 What do you think of Americans in general?

- ☐ Very positive (1)
 - ☐ Somewhat positive (2)
 - ☐ Neither (3)
 - ☐ Somewhat negative (4)
 - ☐ Very negative (5)
 - ☐ I don't know/don't want to answer (6)
-

End of Block: Attitudes toward US government and people

Start of Block: Attitudes toward the Chinese government and people



Q4.1 What do you think of the Chinese government in general?

- ☐ Very positive (1)
 - ☐ Somewhat positive (2)
 - ☐ Neither (3)
 - ☐ Somewhat negative (4)
 - ☐ Very negative (5)
 - ☐ I don't know/don't want to answer (6)
-



Q4.2 What do you think about the Chinese people in general?

- ☐ Very positive (1)
- ☐ Somewhat positive (2)
- ☐ Neither (3)
- ☐ Somewhat negative (4)
- ☐ Very negative (5)
- ☐ I don't know/don't want to answer (6)

End of Block: Attitudes toward the Chinese government and people

Start of Block: Attitudes toward US presence in Japan



Q5.1 Generally speaking, how do you feel about the presence of U.S. troops in Japan?

- ☐ Very positive (1)
 - ☐ Somewhat positive (2)
 - ☐ Neither (3)
 - ☐ Somewhat negative (4)
 - ☐ Very negative (5)
 - ☐ I don't know/don't want to answer (6)
-



Q5.2 What impact do you think the presence of U.S. troops will have on the area where you live?

- ☐ Very Positive Impact (1)
 - ☐ Somewhat positive impact (2)
 - ☐ Neither (3)
 - ☐ Slightly Negative Impact (4)
 - ☐ Very Negative Impact (5)
 - ☐ I don't know/don't want to answer (6)
-

End of Block: Attitudes toward US presence in Japan

Start of Block: Political attitudes - Intro

Q6.1 Next, I would like to ask for your opinion on the society and politics of Japan.

Page Break



Q7.1 How satisfied are you with your current lifestyle?

- ☐ Pretty happy (1)
- ☐ Somewhat satisfied (2)
- ☐ Neither (3)
- ☐ Somewhat dissatisfied (4)
- ☐ Quite dissatisfied (5)

Page Break



Q7.2 How would you compare your current lifestyle to that of one year ago? Which of these is it?

- ☐ Got a lot better (1)
- ☐ Slightly better (2)
- ☐ Unchanged (3)
- ☐ Slightly worse (4)
- ☐ Got Pretty Bad (5)

Page Break



Q7.3 How much confidence can you trust in the following: Please answer all questions.

	Pretty Reliable (1)	Can be somewhat trusted (2)	Not very reliable (3)	Almost Unreliable (4)
Political parties (Q4.1_1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Self-Defense Forces (Q4.1_2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Diet (Q4.1_3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Government and other government agencies (Q4.1_4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mass Media (Q4.1_5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Page Break

End of Block: Political attitudes - policy support and trust

Start of Block: Interest in politics



Q8.1 With or without elections, some people are always interested in politics, and some people are not so interested. How much attention do you pay to political events?

- ☐ Always paying attention (1)
- ☐ Pay attention sometimes (2)
- ☐ Paying attention once in a while (3)
- ☐ Not at all careful (4)

Page Break



Q9.1 Regardless of which party you will vote for in the upcoming elections, which party do you usually support?

- ☐ Liberal Democratic Party (1)
- ☐ New Komeito (2)
- ☐ Constitutional Democratic Party (3)
- ☐ National Democratic Party (4)
- ☐ Japan Communist Party (5)
- ☐ Japan Restoration Society (6)
- ☐ Other (7)
- ☐ No political party supports (8)

Display This Question:

If Q9.1 != 8



Q9.2 Are you an ardent supporter of the political party you support, or are you not a very ardent supporter?

- ☐ Ardent Advocate (1)
- ☐ Less Ardent Advocate (2)

Page Break

Display This Question:

If Q9.1 = 8



Q9.3 Which political party do you think is the most preferable?

- ☐ Liberal Democratic Party (1)
- ☐ New Komeito (2)
- ☐ Constitutional Democratic Party (3)
- ☐ National Democratic Party (4)
- ☐ Japan Communist Party (5)
- ☐ Japan Restoration Society (6)
- ☐ Other (7)

Page Break



Q10.1 Regarding politics, we sometimes use the terms "left-leaning (innovation)" and "right-leaning (conservative)." Where do you think you are?

- ☐ Most "left" (1)
- ☐ "Left" (2)
- ☐ Slightly "left" (3)
- ☐ Middle Way (4)
- ☐ Slightly "right" (5)
- ☐ "Right" (6)
- ☐ Most "Right" (7)

End of Block: Political attitudes - ideology

Start of Block: Political attitudes - turnout



Q11.1 It is not uncommon for people to not be able to go to the polls because they are not feeling well or because they do not have enough time. How many elections have you been to since you got the right to vote?

- ☐ Voted in all elections (1)
- ☐ Most voted in elections (2)
- ☐ Voted in several elections (3)
- ☐ Rarely voted (4)

Page Break

End of Block: Political attitudes - turnout

Start of Block: Basic demographics

Q12.1 Please answer some questions about yourself.

Page Break



Q12.2 Please tell us your gender.

☐ Man (1)

☐ Woman (2)

Page Break



Q12.3 What is your age? Please enter a number.

Page Break



Q12.4 Which school did you last graduate from? Do not include various schools, but if you are a dropout or are currently in school, please consider it as graduation (for example, if you are enrolled in a university, please select a university).

- ☐ Elementary and Junior High School (1)
- ☐ High School and Old Junior High School (2)
- ☐ College (3)
- ☐ Junior College and College of Technology (4)
- ☐ Universities and Graduate School (5)

Page Break



Q12.5 Where do you currently live? Please select the name of the state or province where you live.

▼ Hokkaido (1) ... Overseas (48)

Page Break



Q12.6 What is the approximate household income of you and your family during the past year?
Please answer with annual income (tax included) including bonuses and extra income.

- ☐ 0.00K to 1.99K (1)
- ☐ \$ 2,000-3.99K (2)
- ☐ \$ 4.00-5.99K (3)
- ☐ \$ 6.00-7.99K (4)
- ☐ \$ 8.00-9.99K (5)
- ☐ \$ 10.00-11.99K (6)
- ☐ \$ 12.00-13.99K (7)
- ☐ Over 14 million yen (8)

Page Break

End of Block: Basic demographics

Start of Block: Conjoint Analysis

Q13.1 Next, I would like to ask about specific issues related to security.

Page Break

Q13.2 Japan has deployed the latest fighter jets as one of the pillars of its security policy. For example, the F-35 is a state-of-the-art fighter that was decided to be introduced as a successor to the F-4 fighter jet, and deployment began in FY2017. In addition to its high stealth performance, the F-35 has a system that has evolved significantly from conventional fighters and is a fighter that is expected to contribute greatly to the defense of Japan and to the peace of the region.

The U.S. military has also assumed that this fighter jet will be the main air weapon and has been promoting the actual deployment of this fighter jet for the security of the East Asian region. The U.S. Forces in Japan are also promoting additional deployments of the F-35 as the "keystone" of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

However, the specific deployment location of these fighter jets has been opposed by citizens, and it has not been decided which base to deploy them to.

Q13.3

Q13.4

Source: U.S. Department of Defense Photo: Senior Airman Alexander Cook

Page Break

Q13.5 Over the next few minutes, I would like to present several proposed plans for the deployment of F-35 fighter jets in Japan country. These proposed plans are based on proposals being considered by the Japan government, but they are not necessarily the same as the actual plans.

From the next screen, a similar table will be presented eight times. The proposed plans on each table are not the same. Please check each table carefully.

Page Break

Q13.6 [Case 1]

Hypothetically, suppose that the following two proposals have been proposed for the new deployment of F-35 fighter jets. Which plan do you support better? Even if you can't say for sure which one you support, choose one or the other, or dare I say which you support.

Plan Plan **A** Plan Plan **B** $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-1\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-1-1\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-2-1\}$ $\$ \{e://Field /A-1-2\}$
 $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-1-2\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-2-2\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-3\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-1-3\}$ $\$ \{ e://Field/A-1-2-3\}$
 $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-4\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-1-4\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-2-4\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-5\}$ $\$ \{ e://Field/A-1-1-5\}$
 $\$ \{e://Field/A-1-2-5\}$



Q13.7

Which do you support?

☐ Plan A (1)

☐ Plan B (2)

Page Break

Q13.8 [Case 2]

Hypothetically, suppose that the following two proposals have been proposed for the new deployment of F-35 fighter jets. Which plan do you support better? Even if you can't say for sure which one you support, choose one or the other, or dare I say which you support. Plan

Plan A Plan **Plan B** $\{e://Field/A-2-1\} \{e://Field/A-2-1-1\} \{e://Field/A-2-2-1\} \{e://Field/A-2-2\}$
 $\{e://Field/A-2-1-2\} \{e://Field/A-2-2-2\} \{e://Field/A-2-3\} \{e://Field/A-2-1-3\} \{e://Field/A-2-2-3\}$
 $\{e://Field/A-2-4\} \{e://Field/A-2-1-4\} \{e://Field/A-2-2-4\} \{e://Field/A-2-5\} \{e://Field/A-2-1-5\}$
 $\{e://Field/A-2-2-5\}$



Q13.9

Which do you support?

☐ Plan A (1)

☐ Plan B (2)

Page Break

Q13.10 [Case 3]

Hypothetically, it is assumed that the following two proposals have been proposed for the new deployment of F-35 fighter jets. Which plan do you support better? Even if you can't say for sure which one you support, choose one or the other, or dare I say which you support. Plan

Proposal A Plan Plan B $\{e://Field/A-3-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-1-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-2-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-1-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-2-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-1-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-2-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-1-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-2-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-5\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-1-5\}$ $\{e://Field/A-3-2-5\}$



Q13.11

Which do you support?

☐ Plan A (1)

☐ Plan B (2)

Page Break

Q13.12 [Case 4]

Hypothetically, it is assumed that the following two proposals have been proposed for the new deployment of F-35 fighter jets. Which plan do you support better? Even if you can't say for sure which one you support, choose one or the other, or dare I say which you support. Plan

Proposal A Plan **Plan B** $\{e://Field/A-4-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-1-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-2-1\}$ $\{e://Field /A-4-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-1-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-2-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-1-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-2-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-1-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-2-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-5\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-1-5\}$ $\{e://Field/A-4-2-5\}$



Q13.13

Which do you support?

☐ Plan A (1)

☐ Plan B (2)

Page Break

Q13.14 [Case 5] Suppose that the

following two proposals have been proposed for the new deployment of F-35 fighter jets. Which plan do you support better? Even if you can't say for sure which one you support, choose one or the other, or dare I say which you support. Plan Plan

A Plan **Plan B** $\{e://Field/A-5-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-1-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-2-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-2\}$
 $\{e://Field/A-5-1-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-2-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-1-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-2-3\}$
 $\{e://Field/A-5-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-1-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-2-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-5\}$ $\{e://Field/A-5-1-5\}$
 $\{e://Field/A-5-2-5\}$



Q13.15

Which do you support?

☐ Plan A (1)

☐ Plan B (2)

Page Break

Q13.16 [Case 6]

Hypothetically, assume that the following two proposals have been proposed for the new deployment of F-35 fighter jets. Which plan do you support better? Even if you can't say for sure which one you support, choose one or the other, or dare I say which you support.

Plan Plan **A** Plan Plan **B** $\{e://Field/A-6-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-1-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-2-1\}$ $\{e://Field /A-6-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-1-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-2-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-1-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-2-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-1-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-2-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-5\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-1-5\}$ $\{e://Field/A-6-2-5\}$



Q13.17

Which do you support?

☐ Plan A (1)

☐ Plan B (2)

Page Break

Q13.18 [Case 7]

Hypothetically, suppose that the following two proposals have been proposed for the new deployment of F-35 fighter jets. Which plan do you support better? Even if you can't say for sure which one you support, choose one or the other, or dare I say which you support.

Plan Plan **A** Plan Plan **B** $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-1\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-1-1\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-2-1\}$ $\$ \{e://Field /A-7-2\}$
 $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-1-2\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-2-2\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-3\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-1-3\}$ $\$ \{ e//Field/A-7-2-3\}$
 $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-4\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-1-4\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-2-4\}$ $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-5\}$ $\$ \{ e//Field/A-7-1-5\}$
 $\$ \{e://Field/A-7-2-5\}$



Q13.19

Which do you support?

☐ Plan A (1)

☐ Plan B (2)

Page Break

Q13.20 [Case 8]

Hypothetically, it is assumed that the following two proposals have been proposed for the new deployment of F-35 fighter jets. Which plan do you support better? Even if you can't say for sure which one you support, choose one or the other, or dare I say which you support. Plan

Proposal A Plan **Plan B** $\{e://Field/A-1-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-1-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-2-1\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-1-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-2-2\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-1-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-2-3\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-1-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-2-4\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-5\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-1-5\}$ $\{e://Field/A-1-2-5\}$



Q13.21

Which do you support?

☐ Plan A (1)

☐ Plan B (2)

Page Break

End of Block: Conjoint Analysis

Start of Block: US-Japan relations and US-base issues - intro

Q14.1 Thank you. Now, please answer your questions about the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and U.S. military bases in Japan.

Page Break

Q15.1 Please read the following newspaper articles carefully before answering some questions.

Q15.2 Foreign Minister Hayashi "The U.S. military may be a factor."

Spread of infection in municipalities surrounding U.S. military facilities 19:57, 13 January 2022 (UTC)

Regarding the infection situation of the new coronavirus in the vicinity of the facility area of the U.S. Army in Japan, Foreign Minister Hayashi stated, "We cannot deny the possibility that the infection situation in the U.S. military is one of the factors of the spread of infection in neighboring municipalities," and expressed his intention to continue to urge the U.S. side to thoroughly implement infection control measures.

Regarding the spread of new coronavirus infections in Okinawa Prefecture and Yamaguchi Prefecture in the facility areas of the U.S. Army in Japan, criticism has been issued such as "It is caused by the spread of infection within the U.S. Army in Japan."

In response to this, Foreign Minister Hayashi said at a press conference at the Japan Press Club, "We take the spread of infection very seriously. We cannot deny the possibility that the infection situation in the area of the U.S. military facility is one of the factors contributing to the spread of infection in the surrounding municipalities."



Q15.3 How much do you agree or disagree with the opinion that the U.S. military is responsible for failing to take proper quarantine measures to spread the Omicron strain to Japan?

- ☐ Agree (1)
- ☐ If anything, yes (2)
- ☐ Neither (3)
- ☐ Somewhat against (4)
- ☐ Oppose (5)

Q15.4 Please feel free to write your thoughts on the opinion that the U.S. military is responsible for spreading the Omicron strain to Japan.

Page Break

Q16.1 The following is one opinion on the historical experience of Okinawa.

Q16.2 "The people of Okinawa were treated unfairly for [\\$e://Field/opinion.](#)"



Q16.3 How much do you agree with or disagree with this opinion?

- ☐ Agree (1)
 - ☐ If anything, yes (2)
 - ☐ Neither (3)
 - ☐ Somewhat against (4)
 - ☐ Oppose (5)
-

Q16.4 Please feel free to write your thoughts on this opinion.

End of Block: Historical statement

Start of Block: The Okinawa Survey



Q17.1 Japan currently has a security treaty with the United States, but do you think this Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is useful for peace and security in Japan, or is it not useful?

- ☐ Helpful (1)
- ☐ Somewhat helpful (2)
- ☐ Somewhat unhelpful (3)
- ☐ Not Helpful (4)
- ☐ Not sure (5)

Page Break



Q18.1 How important do you think the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty that Japan has with the United States is for peace and security in Japan?

- ☐ Very Important (1)
- ☐ Somewhat important (2)
- ☐ Not Significant (3)
- ☐ Not important at all (4)
- ☐ Not sure (5)



Q19.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the opinion that "Okinawa bears an unequal proportion of the burden of U.S. military bases in Japan"?

- ☐ Agree (1)
- ☐ If anything, yes (2)
- ☐ Neither (3)
- ☐ Somewhat against (4)
- ☐ Oppose (5)



Q20.1 Have you ever participated in or will participate in any of the following activities? Select all that apply.

- ☐ Participation in organizations that raise public awareness of issues related to U.S. military bases (1)
- ☐ Participation in protests (demonstrations and marches) against U.S. military bases (2)
- ☐ Signing a petition on some issue related to U.S. military bases (for example, opposition to the relocation of Futenma Air Station in Okinawa to Henoko) (3)
- ☐ Complaining to municipalities and prefectures about any problem with U.S. military bases (for example, noise problems associated with air training) (4)
- ☐ N/A (5)



Q21.1 Have you ever had any of the following contacts with U.S. troops stationed in Japan?
Select all that apply.

- ☐ Meet U.S. Army Personnel in Your Area (1)
- ☐ Visiting U.S. military bases for events such as base festivals and open houses (2)
- ☐ Attend informational events on U.S. military bases in your area (3)
- ☐ Have a conversation with a U.S. military person for more than 5 minutes (4)
- ☐ Working at U.S. Military Bases (5)
- ☐ Work for a company close to a U.S. military base, or a U.S. military person becomes a customer of your work (6)
- ☐ Have a close relationship with a U.S. military personnel (for example, become friends or lovers) (7)
- ☐ U.S. Army Men in Family (8)
- ☐ N/A (9)

End of Block: US bases - Question 2

Start of Block: Final open-ended question

Q22.1 Feel free to write your thoughts about U.S. forces in Japan (U.S. troops stationed in Japan).

Page Break

End of Block: Final open-ended question

Start of Block: Debriefing - treated.

Q23.1 Finally, please tell us if you have any comments about this survey. Please feel free to enter in the blank field below. If there is nothing, please write "nothing".

Q23.2 **【Note】** This survey is for the purpose of academic research and is not intended to examine support or disapproval of a specific candidate or political party. Researchers conducting surveys are not affiliated with any particular political party or politically sponsored organization, and do not receive any funding from such organizations.

During the survey, you read a newspaper article, but this is the actual article that was published on NHK's website on January 13, 2022.

If you have any questions or concerns, please email yusaku.horiuchi@dartmouth.edu, cwillis@albany.edu or togo@waseda.jp.

【Important】 In order to record on the system that your participation in the survey is completed, please be sure to press the button of "Complete the survey".

Page Break

End of Block: Debriefing - treated.

Start of Block: Debriefing - control

Q24.1 Finally, please tell us if you have any comments about this survey. Please feel free to enter in the blank field below. If there is nothing, please write "nothing".

Q24.2 **【Note】** This survey is for academic research purposes only and is not intended to examine support or disapproval of specific candidates or political parties. Researchers conducting research are not affiliated with any particular political party or politically sponsored organization, and do not receive any funding from such organizations. If you have any questions or concerns, please use yusaku.horiuchi@dartmouth.edu, cwillis@albany.edu or tago@waseda.jp.

【Important】 In order to record on the system that your participation in the survey is completed, please be sure to press the button of "Complete the survey".

Page Break

End of Block: Debriefing - control

Interviewees

Below are brief descriptions of the interviewees and the locations of the interviews. Some interviews took place in-country; others happened over the phone or Zoom. The interviewees are anonymous except for former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, from whom I received permission to use his name. Please note that activists' group affiliations are not included to preserve their anonymity.

Japan

Interviews for the Japan portion of the project were conducted between July 2019 and June 2023.

- Activists
 - July 14, 2019: an activist and scholar living in Tokyo who works at a policy think-tank and advocates for the reduction of US bases in Okinawa. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2019. I conducted a follow-up interview in Japan on June 28, 2022.
 - July 19, 2019: an activist and scholar from Tokyo and living in Canada. They have extensively studied and written about base politics in Okinawa. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2019.
 - July 27, 2019: an Okinawan activist and professor who has focused on the environmental aspects of anti-US-military activism in Okinawa. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2019.
 - July 31, 2019: an Okinawan activist and professor who is a key figure in environmental activism against the Henoko construction project. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2019.
 - August 5, 2019: an Okinawan activist focused on the indigenous rights aspect of the anti-US-military movement in Okinawa. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2019.
 - August 13, 2019: an activist and scientist based in Tokyo who studies the environmental impacts of the Henoko construction project in Okinawa. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2019.
 - November 29, 2020: an Okinawan activist involved in several different groups, some explicitly focused on issues related to the US bases in Okinawa and others

about preserving Okinawan history. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2020.

- May 13, 2022: an activist living in Tokyo involved in anti-US-military activism around Tokyo, in Okinawa, and in host communities outside Japan. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2022.
- May 26, 2022: an activist and lawyer from Yokosuka who has been a key figure in anti-US-military activism against CFA Yokosuka for decades. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
- June 4, 2022: a leader of one of the peace groups based in Tokyo involved in anti-US-military activism. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
- June 10, 2022: a key figure in Okinawan anti-US-military activism who has been involved for decades. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2022.
- June 17, 2022: two members of a women's rights organization in Tokyo that sometimes engages in anti-US-military activism. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
- June 19, 2022: an Okinawan activist and graduate student who is a central figure in anti-US-military activism. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2022.
- June 28, 2022: an activist and lawyer living in Tokyo whose grandparents immigrated to Tokyo from Okinawa. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2022.
- June 30, 2022: a leader of a major organization in Tokyo that sometimes engages in anti-US-military activism or supports others' efforts. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2022.
- October 16, 2022: an activist from Yokosuka who is a member of various organizations involved in anti-US-military activism, including some of the larger organizations in Tokyo. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
- October 29, 2022: an activist from Yokota who is a member of various organizations involved in anti-US-military activism, including some of the larger organizations in Tokyo. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
- November 18, 2022: an activist from Yokosuka (currently living closer to Tokyo) involved in a variety of organizations concerned with CFA Yokosuka, especially

anti-war and anti-nuclear issues. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.

- December 5, 2022: an activist originally from mainland Japan, now living in Okinawa. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
- US Military Personnel
 - July 16, 2019: a public affairs officer from AFB Yokota. This interview was conducted over the phone while I was in Japan in 2019.
 - June 15, 2022: a public affairs officer from CFA Yokosuka who had previously been stationed at various other US bases in the Asia-Pacific, including one in Okinawa. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2022.
 - August 31, 2022: a retired US naval officer stationed in Yokosuka in the 1990s. The interviewee responded to questions over email.
- Politicians
 - July 25, 2019: a representative from the Okinawa prefectural government. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2019.
 - July 25, 2019: an Okinawan politician who opposes the Henoko construction. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2019.
 - June 1, 2022: Yokosuka city officials. The interviewees responded to questions over email.
 - June 13, 2022: a politician from the Japanese Communist Party, which has traditionally supported the anti-US-military cause. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
 - June 27, 2022: former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2022.
 - June 15, 2023: an Okinawan politician who opposes the Henoko construction and a former mayor of Nago City. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2023. I asked follow-up questions via email.
- Media
 - July 22, 2019: a journalist from an Okinawan newspaper. This interview was conducted in Japan in 2019.

- July 29, 2019: a journalist from an Okinawan newspaper. The interviewee responded to questions over email.
- Scholars and Other Interviewees
 - October 25, 2020: a US-based scholar who has conducted extensive field research in Okinawa about base politics. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2020.
 - May 20, 2022: a former naval officer (previously stationed in Yokosuka) and member of the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS) executive board. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.

South Korea

Interviews for the South Korea portion of the project were conducted between August 2021 and April 2023.

- Activists
 - August 5, 2021: a Korean activist from Seoul who is a member of a major national organization involved in anti-US-military activism. They were involved with the movement against the Jeju Naval Base. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2021.
 - August 11, 2021: two key figures in the movement against the Jeju Naval Base. One is originally from the US and the other is from Seoul. This interview was conducted in South Korea in 2021. I emailed the American activist follow-up questions in 2023.
 - September 7, 2021: a Korean activist from Seoul who is a member of a major national organization involved in anti-US-military activism. They were involved with the movement against the Jeju Naval Base. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2021.
 - November 10, 2021: a Korean artist and graduate student who was involved in the movement against the Jeju Naval Base. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2021.
 - June 3, 2022: a Korean priest originally from Seoul who moved to Gangjeong Village in solidarity with the movement against the Jeju Naval Base. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.

- April 20, 2023: a Seoul-based activist who is a member of a major environmentally focused organization. This activist was involved in a variety of anti-US-military campaigns in Korea including those in Pyeongtaek and Jeju. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2023.
- April 24, 2023: an activist in Pyeongtaek who was involved in the movement against the expansion of Camp Humphreys. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2023.
- Military Personnel
 - September 1, 2021: a Korean naval officer and professor based in Seoul. This interview was conducted in South Korea in 2021.
- Media
 - September 7, 2021: a journalist from Jeju who covered the movement against the Jeju Naval Base. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2021.
 - February 10, 2022: a journalist from Jeju who covered the movement against the Jeju Naval Base. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
 - June 14, 2022: a journalist from Daegu who stated (over the phone) that there were few protests against the US bases there. They permitted me to use the rationale for why they refused to be interviewed about anti-US-military protests in Daegu.

Philippines

Interviews for the Philippines portion of the project were conducted between February 2019 and September 2022.

- Activists
 - February 13, 2019: a key figure in activism in the Philippines who has been involved with various causes since the 1970s, especially anti-nuclear, anti-war, and anti-US-base issues. This interview was conducted in the Philippines in 2019.
 - February 26, 2019: a leader of a women's rights group in Olongapo that focuses on the well-being of women, especially former sex workers, and the children of Filipinas and US soldiers ("Amerasians"). This interview was conducted in the Philippines in 2019.

- March 12, 2019: a key figure in activism in the Philippines who has been involved with various causes since the 1980s, especially anti-war, women's rights, and anti-US-base issues. This activist was especially involved in the movements against the VFA. This interview was conducted in the Philippines in 2019.
- December 1, 2020: a key figure in anti-US-military activism since the 1980s and a colleague of the activist interviewed on February 13, 2019. They are involved with various causes like anti-war and women's rights issues. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2020. I asked follow-up questions via email in 2022.
- August 16, 2022: an activist who participated in protests against the US bases in the late 1980s and was also involved in women's rights activism. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
- September 10, 2022: an activist who participated in protests against the US bases in the late 1980s. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
- September 30, 2022: an activist who participated in protests against the US bases in the late 1980s and was also involved in women's rights activism. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.
- US Military Personnel
 - January 14, 2021: a US military officer who was deployed to the Philippines in the VFA era. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2021.
 - January 29, 2021: a US military officer who was deployed to the Philippines, including Mindanao, in the VFA era. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2021.
- Politicians
 - March 5, 2019: a member of the "Magnificent Dozen" who voted not to continue the MBA. This interview was conducted in the Philippines in 2019.
- Scholars and Other Interviewees
 - March 6, 2019: a Filipino historian and college professor. This interview was conducted in the Philippines in 2019.
 - October 27, 2020: a Filipino scholar and college professor from Mindanao based in the US. They have studied public opinion of and protests against the US military in the Philippines. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2020.

- November 19, 2020: a Filipina scholar based in Mindanao who has studied the US's role in the region. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2020.
- August 10, 2022: a former activist, now a scholar, who was especially involved with the movements against the VFA. This interview was conducted over Zoom in 2022.

Field Notes

- July 2019, Okinawa: drove to the Henoko sit-in tent site and spoke to activists manning the tent.
- August 2021, Jeju: observed and participated in a protest against the Jeju Naval Base and spoke with other participants.
- August 2021, Daegu: observed USAG Camp Walker and the surrounding community.
- May 2022, Yokosuka: observed and participated in an anti-US-military protest and spoke with other participants.
- June 2022, Okinawa: observed and participated in anti-US-military rallies and protests in Henoko and Takae Villages. Additionally, observed MCAS Futenma in Ginowan City.

Appendix 2: Chapter 3: Identity, Historical Framing, and Anti-US-Military Activism in Japan




Figure A2.1: Protests in Japan, 2005-2018⁶⁴

⁶⁴ This data is derived from protest permit applications from the Japanese National Police Agency. The permits include protests of 2,000 or more potential protesters (as estimated by organizers). Shinomoto (2021) uses the same data.




Figure A2.2: Stacked Predicted Probability Plots of Treatment Group Membership and Opinions of the US-Japan Alliance, Both Surveys

	National Survey	Okinawa Survey	National Survey Alt	Okinawa Survey Alt
USCAR	0.2424** (0.1185)	-0.0305 (0.1946)	0.2123* (0.1177)	-0.0356 (0.1994)
WW2	0.1561 (0.1207)	-0.0677 (0.2109)	0.1270 (0.1193)	-0.3576* (0.2102)
Reversion	0.1554 (0.1191)	-0.2848 (0.1957)	-0.0837 (0.1162)	-0.1833 (0.1999)
Party	0.4342*** (0.0404)	0.4084*** (0.0689)	0.4223*** (0.0398)	0.3325*** (0.0690)
Gender	-0.5534*** (0.0770)	-0.4065*** (0.1309)	-0.4918*** (0.0759)	-0.3161** (0.1326)
Education	0.0030 (0.0280)	-0.0169 (0.0476)	-0.0395 (0.0279)	-0.0648 (0.0479)
Age	0.0111*** (0.0024)	-0.0014 (0.0056)	0.0054** (0.0024)	-0.0082 (0.0057)
Income	0.0273 (0.0211)	0.0405 (0.0406)	0.0167 (0.0209)	-0.0096 (0.0406)
1 2	-1.9653*** (0.2007)	-1.8061*** (0.3434)	-3.1073*** (0.2115)	-3.3136*** (0.3673)
2 3	-0.6512*** (0.1915)	-0.4695 (0.3365)	-1.5211*** (0.1919)	-1.8127*** (0.3490)
3 4	1.9466*** (0.1954)	1.7763*** (0.3433)	1.2008*** (0.1908)	0.6087* (0.3432)
AIC	5958.9109	2273.3201	5816.4351	2147.1817
BIC	6023.9958	2326.2438	5881.9795	2200.4042
Log Likelihood	-2968.4554	-1125.6601	-2897.2176	-1062.5909
Deviance	5936.9109	2251.3201	5794.4351	2125.1817
Num. obs.	2743	908	2860	933

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table A2.1: Frame Exposure and Opinion of US-Japan Security Alliance, Alternate Specifications (Ordered Logit)

The first two models appear in Chapter 3 while the last two models include alternate specifications of the dependent variable, respondents' opinions of the US-Japan security alliance. This question asked respondents "How important do you think the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty that Japan has with the United States is for peace and security in Japan?" Respondents could answer from "not very important" (1) to "very important" (5). This alternative specification suggests that the finding that exposure to the USCAR frame is associated with more positive opinions of the US-Japan security treaty are robust.

Statement	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither	Somewhat Agree	Agree
<i>Battle of Okinawa</i>	4.51%	3.94%	40.85%	30.14%	20.56%
<i>USCAR</i>	3.95%	6.21%	44.07%	28.25%	17.51%
<i>Reversion</i>	5.62%	8.43%	53.93%	22.75%	9.27%

Table A2.2: Agreement with Historical Statements by Percentage (National Survey)

Statement	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither	Somewhat Agree	Agree
<i>Battle of Okinawa</i>	6.03%	3.45%	28.44%	30.17%	31.9%
<i>USCAR</i>	4.31%	9.48%	38.79%	21.55%	25.86%
<i>Reversion</i>	0.83%	5.79%	39.67%	23.14%	30.57%

Table A2.3: Agreement with Historical Statements by Percentage (Okinawa Survey)




Figure A2.3: Bar Graph of Respondents' Levels of Anti-US-Military Activism (National Survey)




Figure A2.4: Bar Graph of Respondents' Levels of Anti-US-Military Activism (Okinawa Survey)




Figure A2.5: Predicted Probability Plots of *Hist. Frame* for Levels of *Activism*, National Survey USCAR Treatment Group




Figure A2.6: Predicted Probability Plots of *Hist. Frame* for Levels of *Activism*, National Survey Battle of Okinawa Treatment Group




Figure A2.7: Predicted Probability Plots of *Hist. Frame* for Levels of *Activism*, National Survey Reversion Treatment Group




Figure A2.8: Predicted Probability Plots of *Hist. Frame* for Levels of *Activism*, Okinawa Survey USCAR Treatment Group




Figure A2.9: Predicted Probability Plots of *Hist. Frame* for Levels of *Activism*, Okinawa Survey Battle of Okinawa Treatment Group




Figure A2.10: Predicted Probability Plots of *Hist. Frame* for Levels of *Activism*, Okinawa Survey Reversion Treatment Group

Appendix 3: Chapter 4: Friends or Foes? Local Governments and the US Military in Japan

	Alliance (National)	Alliance (Okinawa)	Troops in Japan (National)	Troops in Japan (Okinawa)
Festival	0.1097 (0.1480)	0.5720 ^{***} (0.1413)	0.2980 [*] (0.1527)	0.4286 ^{***} (0.1318)
Employment	-0.5091 ^{**} (0.2499)	-0.0468 (0.1730)	0.2341 (0.2616)	0.3763 ^{**} (0.1622)
Party	0.4243 ^{***} (0.0398)	0.3180 ^{***} (0.0689)	0.3418 ^{***} (0.0406)	0.5271 ^{***} (0.0648)
Gender	-0.4996 ^{***} (0.0759)	-0.3286 ^{**} (0.1327)	-0.4937 ^{***} (0.0777)	-0.1391 (0.1204)
Education	-0.0408 (0.0279)	-0.0769 (0.0480)	-0.0765 ^{***} (0.0282)	-0.1672 ^{***} (0.0438)
Age	0.0052 ^{**} (0.0024)	-0.0092 (0.0058)	-0.0034 (0.0024)	-0.0239 ^{***} (0.0053)
Income	0.0167 (0.0209)	-0.0245 (0.0407)	0.0305 (0.0212)	0.0345 (0.0372)
1 2	-3.1573 ^{***} (0.2096)	-3.2617 ^{***} (0.3657)	-3.1749 ^{***} (0.2013)	-2.5986 ^{***} (0.3218)
2 3	-1.5689 ^{***} (0.1896)	-1.7514 ^{***} (0.3473)	-1.7218 ^{***} (0.1892)	-1.4297 ^{***} (0.3132)
3 4	1.1527 ^{***} (0.1882)	0.6975 ^{**} (0.3421)	1.2713 ^{***} (0.1877)	0.3612 (0.3117)
5 6			2.9007 ^{***} (0.2021)	1.8818 ^{***} (0.3306)
AIC	5815.0518	2131.8968	6583.9768	2893.6413
BIC	5874.6376	2180.2808	6649.7118	2947.7904
Log Likelihood	-2897.5259	-1055.9484	-3280.9884	-1435.8207
Deviance	5795.0518	2111.8968	6561.9768	2871.6413
Num. obs.	2860	933	2910	1015

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1

Table A3.1: Festivals, Employment, and Opinions of the US Military in Japan, Alternate Specifications (Ordered Logit)




Figure A3.1: Stacked Predicted Probability Plots of Base Festival Attendance, Opinions of the US-Japan Alliance (Top), and US Troops in One's Community (Bottom), Both Surveys




Figure A3.2: Stacked Predicted Probability Plots of Base-Related Employment, Opinions of the US-Japan Alliance (Top), and US Troops in One's Community (Bottom), Both Surveys




Figure A3.4: Predicted Probability Plots of *Festival* for Levels of *Activism*, National Survey



Figure A3.5: Predicted Probability Plots of *Employment* for Levels of *Activism*, National Survey



Figure A3.6: Predicted Probability Plots of *Festival* for Levels of *Activism*, Okinawa Survey



Figure A3.7: Predicted Probability Plots of *Employment* for Levels of *Activism*, Okinawa Survey

Appendix 4: Out of Sight, Out of Mind: National-Level Anti-US-Military Activism in the Philippines




Figure A4.1: Number of US Troops in the Philippines per Year, 1987-2016